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This dissertation brings a visual culture and queer studies approach to the study of 
cinema’s role in discourses of belonging in Israel and Occupied Palestine. I argue that cinema 
and racialized discourses of gender, sexuality and ethno-nationalism play a key role in the denial 
of Palestinian belonging. I begin by arguing that ongoing Palestinian dispossession remains 
largely unrecognizable in the dominant North American and European imagination of Palestine 
in part due to what became a recognizable and inevitable narrative of Palestine as a Jewish 
national homeland. Revealing the extra-Zionist routes of early Jewish Agency propaganda films, 
for example, I detach them from reigning progress narratives in Israeli transnational film studies, 
and explore their implication in a broader visual culture that promoted exclusive Jewish national 
belonging in Historic Palestine. Through an analysis of painting, landscape imagery, and 
settlement architecture, including the early Wall and Tower design of the 1930s settlements and 
their continued logic in the architectures of occupation today, I place cinema in this larger visual 
and architectural context of what I call Cinematic Occupation, emphasizing its diverse 
enlistments in occupation and in the denial of Palestinian belonging. I show how Israeli 
nationalism reiterates an overly stable, demographically regulated, and militarized sense of 
home, while a trope of unsettled homes in Palestinian cinema suggests the possibility of 
persisting in an attachment to “Palestine” without stable foundations. Underscoring how 
Palestinians have maintained a sense of belonging—to Palestine, to a broader Palestinian 
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collectivity—without recourse to dominant narratives of national identity, I argue for a model of 
solidarity that attends to constrained forms of belonging. In this way, I align my work with recent 
queer studies work on racialized forms of state, military, and administrative violence, including, 
but not limited to, those that have an obvious relation to issues of gender and sexual diversity. 
Ultimately, I argue that dominant Zionist and Israeli narratives about the illegitimacy of 
Palestinian belonging have benefited from the logic that cinema is a source of visual proof, and I 
explore alternative models in contemporary Palestinian cinematic practice for thinking about 
cinema’s potential and limits. 
 
 
   vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  ........................................................................................................................................	  VI	  
LIST	  OF	  FIGURES	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  VIII	  
PREFACE	  ................................................................................................................................................................	  IX	  
1.0	   INTRODUCTION	  .........................................................................................................................................	  1	  
1.1	   SHIFTING	  TERMS	  .......................................................................................................................................	  8	  
2.0	   CHAPTER	  ONE:	  NATIONAL	  INTELLIGIBILITY	  AND	  QUEERNESS	  IN	  HISTORIC	  AND	  
OCCUPIED	  PALESTINE	  .....................................................................................................................................	  17	  
2.1	   “UNRECOGNIZED”	  PALESTINE:	  FRAMES	  OF	  REFERENCE	  FOR	  PALESTINIAN	  AND	  ISRAELI	  
CINEMA	  STUDIES	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  17	  
2.2	   “BUT	  WHY	  THE	  CINEMA?”	  ....................................................................................................................	  45	  
2.3	   CINEMA’S	  EXPANSE	  ................................................................................................................................	  56	  
2.4	   WHAT’S	  QUEER	  ABOUT…?:	  QUEER	  RELATIONALITY	  AND	  CRITIQUE	  ....................................	  63	  
3.0	   CHAPTER	  TWO:	  ZIONIST	  “PALESTINE	  FILMS”	  AND	  THE	  SETTLING	  OF	  A	  JEWISH	  
NATIONAL	  HOME	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  80	  
3.1	   “PALESTINE	  FILMS”	  AND	  CINEMATIC	  ZIONISM	  .............................................................................	  83	  
3.2	   “AT	  ONCE	  REMOTE	  AND	  NEAR—A	  PARTICULAR	  PALESTINIAN	  PROBLEM”	  ........................	  96	  
   vii 
3.3	   SABRAS	  BLOOMING	  (IN)	  THE	  ARID	  WASTELAND	  ......................................................................	  111	  
4.0	   CHAPTER	  THREE:	  CINEMATIC	  OCCUPATION	  ..............................................................................	  134	  
4.1	   THE	  TOWER	  AND	  THE	  VERTICAL	  IMAGE	  ......................................................................................	  145	  
4.2	   THE	  WALL	  AND	  THE	  HORIZONTAL	  IMAGE	  ...................................................................................	  159	  
4.3	   CINEMATIC	  OCCUPATION	  ..................................................................................................................	  173	  
4.4	   QUEER	  CINEMATIC	  OCCUPATION	  ....................................................................................................	  179	  
5.0	   CHAPTER	  FOUR:	  PALESTINIAN	  CINEMA	  AND	  QUEER	  PALESTINIAN	  ALLIANCE	  ..............	  190	  
5.1	   HOUSING	  IMAGES	  .................................................................................................................................	  190	  
5.2	   PALESTINIAN	  UNBELONGING	  ...........................................................................................................	  199	  
5.3	   INHABITING	  RESISTANCE:	  WHAT	  CAN	  CINEMA	  DO?	  .................................................................	  213	  
5.4	   QUEER	  PALESTINIAN	  ALLIANCE	  ......................................................................................................	  225	  
6.0	   CONCLUSION	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  235	  
APPENDIX	  A:	  LIST	  OF	  FIGURES	  ...................................................................................................................	  243	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	  ................................................................................................................................................	  245	  
   viii 
 LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE	  1	  “BARREN	  WILDERNESS,”	  BUILT	  IN	  DAY	  (1938),	  PRODUCED	  BY	  THE	  KEREN	  
HAYESOD	  (UNITED	  ISRAEL	  APPEAL).	  SCREENSHOT	  TAKEN	  BY	  THE	  AUTHOR	  FROM	  THE	  
ONLINE	  HOLDING	  IN	  THE	  VIRTUAL	  CATALOGUE	  OF	  THE	  STEVEN	  SPIELBERG	  JEWISH	  FILM	  
ARCHIVE.	  ............................................................................................................................................................	  235	  
FIGURE	  2	  NETWORK	  OF	  SETTLEMENTS	  MAP,	  FROM	  BUILT	  IN	  A	  DAY	  (1938),	  PRODUCED	  BY	  
THE	  KEREN	  HAYESOD	  (UNITED	  ISRAEL	  APPEAL).	  SCREENSHOT	  TAKEN	  BY	  THE	  AUTHOR	  
FROM	  THE	  ONLINE	  HOLDING	  IN	  THE	  VIRTUAL	  CATALOGUE	  OF	  THE	  STEVEN	  SPIELBERG	  
JEWISH	  FILM	  ARCHIVE.	  .................................................................................................................................	  236	  
FIGURE	  3	  SURVEILLANCE	  IMAGES	  (BINOCULARS,	  WATCHTOWER),	  FROM	  BEHIND	  THE	  
BLOCKADE	  (1947),	  PRODUCED	  BY	  THE	  JEWISH	  NATIONAL	  FUND.	  SCREENSHOT	  TAKEN	  BY	  
THE	  AUTHOR	  FROM	  THE	  ONLINE	  HOLDING	  IN	  THE	  VIRTUAL	  CATALOGUE	  OF	  THE	  STEVEN	  
SPIELBERG	  JEWISH	  FILM	  ARCHIVE.	  ..........................................................................................................	  236
   ix 
PREFACE 
 
My parents, Steve and Catherine Jankovic, deserve the first acknowledgement for their 
encouragement, their intellectual curiosity and generosity, and the sacrifices they must have 
made—though have never held over me—to put me through college. I owe a certain “pesky” 
critical approach to academic, activist, and creative work to the fact of being the middle child 
between my incredibly smart and witty siblings, Steve and Lauren. For all the times Lauren came 
to my rescue in college because I, exasperated, desperately needed her help to finish an elaborate 
photography or video project, I wonder how I managed graduate school without her nearby. I 
owe so much of my everyday joy to my “other family”—my great love, the dependable Oliver 
Haimson, and the always-classy Joseph Hall. 
Colleagues and friends in the English Department at the University of Pittsburgh created 
a challenging intellectual space that shaped the contours of my research, teaching, and critical 
sensibilities. I am especially grateful to my adviser and committee chair Neepa Majumdar, who 
helped me through many difficult decisions and a few uncomfortable situations with unfailing 
advice and constant encouragement. She has advocated for me, set the bar high, and then 
reminded me to celebrate my successes when they came along. Mark Lynn Anderson has always 
challenged me to take sides and flirt with failure, and has sometimes inspired me to wear one of 
my antique broaches to match his own.  I also want to thank Troy Boone, who has been a reliable 
   x 
and essential member of my committee, even if he ended up there by an ultimately happy 
accident. I owe Todd Reeser gratitude for shaping my work in queer studies, and for his 
wonderful taste in masculine creatures—specifically Tom McWhorter and Simon the cat. I owe 
thanks to fellow grads that supported me, and my work, since day one, especially Katherine 
Kidd, Kristen Fallica, and Ryan Pierson.  Memorable conversations with Nadia Yaqub, Victoria 
Moufawad-Paul, and Sobhi al-Zobaidi inspired, shaped, and sometimes re-routed my thinking, 
and I am grateful also to Patricia White for organizing two important panels. Thanks to others 
who helped get me here; including Amy Cornell, Adam DeKraker, Ed Gubar, Joan Hawkins, 
Nadav Hochman, Evelyn Jankovic, Patricia Kambitsch, John, Liz and Dan Landis, Raz 
Schwartz, and Anne Wingate. 
Without the friendship of Haneen Maikey and Nadia Awad especially, I would not have 
been able to maintain my sense of doing something important and worthwhile. I’ve learned so 
much about collaboration, solidarity, and hard work from both of them. Haneen, as Director of 
alQaws for Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society and member of Palestinian 
Queers for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, is likely the hardest working, most resilient, and 
brilliant activist and thinker I will ever know, and I hope we continue our collaboration and 
friendship even if there are no more “interim” reports to write. Many thanks to the fiercely 
critical, sensitive, creative, and dedicated Nadia, who, although I thought I lost her one cold night 
in Ramallah, somehow managed to persevere with a documentary film project faced with 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles at every turn (was it the pomegranate juice?).  
My research trips were facilitated by the financial support of the Women’s Studies 
Program and English Department at the University of Pittsburgh, the Northeast Modern 
Language Association, as well as an Andrew Mellon Pre-doctoral Fellowship and a University of 
   xi 
Pittsburgh Cultural Studies Fellowship. I am grateful to helpful staff at the Tel Aviv 
Cinematheque library, the Jerusalem Cinematheque Archive, the Lew and Edie Wasserman 
library, Third Ear Records, the Palestinian American Research Center, the A.M. Qattan 
Foundation Library (especially Azmi). I am especially grateful to hospitality and kindness of the 
women of Shashat Palestinian Women’s Filmmaking, especially director Alia Arasoughly, and 
the cheerful staff who spoiled me each day with coffee and grapes. Thanks also to the hospitality 
of Dan Chyutin and his family, and to Juliana Weber. 
As grateful as I am to all of these people, any mistakes within this dissertation are mine 
alone. 
 
 
 
 
   1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Unraveling the layers of meaning implied by awdah—the Arabic term for “return,” as in the 
“right of return” historically denied to diasporic Palestinians—Edward Said invokes the lost 
Palestinian house when he writes: “all of us speak of awdah, ‘return,’ but do we mean that 
literally, or do we mean ‘we must restore ourselves to ourselves’? The latter is the real point, I 
think, although I know many Palestinians who want their houses and their way of life back, 
exactly. But is there any place that fits us, together with our accumulated memories and 
experiences? Do we exist? What proof do we have?”1 In this quote the house represents the 
concrete elements of Palestinian dispossession: the keys, photographs, and deeds still held onto 
from the many houses razed, abandoned, and stolen when armed Zionist groups forced over 
700,000 Palestinians from their land in 1948. In Palestinian literature, poetry, and other kinds of 
artistic and cultural production, in addition to private, public, and political discourse, the house 
figures as both a symbol for a lost homeland and “way of life,” as well as a concrete site of 
ongoing dispossession. Yet, Said draws our attention to his “real point” in invoking awdah—a 
question regarding less literal senses of collective Palestinian identity. He questions whether the 
notion of return is misplaced—or, rather, he wonders whether return is too closely tied to place, 
when there may not be “any place that fits [Palestinian]…accumulated memories and 
experiences.”  
                                                
1 Edward Said, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 33. 
   2 
From this questionable location for Palestinian identity, Said introduces a more clearly 
existential concern that for Palestinians is not a playfully philosophical one, but rather an 
inescapable historical echo—“Do we exist? What proof do we have?” The question do we exist? 
summons the infamous phrase associated with Zionism: “A place without a people for a people 
without a place.” As the fourth prime minister of Israel, in 1969 Golda Meir infamously echoed 
this phrase again in another iteration—simply, “there were no such thing as Palestinians…they 
did not exist.”2 In yet another form, in the context of the post-1967 Palestinian national struggle, 
revolutionary filmmaker Mustafa Abu Ali titled his 1974 film depicting the lives and struggles of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan They Do Not Exist (I return to this film in Chapter 4). 
Neither Abu Ali nor Said choose a simple counter-claim to this dominant frame of denying 
Palestinian existence. While Abu Ali’s title over-identifies with Meir and hegemonic Zionism, 
Said dwells on it as a question. Varying degrees of reluctance to settle on an affirmative—yes, 
we exist—can be found throughout Palestinian literary, political and cultural history, 
emphasizing both a deep skepticism concerning representational routes to reparative history, as 
well as what seems a concern to find the “place that fits us” that would include a largely 
dispersed people.  
This dissertation is particularly interested in investigating cinema’s complex role in 
relation to the question of forms of Palestinian claims to selfhood, belonging, and historical 
memory. There are of course many differences in cinema’s role in Palestinian history during 
diverse political moments, in varying cultural and geopolitical contexts, as well as in differing 
modes of address to various local and global audiences. In the post-Oslo context, for instance, a 
                                                
2 The Sunday Times (London), June 15, 1969, 15. For a discussion of Meir’s statement in relation 
to the formation of Palestinian identity, see Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The 
Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
147. 
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new influx of European funding supported and elicited particular forms of Palestinian expression 
over others, primarily those that supported the idea that some measure of peace had been 
achieved through the Oslo process. Furthermore, not all Palestinian cultural expression is as 
markedly self-questioning, and in such a post-modernist styled fashion, as Elia Suleiman’s films, 
for instance.  And yet, across cinematic genres and historical and political contexts, identity and 
cinema are continually posed as open questions in Palestinian cinema, and much like the 
questions asked by Said above, many Palestinian films suggest that cinema offers no simple or 
stable housing of Palestinian identity and history.  
Insofar as national identity, or the broader sense of belonging implied by being “a 
people,” tend to have strong ties to place—the homeland, the national landscape—“return” 
seems to offer a solution to the question of existence. Yet, Said emphasizes that awdah contains 
not just a response to a literal unsettling that has resulted from a loss of place, but an unsettling at 
the center of the definition of Palestinians as “a people.” That Palestinian collective identity has 
survived in many ways what would otherwise seem to be a fatal existential crisis suggests that 
there are forms of belonging that circumvent stable foundations and internationally recognized 
nation-state status. Out of necessity, Palestinians have often risked making claims to belonging 
through alternative routes—without houses, without a nation, without the certainty to say yes, we 
exist. In making this point, I do not mean to under-emphasize the ongoing existence and 
importance of discourses of belonging that rely on autochthony and nationalism, which place 
high value on “the homeland” in defining true belonging. I aim, rather, to better understand how 
Palestinian visual culture in particular, has maintained a sense of belonging—to Palestine, to a 
broader Palestinian collectivity—without access or recourse to dominant narratives of identity. I 
think that narratives of Palestinian belonging in Palestinian cinema have something to teach us 
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about how belonging functions affectively and materially in relation to its most dominant and 
powerful structures like the nation and the family. There are many ways in which we can be 
made to feel the mark of not belonging—whether through restricted access to citizenship or 
through cultural discourses of racialization, sexism, and so on.  Yet, there are also ways to still 
articulate and feel a sense of belonging—to some place or some group—even in those cases 
when it is denied or constrained.  
And what of the question of proof? If the house serves to some extent as the proof of 
stable identity, literally grounded in place, then various kinds of un-housings bear a significant 
relation to both the question of identity and of proof. National identity, for instance, relies in 
many ways on state and institutional archives that collect, store, and disseminate what are often 
regarded as the officious evidence of dominant nationalist narratives. Given the massive amount 
of looting and dispossession of Palestinian private and public archives after 1948, and the 
continued restrictions on Palestinian life in Occupied Palestine and in the Diaspora, Palestinians 
have not always been able to point to recognizable and institutionally housed archives to confirm 
the legitimacy of their historical claims to existence. An Al Jazeera-produced documentary The 
Great Book Robbery, part of a larger project chronicling Palestinian “cultural destruction,” 
focuses in particular on how massive collections of books, some rare, were claimed by the Israeli 
state and placed as uncollected, “abandoned” property in state public libraries after 1948, 
underscoring how a Palestinian archive is in many ways un-locatable or unclaimed. The project’s 
website archives an ongoing list of the books using the Israeli National Library’s own catalogue, 
amassing a counter-archive for the books. This is one example of how, in many different 
locations and languages, various collections, research centers, anthologies and online repositories 
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serve as fragments of a more de-centralized and diffuse claim to historical memory for 
Palestinians.  
Said himself has suggested that cinema can serve in some sense as “the place that fits us” 
for Palestinians, yet Palestinian cinema itself has no officious and extensive physical archive to 
house the visual proof that cinema is seen to offer Palestinian collective memory, experience, 
and identity. Remarking specifically on the question of visibility, in the introduction to Dreams 
of Nation: On Palestinian Cinema, Said writes, “it became obvious to me that the relationship of 
Palestinians to the visible and the visual was deeply problematic,” and locates a “desire to be 
visible” in close relation to that same “early mobilizing phrase of Zionism” about an empty 
land.3 Said argues that Palestinian cinema represents a “collective identity”—a “visual 
alternative, a visual articulation, a visible incarnation of Palestinian existence.”4 Yet in that same 
introduction, Said recalls an anecdote from his book After the Last Sky, regarding the 
photographs of Jean Mohr commissioned for a 1983 United Nations International Conference on 
the Question of Palestine. While many of the papers commissioned for the conference were 
excluded, Mohr’s photographs were included but with truncated captions. Said explains: “ So 
there was a picture, for example, of a family, but instead of there being a label describing the 
family, what year the picture was taken, or what the family was doing there, the only 
identification allowed was ‘Gaza.”5 In this example, the problematic of visibility and visuality is 
demonstrated: the photographs were indeed exhibited, and yet the captions and the context of the 
conference provided a limited frame for the effects of that constrained “visibility.”   
                                                
3 Edward Said, preface to Dreams of a Nation: On Palestinian Cinema, ed. Hamid Dabashi, 
(London, New York: Verso, 2006), 2. 
4 Said, preface, 3. 
5 Said, preface, 3. 
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With cinema, Said seems more optimistic, perhaps appropriately for the introduction to 
the important collection and film festival that is Dreams of a Nation, and yet with this 
dissertation I want to return to Said’s hesitation around the question of proof and of visibility. I 
will argue in this dissertation that dominant Zionist and Israeli narratives about the non-existence 
or illegitimacy of Palestinian belonging in Historic and Occupied Palestine have benefited from 
the logic that cinema constitutes a source of visual proof. The evidence for this argument alone 
should caution against any overly optimistic notions about cinema’s potential to house 
Palestinian claims to existence and identity, and yet I also argue that this hesitance about cinema 
is a defining feature of Palestinian film practice itself. Following this questioning mode that 
declines to offer oppositional stances and counter-claims, this project must confront some rather 
taken-for-granted assumptions in film studies, particularly since a mode of critique following the 
logic of national representation has tended to dominate the study of cinema in the region, as I 
explain in Chapter 1. 
The house returns at different moments in this dissertation, and in some ways the house 
frames this dissertation’s conceptual approach precisely to serve as a reminder of the material 
conditions grounding any discussion of the possibilities afforded by the frames of analysis I turn 
to; primarily transnational film theory, visual culture studies, and queer theory. Besides serving 
as a symbol of lost homeland, of stolen family inheritance, of an unacknowledged dispossession 
and destruction, and of military penetration into the daily lives of Palestinians living in the 
Occupied Palestine, the house also offers through its concrete structure—as architecture—a way 
of looking at the world. The house is a powerful site for imagining boundaries between the 
personal and public, the national and the individual, and the formal organization of belonging as 
relying on stable foundations. For architecture theorist Beatriz Colomina, the “house is a device 
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to see the world” and  “a mechanism of viewing,” much like the cinema.6 This study looks at the 
house as a site of looking out onto the world, but also the house itself as an image captured in 
cinema, and by various forms of NGO, state, and military imaging. As the grounds for imagining 
national and regional ties, collective identity, and familial belonging, the house can also be a 
reminder of how discourses of identity and belonging often rely on a presumptive rigidity, which 
other theorizations often come along to expose as ultimately unstable, contested and always 
under construction, as it were.  Yet, this can lead to what I think is an unproductive and 
problematic dichotomy between perceived rigidity and flexibility. 
As an example, the movement away from conceptualizing the nation in overly stable 
terms, widely recognized through Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities,” 
marked new ways to think about nationalism and global and local forms of belonging. Yet today 
the once-progressive-seeming figuration of “imagined communities” resonates to a troubling 
degree with Newt Gingrich’s decidedly conservative comment, which gave new public voice to a 
rather taken for granted sentiment, that Palestinians are an “invented” people.7 Concerned about 
these movements from seemingly progressive theoretical framework to conservative uses, the 
notion of “ways of seeing” in visual culture studies serves as a powerful explanatory framework 
for this study’s focus on visuality, and yet is tempered by a close relation to the concrete 
                                                
6  Beatriz Colomina, Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture as Mass Media (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1996), 7. 
7 “Gingrich calls Palestinians an ‘invented’ people,” AlJazeera.com, December 10, 2011, 
accessed December 2, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/12/201112108493783540.html. See Benedict 
Anderson’s discussion of nations as “imagined communities” in Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). For a cinema-
specific expansion of Anderson’s ideas beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, see Andrew 
Higson, “The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema,” in Transnational Cinema: The Film 
Reader, eds. Elizabeth Ezra and Terry Rowden (London and New York: Routledge, 2006): 15-
25.   
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structures where power takes on the form of brute force. The house as a literal space of not only 
a kind of grounds for identity but a site of destruction, loss and occupation—as a location of 
intersecting power relations—for me mitigates a tempting tendency in transformative-leaning 
theoretical models, which sometimes seek too quickly to name spaces of possibility and 
resistance. I am interested in the ever-shifting process of who and what is afforded the 
recognition necessary to “count,” and where and how this takes place. This approach of 
concentrating on what now is being made to seem impossible, unthinkable, or wholly negative 
can still be said to have transformation as an ultimate goal, but works with a different strategy, 
one of a definite “taking of sides” but without the presumption of knowing in advance what the 
outcome of any particular strategy will be.  
1.1 SHIFTING TERMS 
Since I am interested in the question of why it has been so difficult to change the frame of 
reference around Palestinian dispossession, why it has largely remained unacknowledged or 
under-acknowledged even in the face of massive evidence, I want to address the question of what 
to call this “place” of which this project is concerned.  At the time when I began this project, or 
even before then when I surprised myself by bringing an issue I was concerned about in a 
political and personal sense into my graduate work, using the slashed “Palestine/Israel” or 
“Israel/Palestine” seemed like a kind of intervention. Using the term “Israel/Palestine” seemed 
like a way to emphasize the reality of military occupation and of Israeli control over the region 
by to some degree thwarting its regime of segregation and separation.  The phrase “Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories” for me was supporting a kind of normalization of the occupation without 
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naming it, and many still debated in the U.S. whether there was still an occupation, having 
believed in the myth of a transfer of authority to the Palestinians after Oslo.  At this time, it was 
much less common that “military occupation” was recognized as a descriptive and not just 
evaluative naming in US mainstream and even so-called progressive and alternative politics, not 
to mention in academic spaces. Using that slash seemed to me then a productive and critical way 
to draw immediate visual attention (in writing) to an under-acknowledged interdependence of 
Israeli and Palestinian society in the region, to insist on this mutuality as a method of 
approaching regional politics and not to let Israel-focused studies (including film) go about as if 
there was not an ongoing occupation, a siege in Gaza, an Apartheid infrastructure holding the 
occupation in place, and an unjust situation for Palestinians and other minorities in Israeli 
society. There were and still are ways that working on “Israeli film” can obscure these relations 
by, wittingly or not, relying on an internationally recognized status of statehood. A study with a 
Palestinian focus, on the other hand, even when one may prefer to leave the question of Israeli 
society aside for a moment, is often unable to contextualize its inquiry and research, nor to 
answer to questions about legitimacy. Is there a Palestinian cinema? Are there queer Palestinian 
organizations? Are you talking about “real” Palestinians or Palestinians with Israeli, U.S., 
European, etc. citizenship?—these are examples of the many familiar questions that emphasize 
that “Palestinian” does not carry the same kind of authoritative and settled (i.e. taken for granted) 
sense that “Israeli” does. “Israel” is recognizable for many, particularly in North America and 
Europe, and does not cause an immediate sense of questioning—of what configuration of the 
region and its peoples do you speak? Israel/Palestine or Palestine/Israel seemed like a way to 
quickly undermine a certain casual use of “Israel” in the academic, activist, and everyday 
contexts that I moved through. 
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Today that slashed use no longer feels like an intervention. In fact, it even seems 
anachronistic, as “Israel-Palestine” did and still does in some contexts. Only a few years ago, to 
write “Palestine/Israel” was to refuse to allow “Israel” to stand on its own, which would deny its 
reliance on an occupation of Palestinian society and the dispossession of Palestinian homes on 
the land that in part came to be called “Israel.” Today, “Palestine/Israel” seems like another lie, 
since it suggests that writing “Palestine” somehow erases the hard facts of occupation, of the 
siege and blockade of Gaza, of the total destruction of many Palestinian villages in 1948. There 
isn’t simply a “Palestine” with some kind of equal standing, no matter how constrained, to place 
aside Israel. And, to address the hybrid meaning suggested by “Palestine/Israel,” there is 
currently no just collaboration or co-existence that would warrant the naming of the region and 
retain both terms. To pretend that naming it such is somehow a reach toward some horizon of 
peace would be, I think, to fall into a neo-liberal trap (like post-feminist and post-racial 
discourse), that also seeks to “post-“ an acknowledgment of power relations still very much at 
work.  
In this project, I use “Historic and Occupied Palestine” to attempt to name the historical, 
material, and affective realities of the geo-political configuration, material place, and shifting 
idea invoked by “Palestine.” In this use, “Historic Palestine” refers primarily to the pre-1948 idea 
and place of Palestine, while “Occupied Palestine” refers quite broadly to the region covered by 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Israeli state. This is neither meant to be fully 
descriptive, nor is it meant to be prescriptive. In other words, Occupied Palestine is meant to 
acknowledge the changing reality of occupation and dispossession, which may cross official and 
de-facto borders. I try to reserve use of “Israel” to refer to state discourse and to the nation-state; 
yet for me this term ought not to be allowed to simply refer to a specific geographic location, 
   11 
since I believe that use performs a mundane yet brutal kind of violence by all it takes for granted 
in that naming. “Palestinian society,” as I use it here, refers to a broad, diasporic community, and 
I am careful to distinguish between discussing the dominant discourses of Jewish-Israeli 
belonging versus a term like “Israeli society,” which could be seen to refer to the many citizens 
and non-citizens (so both Jewish and non-Jewish citizens and non-citizens, non-citizen migrant 
workers, as well as Arab Jews, Bedouins, Arab-Palestinians, and others) understood to be a part 
of “Israeli society” through a neo-liberal multicultural frame. The very definition of the state as a 
Jewish democratic nation makes unwelcome the presence of those who supposedly make Israel 
“multicultural.”  
My rather loose use of identifying terminology in part is a response to the ways in which 
a precise classification of Palestinians according to location, citizenship status, permit status and 
ability to travel within and outside the region, diasporic location, multi-racial/ethnic or national 
identification, and so on, can often serve a discourse that seeks to fragment Palestinian society 
and deny coalitional possibilities and claims of belonging. The popular use of the term “Arab 
Israeli” for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship within dominant Israeli discourse is one example 
of this evacuating of Palestinian identity seen in part as a way to encourage assimilation into 
“Israeli” society through breaking ties with Palestinian culture and history. While acknowledging 
the differences in Palestinian experiences and status can be important, especially within 
Palestinian social movement work toward ending occupation, it also can run the risk in some 
contexts of supporting further dispossession of Palestinian collective identity.8 
                                                
8 I have had my own experience of a Jewish-Israeli scholar after a public talk seeking to 
“correct” my use of “Palestinian” as a term for filmmakers and cultural artifacts self-identified 
and widely recognized as Palestinian, since for this scholar the “proper” term would be “Arab 
Israeli.” “You have to be careful with these terms,” he cautioned. In part, my resistance to clear-
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It took some time for me to recognize that my aim in the work I was doing in relation to 
Historic and Occupied Palestine was primarily in response to what I argue is a problem of 
Palestinian unrecognizability, which is in part a kind of unquestioning non-recognition of 
Palestinians as a people whose lives matter, especially in North American academia, foreign 
policy, and dominant public discourse. The project became more clearly oriented toward 
Palestine, and Palestine as a particular kind of orientation. At the same time, I have come to see 
the “ground” I can affect some change in largely as the fields of study in which I can claim some 
stake in contributing to as a North American scholar; namely, transnational film studies, visual 
culture studies, and queer studies. It’s not my place to suggest I can claim other ground, and yet I 
have come to see my approach less as an intervention (i.e. a disciplinary intervention) than as 
interference. I think “intervention” risks overstating my power as a critic, and, perhaps more 
importantly, it sounds too much like “military intervention” or “humanitarian intervention,” 
neither of which has done much good for Palestinians. In a 1982 essay by Edward Said on the 
politics of interpretation, he argues that ought to we “work against the doctrine of non-
interference among fields.”9 Interference is necessary, he argues, since one function of 
disciplinary techniques is “to protect the coherence, the territorial integrity, the social identity of 
the field, its adherents and its institutional presence.”10  I like “interference” better than 
“intervention” because its messier, more trouble-making, less sure of itself, and because those 
are things I want to mess with. At stake in the type of interference Said calls for is “the recovery 
                                                                                                                                                       
cut definitions has to do with a refusal to follow that caution by responding to the sort of 
questions asked too frequently of Palestinians. 
9 Edward Said, “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community,” in The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Seattle: Bay Press, 1983), 136. 
10 Edward Said, “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community,” 141. 
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of a history hitherto either misrepresented or rendered invisible.”11 As the choice of 
“misrepresented” and “rendered invisible” already imply, Said argues that the “visual faculty” as 
he says, is the best tool for accomplishing this “great unsettlement in ways of seeing and 
doing.”12 Likewise, in the introduction to Dreams of a Nation: On Palestinian Cinema, a 
discipline-cohering book of sorts for Palestinian film studies, Said argues that Palestinian cinema 
represents a “collective identity”—a “visual alternative, a visual articulation, a visible 
incarnation of Palestinian existence.”13 It is on this point, again, that I depart from Said. I argue 
that across cinematic genres and historical and political contexts, identity and cinema are 
continually posed as open questions in Palestinian cinematic practice, emphasizing both a 
skepticism in visual routes toward repairing historical traumas, as well as a hesitance toward 
defining in any strict terms what it means to be Palestinian. 
In Chapter 1, “National Intelligibility and Queerness,” I map out a conceptual framework 
for exploring the twentieth-century creation of a Jewish national homeland discourse, which I 
argue went hand-in-hand with the projection of illegitimacy onto Palestine’s non-Jewish 
inhabitants. I show how dominant conventions in Palestinian and Israeli film studies, such as 
claims about national cinematic origins, archives, and representation, offer limited contexts for 
understanding the historical and cultural relevance of film practice and film analysis with regard 
to the problem of recognition and to a trend I trace through contemporary Palestinian cinema—
ranging from the short rather obscure documentary by Abdelsalam Shehadeh’s, Rainbow (2004) 
to the 2005 Oscar-nominated Paradise Now by Hani Abu-Asad—which explicitly and implicitly 
questions what cinema and nationalism offer toward political and social change. Through queer 
                                                
11 Edward Said, “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community,” 158. 
12 Edward Said, “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community,” 158. 
13 Edward Said, preface to Dreams of a Nation: On Palestinian Cinema, ed. Hamid Dabashi 
(London, New York: Verso, 2006), 3. 
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Palestinian activism and approaches to queer Israeli cinema, I explain the conceptual and 
political relevance of queer theory’s intersectional approach to gender, racialization, and 
sexuality for thinking about processes of recognition and national intelligibility. 
Interfering with Israeli film studies’ tendency to historicize early Zionist films as “pre-
state” Israeli cinema, which implies the state had already established a sense of inevitability, in 
Chapter 2, “Zionist ‘Palestine Films’ and the Making of a Jewish National Home,” I emphasize 
Zionist cinema’s fragmentation through examination of its history of collaborating with British 
Empire colonial and US Protestant Holy Land discourse, its role in funding settlement and state-
building, Zionist institutional disagreements over its ability to serve as a historical record of 
Jewish national homemaking, and its role in promoting the Sabra (the masculine figure of the 
New Muscle Jew and his pioneering effort) as a nationalist symbol. By examining contradictory 
discourses of visibility and disorientation evident in, for example, a visual confusion described 
by early Jewish immigrant artists and a critique of propaganda films by Zionist leader Vladimir 
Jabotinsky, I reveal how processes of transformation and contradiction played key roles in the 
formation of dominant Zionist configurations of Jewish belonging in Palestine. Furthermore, I 
suggest how the notion that the Palestinian landscape and Jewish identity had been “laid waste” 
during the Diaspora relied on racialized discourses of gender and sexuality that are not fully 
explained by the often-repeated analysis of Zionism as a masculinist and homophobic national 
project.   
Chapter 3, “Cinematic Occupation,” expands on the idea from Chapter 1 that cinema 
ought to be considered one of the tools of Zionist nation-building used to orientate Jewish 
nationalism in Palestine in particular ways by exploring cinematic aspects of the visual and 
spatial logics of occupation. I explore the dispersal of cinema and cinematic technology across 
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media and fields of visuality, from the various uses of cinematic and proto-cinematic technology 
in settlement and occupation architecture to examples of Palestinian and Israeli photography, 
film, and painting. I argue that two dominant tropes of the visual and spatial logics of the 
ongoing history of Israeli occupation, the wall and the tower, show formations of dominant 
national intelligibility at work, both through consolidations of visual dominance such as hilltop 
settlements, and through forms of concealment such as the Separation Barrier. I further explore 
cinema and queerness in relation to the context of occupation through reference to Gaza 
filmmakers, Israeli military use of cinema industry professionals for urban warfare training, and 
the contemporary context informing debates over “pinkwashing,” the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s 
use of LGBT rights in a broad campaign that includes cinema. 
Chapter 4, “Palestinian Cinema and Queer Alliance,” explores the trope of residing in 
seemingly unlivable spaces, arguing that this theme in Palestinian film practice posits alternative 
modes of belonging and non-national forms of coalition that are also present in queer Palestinian 
activism. Through close analysis of how “home,” and by extension national home and belonging, 
is construed in queer ways in Palestinian films, I suggest alternative frameworks for studying 
Palestinian cinema.  I analyze how “home”—through reference to occupied houses, houses under 
curfew, houses in ruins, and a stolen family house in Palestinian films like Annemarie Jacir’s 
2008 Salt of This Sea, Alia Arasoughly’s short Clothesline (2006), and Soverio Costanzo’s 
feature Private (2004)—takes on meanings distinct from dominant senses of home as secure, as 
delimiting a private/public boundary, and as an instantiation of national space. I show how Israeli 
national discourse reiterates an overtly stable, demographically regulated, and even militarized 
sense of home, while, in contrast, Palestinian cinema’s unsettled homes suggest the possibility of 
persisting in an attachment to “Palestine” without stable foundations. While queerness is largely 
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used against Palestinian society in various forms of Israeli pinkwashing, I turn to queer diaspora 
studies, queer of color critique, queer Palestinian activism, and what I consider queer critical 
strategies in Palestinian cinema in order to further explore new coalitional possibilities and new 
approaches to aligning with Palestine.
This is something I continually re-learn through my work with alQaws for Sexual and 
Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society, a leading queer Palestinian activist organization based 
in Occupied Palestine. I have been able to support alQaws’ mission by using a skill I learned as a 
graduate student, grant and report writing, and it’s been my job to listen to and help articulate to 
foundations the strategies and projects developed by the group’s Palestinian activists. Given that 
queer Palestinian activist work engages, participates in, and overlaps with the fields of study I 
mentioned, I incorporate the discourses, strategies, protests, and insights from that work, 
including work related to the Palestinian-led global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 
movement, throughout the dissertation.
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2.0   CHAPTER ONE: NATIONAL INTELLIGIBILITY AND QUEERNESS IN 
HISTORIC AND OCCUPIED PALESTINE 
2.1  “UNRECOGNIZED” PALESTINE: FRAMES OF REFERENCE FOR 
PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI CINEMA STUDIES 
When former CIA analyst Kathleen Christison remarks at the beginning of Perceptions of 
Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (1999) that “the idea that an event as 
significant as the displacement of over seven hundred thousand people from homes and native 
land could have become an ‘unrecognizable episode’… would seem preposterous,” she sets an 
incredulous tone for a history that probes United States policy decisions and popular perception 
of the fate of Zionism and Palestinians in Historic and Occupied Palestine.1 Adopting the term 
“unrecognizable episode” from Middle East scholar Malcolm Kerr, Christison characterizes the 
“frame of reference” that “defines and sets boundaries around Palestinian-Israeli issues” and that 
in United States politics has virtually ignored the dispossession and self-determination of 
Palestinians since the “Palestine question” was first posed to U.S. leaders.2 If Palestinian 
dispossession and Palestinian liberation struggles have remained unrecognizable, it is in large 
                                                
1 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 3. 
2 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 8. Also see Malcolm H. Kerr. America's Middle East 
Policy: Kissinger, Carter and the Future IPS Papers 14 (E) (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1980). 
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part due to what became and has largely remained an especially recognizable narrative of 
Palestine as a Jewish national homeland, which has dominated the cultural imagination of 
Palestine in much of Europe and North America.  
This dissertation explores the role of cinema and queerness in forming the terms of this 
“frame of reference.” Inspired by ethnographer Rebecca Stein’s notion of “national 
intelligibility,” my inquiry into the formation of terms of recognizability in this context is highly 
attuned to what she refers to in terms of constant renegotiation, historical contingency, and 
performativity. For Stein, national intelligibility is: 
a concept that designates that which is recognizable according to the dominant national 
script.  It identifies what we might call a national protocol of recognition, one that 
effectively regulates modes of perception, that which can be perceived, and how 
perceived things are to be understood or categorized within its terms.  This discourse is 
also an engine of subject formation, one that sorts intelligible subjects from unintelligible 
ones within the broader field of the perceptible.  At issue, then, is a complex interrelation 
of perception, recognition, and subjectivity, an interrelation that itself is subject to 
constant if irregular, change. National intelligibility is a historically contingent discourse 
that can shift dramatically during periods of profound transition or upheaval within the 
nation-state, on its borders, and within adjacent territories.  I contend that it is also a 
performative discourse that is sustained through iterative practices and can thus be 
contested and altered through such practices.  That is to say, its norms of recognition are 
never secure.  The lexicon of intelligibility is always being produced and, as such, can be 
revised.3 
 
While locating cinema as a central term for this study’s exploration of the continued frame of 
unrecognizability surrounding issues of Palestinian dispossession and Palestinian belonging, this 
project’s critical cinema, media and visual culture studies frame is not limited to audio-visuality, 
or to vision, as primary sites of interpretation and analysis. Likewise, the queer critical frame I 
invoke is neither limited to a particular notion of gender or sexual definition, nor to gender and 
sexuality as exclusive categories of analysis. I understand both cinema studies and queer studies 
                                                
3 Rebecca Stein, Itineraries in Conflict: Israelis, Palestinians, and the Political Lives of Tourism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 2-3. 
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as transdisciplinary and cross-methodological fields of study attendant to what Stein refers to as 
“modes of perception,” and at the intersection of this study’s approach to cinema and queerness 
is a concern for “the complex interrelation of perception, recognition, and subjectivity, an 
interrelation that itself is subject to constant if irregular, change.” For my purposes, national 
intelligibility is not simply shorthand for the frames suggested by “national ways of seeing” or 
“national imaginaries,” since it encompasses the ways in which particular subjects, modes of 
sociality and forms of belonging are rendered thinkable and knowable within certain terms of the 
nation, and not simply the ways in which individuals imagine the nation and their place in 
relation to it. In other words, I am interested in how Jewish nationalism achieved intelligibility 
with the help of cinema, and to what extent and in what ways the ongoing establishment of 
Jewish national belonging has gone hand-in-hand with the projection of unintelligibility onto 
Palestinian nationalism and other forms of Palestinian belonging and community. 
Cinema and queerness also have important historical links to a dominant Zionist 
discourse of national intelligibility. Indeed, cinema and Zionism are thought to have been born at 
nearly the same time. Israeli film scholar Raz Yosef notes that at the Third Zionist Congress in 
1899, a Zionist from Warsaw named Noyfield called for the Zionist leadership to take advantage 
of audio and visual technologies to improve Zionist propaganda.4 This dual origin story 
continues to fascinate Israeli film scholars, as evidenced by the 2011 Israeli Cinema: Identities 
in Motion, in which editors Miri Talmon and Yaron Peleg reiterate the story in contemporary 
Jewish-Zionist politically affirming terms: “the creation and dissemination of Zionism, the new 
ideology which in the late 1880s advocated the idea of the return of the Jewish people to their 
ancient homeland in the Land of Israel, coincided with the evolution and consolidation of cinema 
                                                
4 Raz Yosef, Beyond Flesh: Queer Masculinities and Nationalism in Israeli Cinema (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 21. 
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as a medium and art, both in Europe and in North America.”5 Furthermore, they credit film with 
the ability to “convey the creative momentum of the new nation” and even “the inchoate Israeli 
culture.”6 In the spirit of this stitching together of origin stories, one could easily add new 
discourses of sexuality. At the 1898 Zionist Congress, one year prior to Noyfield’s statement on 
visual media, sexologist and Zionist leader Max Nordau insisted that Jewish national 
homemaking required a New Muscle Jewry, implying that a reinvention of gender and sexual 
norms, based on dominant contemporary European models, was necessary for the creation of a 
Jewish state. Sexology, then, a new science of human sexuality, had profound influence on turn 
of the century Palestine primarily through its influence on Zionism’s racialized prototypes. This 
ideal type of the New Muscle Jew was seen as a necessary step toward Jewry’s perceived 
entrance to civilization and modernity, confirmed through colonization and the establishment of 
a nation. Just as Noyfield proclaimed the importance of the new visual technologies, Max 
Nordau expounded on the need for a Muscle Jewry, a properly racialized and gendered national 
subject on whose intelligibility the new images of nationalism could hinge. After providing a 
somewhat “pre-cinematic” context for cinema and cinema studies’ roles in this history, I will 
return to the question of how and in what way queerness became key to this frame of reference 
and an important critical framework for this project.   
An investigation of cinema’s role in the history of a particular frame of reference 
necessarily requires looking at the dominant fields of perception and knowledge that cinema was 
produced through, and that it in turn contributed to and transformed in important ways. 
Certainly, before the first wave of Zionist settlers began to arrive in Palestine in the late 
                                                
5 Miri Talmon and Yaron Peleg, Israeli Cinema: Identities in Motion (Austin: The University of 
Texas Press, 2011), xi. 
6 Talmon and Peleg, Israeli Cinema, xi. 
   21 
nineteenth century, particular notions of the landscape, history and people of Palestine were 
already well established. Early colonial discourse, for example, shaped the image of Palestine 
before the “new” cinematic technologies and before the first waves of Jewish immigrants. As 
Christison points out early on in her study, “the frame of reference within which Palestinian-
Israeli issues have been perceived in the late twentieth century began forming…not when Israel 
was created in 1948 or even when Zionism became a force in Palestine fifty years earlier but in 
the mid-nineteenth century.”7  Whether Holy Land, Promised Land, or Orient, former Palestine 
was caught up in a discursive imaginary owing largely to print technology and the subsequent 
widespread distribution of the Bible. The phrase “Holy Land” in particular, Yehoshua Ben-Arieh 
argues, “spread steadily during the nineteenth century,” and gradually formed the idea of 
Palestine as a particular place; it “served to demarcate a particular geographical entity, despite 
the fact that in many periods of history the land had no distinctive political status.”8 As various 
editions of the Bible proliferated, so did curiosity about the palpable facts and historical nuances 
of the Bible’s textual geography.   
But Palestine took on a more markedly scientific, historical, ethnographic, and 
geographical substance in the popular imaginary via Holy Land travelers who would produce a 
vast archive of maps, atlases and illustrated books, including editions of the Bible “containing 
drawings of not only events and landmarks but also landscapes, maps, ethnic types and 
architectural designs.”9  Fully invested in an ancient biblical understanding of Palestine, these 
diverse images were also products of more recent European nation-state ideology and imperialist 
                                                
7  Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 17. 
8 Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, “Perceptions and Images of the Holy Land” in The Land That Became 
Israel: Studies in Historical Geography, ed. Ruth Kark (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), 38.  
9 Ben-Arieh, “Perceptions and Images,” 39. 
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discursive formation. Palestine’s landscape became, as Kathleen Stewart Howe describes in 
relation to British Royal Engineer Photographic Surveys from the 1860s, “an intensely surveyed 
and mapped geography of religious possession and imperial strategy.”10 Under the auspices of 
the Palestine Exploration Fund, established in 1865, military officials worked alongside 
clergyman to produce cartographical and topographical surveys for the British Empire.11 Ben-
Arieh suggests how Holy Land discourse, particularly through literature, came to render the 
present state of Palestine in colonial terms and expressed 
an outlook that stressed the state of the land at the time of the writing: backward, 
undeveloped, devastated, desolate and sparsely populated—all this in contrast to its 
glorious past, and to the West-European countries from whence came most of those who 
visited Palestine and wrote about it.12 
 
Palestine emerged as a discursive terrain largely through what Edward Said describes as 
the productive force of Orientalism, a system of classification and discursive production 
embedded in a Western understanding of East/West differences.  
Lester I. Vogel further characterizes the particular frames of reference for American 
tourists, missionaries, diplomats, biblical scholars and settler-colonialists who visited Palestine, 
showing that American Holy Land discourse was similarly “past-oriented, even to the extent that 
conjectures about the land’s future were made within the framework of the land’s past.”13 Bound 
in particular ways to the Biblical textual geography, new travel writing and mapping of Palestine 
was produced largely through notions of a sacred history. These existent, widespread, and 
                                                
10 Kathleen Stewart Howe, “Mapping a Sacred Geography: Photographic Surveys by the Royal 
Engineers in the Holy Land, 1864-68,” in Picturing Place: Photography and the Geographical 
Imagination, eds. Joan M. Schwartz and James R. Ryan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 228. 
11 Etan Bar-Yosef, The Holy Land in English Culture 1799-1917: Palestine and the Question of 
Orientalism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. 
12 Ben-Arieh, “Perceptions and Images,” 45. 
13 Lester I. Vogel, To See a Promised Land: Americans and the Holy Land in the Nineteenth 
Century (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 220. 
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popular discourses suggest that certain norms of recognition and particular fields of perception 
were in place before the explosion of photographic and cinematic visual imagery of Palestine 
around the turn of the century, placing limits on how these images would be produced and 
perceived. 
The popularity of travel books in North America in the nineteenth century reveals 
something of how the idea of Palestine took shape through popular secular and religious 
imaginaries. For example, missionary William M. Thomson’s The Land and the Book: or, 
Biblical Illustrations Drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery, of the Holy 
Land (1880-1886) sold more than two hundred thousand copies, Mark Twain’s The Innocents 
Abroad sold sixty-seven thousand copies in 1870 only a year after it was published, and US 
Southern Methodist James Wideman’s Earthly Footsteps of the Man in Galilee (1893) sold over 
a million copies.14 As Christison explains, Twain’s derogatory and Orientalist descriptions of the 
land and people of Palestine still serve as fodder for American Zionists and for Israeli 
government officials and others who wish to provide a historical basis for the claim that 
“Palestine was a desolate land until settled and cultivated by Jewish pioneers.”15 The claim that 
Palestine was deserted and uncultivated obscures how this notion of “emptiness” was 
meticulously produced and reiterated, justifying what seemed a historical teleology for the 
Jewish “pioneers” who “discovered” it that way. Travel writing like Twain’s that included stops 
variously in “Palestine,” “the Holy Land,” and “the Levant” proliferated in the popular genre of 
the travel book, as well as in periodicals and on lecture circuits in the U.S.  Those popular “non-
fiction” texts and guidebooks in turn lent a certain credibility and matter-of-factness to 
                                                
14 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 17. Also see Burke O. Long, Imagining the Holy Land: 
Maps, Models, and Fantasy Travels (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 39, 53. 
15 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 16. 
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descriptions of the Middle East found in fictional stories with Middle Eastern settings, the wildly 
popular A Thousand and One Arabian Nights, for example.16 Ben Arieh even suggests “almost 
all educated Europeans read the tales [of Arabian Nights] in their youth and remembered them 
vividly,” noting that European travelers carried those images with them to the Holy Land.    
Problems emerged, as Vogel describes, when tourists, biblical scholars, pilgrims, and 
others had to reconcile the then-familiar biblical descriptions of “a land of milk and honey” with 
what they perceived in Palestine with their own eyes. In Vogel’s analysis, preconceived notions 
of the Holy Land, firmly couched in biblical and past-oriented terms, created an expectation for 
Americans that, upon seeing Palestine in person for the first time, was not easily reconciled with 
that real landscape and those real inhabitants: “The American image of the Holy Land was 
remote; it was romantic; it was easily put at odds with the physical reality that actually presented 
itself.”17  
Twain himself acknowledged and satirized the extent to which the experience of Holy 
Land travelers was shaped by travelogues and landscape tradition in painting. Unimpressed by 
Gennesaret and Mount Hermon, Twain declares:  
 
 
 
                                                
16 See also Moshe Davis’ take on the image/reality split and on mark Twain’s Holy Land 
descriptions in America and the Holy Land: With Eyes Toward Zion IV (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 1995), 20-21. 
17 Vogel 220.  For more on the American image of the Holy Land see John Davis, The 
Landscape of Belief: Encountering the Holy Land in Nineteenth-century American Art and 
Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), Moshe Davis, America and the Holy 
Land: With Eyes Toward Zion IV (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), Burke O. Long, 
Imaging the Holy Land: Maps, Models, and Fantasy Travels (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2002) and Hilton Obenzinger, American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and the 
Holy Land Mania Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
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I am sure, from the tenor of books I have read, that many who have visited this land in 
years gone by, were Presbyterians, and came seeking evidences in support of their 
particular creed …Honest as these men’s intentions may have been, they were full of 
partialities and prejudices, they entered the country with their verdicts already 
prepared.18 
 
Twain’s observations extended to his fellow travelers as well, who he determined were 
influenced by books such as Thomson’s The Land and the Book: “our pilgrims have brought 
their verdicts with them…I can almost tell, in set phrase, what they will say when they see 
Tabor, Nazareth, Jericho, and Jerusalem—because I have the books they will ‘smooch’ their 
ideas from.”19 Whether his fellow travelers experienced it or not, in The Innocents Abroad Twain 
repeatedly emphasizes disappointment in the landscape of Palestine, particularly in relation to its 
popular representations. 
 This contradictory vision—what Vogel compares to a stereoscopic image that fails to 
produce a coherent and three-dimensional image—prompted many to seek out explanations for 
the land’s current state, rather than to question the legitimacy of the dominant narratives.20 This 
seemingly inexplicable contradiction between the Holy Land described in the Bible and the 
region as described by travel writers, what Vogel refers to as the “image/reality” dichotomy, was 
not unique to literary texts. As Ben-Arieh describes, the theory that the land had suffered a 
terrible neglect began to take hold, compelling geographers, archaeologists and other specialists 
to pursue scientific research and to provide rationalizations for the apparent incongruities. The 
                                                
18 Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad; or, The New Pilgrim’s Progress  (Hartford, Connecticut: 
American Publishing Co., 1869; reprint, New York: New American Library, 1966), 243. 
Emphasis added. 
19 Twain, The Innocents Abroad, 243. 
20 For an examination of actual stereoscopic imagery of the Holy Land, see Burke O. Long, 
“Parlor Tours of the Holy Land: Fantasy and Ideology in Stereographic Photos of Palestine,” in 
“A Land Flowing With Milk and Honey”: Visions of Israel from Biblical to Modern Times eds. 
Leonard J. Greenspoon and Ronald A Simkins (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2001), 201-218. 
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widely accepted story of what had happened to Palestine in the last 2,000 years went, Ben-Arieh 
suggests, like this: 
the drastically different social conditions and agricultural methods that had become 
prevalent provided sufficient insight into the land’s decline.  The forests that had once 
covered the hillsides had been destroyed, as had the terraces that formerly preserved the 
soil and allowed for its cultivation. This neglect was compounded by fundamental 
changes in population and culture. Advocates of this latter theory (which has been 
accepted up to the present) concluded that there was no contradiction between the biblical 
rendition of the land’s natural geographical conditions, and the reality that had been 
disclosed in the nineteenth century.21 
 
Of course, biblical reasons for the land “laid waste” could be found as well.22 Generating a vast 
Holy Land discourse, literary, scientific, religious, and touristic experts reiterated the notion of 
Palestine as a barren, unfertile, and illegitimately populated landscape until it took on a self-
evident character. In the 1905 travelogue The Cruise of the Eight Hundred To and Through 
Palestine: Glimpses of the Bible Lands, which purports to chronicle the journey of eight hundred 
North American Sunday-school workers to Jerusalem, locations are described in close proximity 
to Biblical descriptions, and while the landscape described occasionally contradicts the Biblical 
excerpt, the explanation seems always to lie in the landscape. Take this swiftly explained 
example: “Here Jesus sat in a boat and taught the people on the shore. We were shown in the 
distance the ruins of Capernaum, where once crowds thronged and synagogues, castles, temples 
and theaters stood, but now there are mud huts and reedy swamps. A curse indeed rests upon the 
land.”23  The author at one point confirms the commonplace image/reality split cited by Vogel 
and associates it, like Twain, with a sense of disappointment: “When I returned from my tour I 
                                                
21 Ben-Arieh, “Perceptions and Images,” 39. 
22 For just such a biblical explanation, W.J.T. Mitchell cites Ezekiel 6:6 in “Holy Landscape: 
Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness,” Critical Inquiry 26 (2000). 
23 Louis Klopsch, Proprietor, The Christian Herald, The Cruise of the Eight Hundred To and 
Through Palestine: Glimpses of the Bible Lands (New York City: The Christian Herald Press, 
1905), 113. 
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was continually asked if I was disappointed…and I came to the conclusion that it was a rule for 
people coming back to say that they were disappointed—‘disillusioned’ is the word.”24 
Recognizing the negative, perhaps disillusioning, effects of these seemingly intransigent 
frames of reference, Vogel proposes that our contemporary task is to strip away the “myths” 
produced by this discursive terrain, which continues to be reiterated and reasserted, in order to 
properly see the reality that has been covered over. According to Vogel’s model, only a careful 
process of uncovering, revealing, recovering, and replacing, would finally constitute a just 
approach to a now dispossessed and nearly destroyed Arab Palestinian society. Though 
recovering neglected histories and images of Palestine to challenge official stories is a necessary 
and ongoing project that should not be dismissed, Vogel’s conceptualization of an image/reality 
binary ultimately fails to fully explain how “the reality that had been disclosed in the nineteenth 
century” was itself shaped, reworked, and transformed to fit the “image” and “myth” of Holy 
Land, promised Jewish homeland, and the future “Jewish and democratic” nation-state.25  I want 
to suggest that a history and a landscape so heavily shaped by images and myths (and are there 
histories and landscapes that are not?) necessitates a more complex understanding of how ways 
of seeing always shape real conditions, and how there is no longer, if there ever was, a way to 
distinguish image from reality in Historic or contemporary Occupied Palestine.  
Furthermore, it is not that nearly 2,000 years of Arab history in Palestine is entirely 
absent from the popular visual and discursive archive of the nineteenth century. Rather, that Arab 
and Bedouin presence was subject to (which is to say constructed by) a vast Orientalist 
discourse, a proliferation of texts and illustrations that, in the case of Palestine, largely depicted 
                                                
24 Klopsch, The Cruise, 135. 
25 “Jewish and democratic” refers to the contemporary way Israel is frequently referred to in 
European and North American foreign policy and mainstream media. 
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the inhabitants as quaint historical and anachronistic remnants—as backward, uncivilized and 
untrustworthy figures, Twain’s “abject beggars by nature, instinct, and education” and “vermin-
tortured vagabonds”—figures who lacked a legitimate place in the region’s history or landscape 
and had little worthwhile to say for themselves.26  Though the infamous phrase associated with 
Zionism of “a land without a people for a people without a land” did not appear until somewhat 
later, Christison emphasizes that  
the notion that there were no Arab inhabitants in the Holy Land or that they were alien 
interlopers became a part of the popular imagination in the West, at least among the 
informed public and the religiously aware, well before the first Zionist settlers ever 
conceived of migrating to Palestine in the 1880s.27 
 
Of course, in the U.S., the image of a barren land awaiting redemption and conquest 
would reflect a familiar structure of erasure in popular imagination around the “discovery” of the 
Americas and Native American populations.28   
In various and often contradictory ways, the twentieth-century creation of a Jewish 
national homeland discourse went hand-in-hand with the projection of illegitimacy and 
unrecognizability onto non-Jewish inhabitants in the region.  After the establishment of Israel 
and the almost complete destruction and displacement of Palestinian society in 1948, cinema—
its technologies, its visual and spatial logics, its narratives and histories—continued to play an 
                                                
26 Twain, Innocents Abroad, 234. 
27 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 22. 
28 Furthermore, the idea of the Promised Land had already been mapped onto North American 
conquest in other ways; Moshe Davis notes how “such concepts as Zion and Jerusalem became 
synoptic metaphors for the New World” and “at least fifteen places in the United States are 
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painted his Bedouin “captors as American Indians” and Claude Renier Condor who likened 
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make room for a more progressive and superior race.” Moshe Davis, America and the Holy 
Land: With Eyes Toward Zion IV (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 7; and Ben-Arieh, 
“Perceptions and Images,” 20. 
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important role in this de-legitimizing function. Yet, due to certain conventions dominant in 
several decades of Israeli film studies, this point is difficult to make from within a project easily 
recognized as located within film studies and focused on cinema in the region.  
Amy Kronish and Costel Safirman’s concluding comment on Israeli cinema and its 
themes in Israeli Film: A Reference Guide provides a quick gloss of a widely accepted and 
repeated narrative about Israeli cinema: 
In its short history, Israeli cinema has moved from crude films, almost primitive in style, 
some propagandistic and some melodramatic, to a more developed and sophisticated 
cinematic style that includes depth of character and complexity of plot.  Thematically, 
Israeli cinema has moved from an emphasis on the community to an understanding of the 
individual, from the sacrifices of the pioneering period to the materialism and personal 
egotism of the contemporary period, from stereotypic heroic images to more complex and 
problematic images of the Israeli in a continually changing society, from one-dimensional 
portrayals of Arab characters to a reaching out for an understanding of one’s Arab 
neighbors.29 
 
Avowedly Zionist Israeli film scholar Ilan Avisar similarly sums up this progress narrative when 
he wrote in 2005 that “after completing a full circle from initial nationalistic propaganda to 
apocalyptic visions of national disintegration, Israeli cinema appears now at a fresh beginning.”30 
Ella Shohat, in her influential Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation, 
refers to an “overall historical evolution of the films themselves, moving from a somewhat 
idealizing nation-building ‘mythic’ cinema into a more diversified ‘normal’ kind of industry,” 
which she attributes in part to the desire of Israeli film critics and filmmakers to situate 
themselves in relation to “countries with long-developed infrastructures, such as France or the 
United States,” rather than to Third World film discourse. While Shohat’s work provides an 
intensively critical account of East/West dynamics in Israeli cinema, it still relies on the notion of 
                                                
29 Amy Kronish and Costel Safirman, Israeli Film: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2003), 21. 
30 Ilan Avisar, “The National and the Popular in Israeli Cinema,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Jewish Studies 24.1 (2005), 143. 
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a rather coherent “broad movement of Israeli cinema” that begins with early Zionist films, the 
“first Jewish film pioneer,” and “through to the emergence of a truly national cinema after the 
inauguration of the Jewish state in 1948.”31 While Shohat is more critical regarding the racialized 
politics of Israeli cinema’s historical arc, editors Talmon and Peleg of the more recent collection 
with the title Israeli Cinema provide their own version of what a ‘normal’ kind of industry 
should look like for Israeli cinema:  
the growing centrifugal pressures of subcultures, which no longer conform to a dominant 
Hebrew unifying culture core, and the ever-growing quest for new leadership and 
‘normalcy’ that will finally end the pressures of war, terror, occupation, victimization, 
and other moral issues that keep haunting Israeli society and culture.32 
 
The desire for normalcy, they argue, “was shattered in the early 2000s by the second Palestinian 
uprising and wave of terror known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” thus situating Palestinian resistance 
to occupation, and even Palestinian society more broadly, as an interruption and “haunting” 
presence stalling Israeli society and Israeli cinema’s narrative arc toward “normalcy.”33 
Besides this often-repeated broad narrative arc describing Israeli cinema’s progress, 
several other dominant understandings of cinema’s place in relationship to culture and politics 
have often contributed to making and re-making Palestinian dispossession as “unrecognizable.” 
Pre-occupations in Palestinian and Israeli cinema studies adhere in many ways to national 
frames, even while acknowledging transnational and diasporic influences, investments, and 
exchanges, and how they privilege cinematic practice that backgrounds political conflict. And 
yet, even the introduction of transnational film studies frameworks, which was meant to allow 
for new approaches and new geographic areas and exchanges, has tended to only reinforce the 
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33 Talmon and Peleg, Israeli Cinema, xvii. 
   31 
progress narrative of Israeli cinema, which dominates that field, and, as I will show, which is 
adopted to evaluate Palestinian film history in at least one large scale study of Palestinian cinema 
by Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi. 
The introduction of the term “transnational” has marked an attempt to expand film 
studies’ focus into areas and relations that a national frame neglected, such as exilic and 
transnational formations like Palestinian cinema. In the first issue of the journal Transnational 
Cinemas, Will Higbee and Song Hwee Lim identify three main approaches to theorizing “the 
question of “transnational” in film studies: the first employs a national/transnational binary 
whereby the transnational complicates the understanding of “cinema’s relationship to the cultural 
and economic formations that are rarely contained within national boundaries;” the second 
focuses on a regional approach that locates film cultures in “shared cultural heritage and/or geo-
political boundary”; and the third approach encompasses film practice defined as diasporic, 
exilic and postcolonial.34  Higbee and Lim critique each of these approaches for how the term 
“transnational cinema” tends to be taken as a given: “the danger here is that the national simply 
becomes displaced or negated in such analysis, as if it ceases to exist, when in fact the national 
continues to exert the force of its presence even within transnational film-making practices.”35 
The criticisms of transnational as a critical frame explicated by Higbee and Lim share some 
resemblance to Michael Walsh’s critique of the popularity of ‘national imaginary’ as a critical 
method over a decade earlier, in 1996. While noting critical differences between the kinds of 
work produced in relation to the nation, nation-state, and/or national imaginary, Walsh remarks 
that “analysis of the nation has appealed to writers who are concerned with issues of race, class, 
                                                
34 Will Higbee and Song Hwee Lim, “Concepts of Transnational Cinema: Towards a Critical 
Transnationalism in Film Studies,” Transnational 1:1 (2010): 9.  
35 Higbee and Lim, “Concepts of Transnational Cinema,” 10. 
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gender and multiculturalism, as a way of bringing to bear many of the ideas of contemporary 
film theory while endeavoring to be historically engaged in a more immediate and fine-grained 
way.”36 While Walsh identifies the national turn with film studies’ role as a kind of political 
intervention in tandem with cultural studies, postcolonial theory, feminist theory, and critical 
race studies, Higbee and Lim suggest that cinema is the motivating factor in transnational 
studies, whereby questions of production, exhibition, distribution, and audience take a more 
prominent, if taken for granted, role in prompting particular kinds of critiques over others. While 
Walsh’s critique marked a desire to further understand how ideology and identification 
motivated certain kinds of national cinema critiques, whereby cinema took a kind of second 
priority, cinema appears more dominant as the primary term in Higbee and Lim’s critique.  In the 
case of studies of Palestinian and Israeli cinema, or films and moving images typically subsumed 
under either of those categories, it is unclear whether the terms national and transnational have 
circulated to produce the effects explored by Higbee and Lim. Focusing too much on the nation 
obscures the exchanges and overlaps between Israeli and Palestinian productions, and those 
productions that do not neatly fit into either, while focusing too much on transnational modes of 
funding and production tend to obscure the role of the nation-state, and the power of the concept 
of the nation. The transnational, furthermore, as Higbee and Lim point out, “risks celebrating the 
supranational flow or transnational exchange of peoples, images and cultures at the expense of 
the specific cultural, historical or ideological context in which these exchanges take place.”37 
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Andrew Higson, “The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema,” in Transnational Cinema: The 
Film Reader, eds. Elizabeth Ezra and Terry Rowden (London and New York: Routledge, 2006): 
15-25.   
37 Higbee and Lim, “Concepts of Transnational Cinema,” 11-12. 
   33 
I prioritize an immanent critique rather than a new totalizing approach, especially since 
the nation-state status of Israel seems to continue to provide a kind of common sense foundation 
for organizing the study of “Israeli cinema.” While intersections of cinema, Palestine, and Israel 
appear in other disciplinary formations, such as in regional media studies, literary studies, and 
popular culture studies, research done under the signs of “Israeli cinema studies” and/or 
“Palestinian cinema studies” are likely the most easily legible. This is particularly true given that 
“Israeli cinema” and “Palestinian cinema” circulate, as mutually exclusive though not without a 
certain amount of variation (for example, “Israeli cinema” is sometimes used in tandem with the 
category “Jewish cinema,” and “Palestinian cinema” occasionally appears as “Arab cinema”), in 
mainstream popular discourse and cultural venues in film festivals and award cycles, marking 
exhibition formats like DVD, and as categories for organizing films in databases, including the 
online Internet Movie Database.  
There are several conventions in national film studies that appear most clearly related to 
the establishment of national intelligibility and legitimacy through cinema; namely, claims 
pertaining to cinematic origins (“first” films, filmmakers, studios, and theaters), to the existence 
of historical cinematic archives (or lack thereof), and to national cinematic representational 
space (whereby, for example, Israeli or Palestinian films from a certain time period would be 
read as a reflection of the state of Israeli or Palestinian nationalism at the time). These 
conventions not only show how national cinema studies frameworks are especially unfitting in 
the context of occupation and statelessness, but also how cinema is looked to as a way to 
legitimize certain narratives of national belonging and deny others. The near lack of a body of 
“Palestinian films” from the early twentieth century can serve as proof of the lack of pre-Zionist 
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or pre-British Mandate Palestinian livelihood, whereas the embrace of early Zionist films as part 
of “Israeli cinema” lends credibility to dominant Zionist records of history.   
Studies of Palestinian and Israeli cinema tend to make often-contradictory historical 
claims about first films and the implications of a larger narrative of aesthetic and formal 
progress. In Dreams of a Nation, Hamid Dabashi writes “the first Palestinian film to have ever 
been made was a short documentary by Ibrahim Hasan Serhan, which recorded the visit of King 
Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman bin Faysal al-Saud to Palestine” and the film is dated 1935 in 
the filmography. Amy Kronish, in her study of Israeli cinema, cites several “firsts”—the first 
films shot in Palestine by the Lumiére brothers, the first film depicting “Jewish views of the 
Holy Land” by a British Jew, the “first local Zionist filmmaker, Ya’ackov Ben Dov (1882-
1968),” the first sound feature film (This is the Land in 1935), and so on. In a section titled “The 
first films of Palestine” in the reference text World Cinema: Israel, Kronish notes that all of the 
early films shot in then Palestine were produced by foreigners (and mainly to appeal to Jewish or 
Christian audiences), and that “an indigenous film industry, however, had yet to begin.”38 A 
subtle, violent erasure is instantiated in Kronish’s use of the term “indigenous” as she proceeds 
to chronicle a history of Jewish-Israeli cinema that begins with “pioneer” Zionist films made 
primarily by European Jews with Jewish Agency funding.  A conflicting vision of early and 
“indigenous” films in Palestine is offered in Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi’s Palestinian 
Cinema, which acknowledges the early film practices of Arab-Palestinians as well as European 
and Arab Jewish immigrants.39 A short film by Ibrahim Hassan Sirhan documenting Prince 
Saud’s journey to Jerusalem and Jaffa in 1935 “constitutes the starting point of Palestinian 
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cinema,” while the period from 1935-1948 only yields textual evidence (newspaper reports, 
production company documents) on Palestinian cinema, including Sirhan’s Studio Palestine and 
the Arab Film Company. Between 1948 and 1967, Gertz and Khleifi report, “almost no 
Palestinian films were produced.”40 These periods reflect “the various struggle of the national 
Palestinian struggle,” reiterating the national frame for their study, though not intending to set 
out “clear-cut boundaries.”41 
The turn of the century Lumiére and Edison Holy Land films generate quite different 
interpretations in these competing film histories. While Tryster’s Israel Before Israel: Silent 
Cinema in the Holy Land marks the importance of those films in terms of the early interest in 
Holy Land imagery by Jewish and non-Jewish filmmakers and audiences, in the 1970s the 
Palestinian film scholar Sufyan Ramahi saw these same films as evidence of pre-Zionist 
indigenous Arabic cultural livelihood in Palestine. Furthermore, while Gertz and Khleifi 
construct a counter-narrative of “first” films by Arab Palestinian filmmakers, if only as a 
reparative historical strategy, Ramahi emphasizes the lack of a definitive filmic archive and 
explains why there are indeed fewer Palestinian films than Zionist films. Cited and translated in 
Guy Hennebelle’s “The National Question in Palestinian Cinema: How to Get Down to 
Business,” Ramahi argues that it is not that Palestinians were uninterested in the cinematic 
medium, nor does the lack of a film archive simply suggest that Arab Palestinians were not 
invested in Palestine as a national home, but rather 
in that period they were living under occupation, first by the Turks, then by the British, 
and they did not have the resources to invest in cinematic production. The potential of 
film for this population had not yet become appreciated in a deeper sense; nonetheless, 
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during the 1930’s, Palestinian theaters seem to have sprung up in reaction to the 
propaganda and the atmosphere of rivalry created by the Zionists.42 
 
In other words, Ramahi points out that cinema was simply not at that time a priority for 
Palestinians, even while Zionists were producing a large body of films that generated funding for 
increasing Jewish settlement. Nevertheless, the survival of a relatively large number of cinematic 
documentations of early Jewish national work in Palestine serves in some contexts as visible, 
hence irrefutable, proof of the illegitimacy of Palestinian claims to the land.  
In this way, beyond its inability to explain the relation between reality and image, the 
approach suggested by Vogel’s image/reality dichotomy also unwittingly follows the logic of 
those who cynically ask for evidentiary—usually indexical and visual—proof of Palestinian 
dispossession and former Palestinian livelihood, disregarding the ways in which those images, 
even when presented, often do little to counter what has long been understood and taken for 
granted.  For Vogel, presenting counter-images of real Palestinian dispossession ought to unmask 
false narratives of the founding of the Israeli state. Frequently, though, even the invitation to 
present such images is meant only to point to the absence of a historical record or the 
impossibility for a coherent, linear, and recognized counter-narrative.  Take, for example, the 
commentary in a Chicago Jewish Star editorial after the opening of a prominent US Palestinian 
film festival: 
In her opening remarks at the first Festival, organizer Qato spoke about the "vibrant 
place" which once was Palestine –before the British Mandate, "with cities, and villages, 
hamlets and Bedouin tents teeming with life –where people of all religions and cultures 
lived together in relative peace."  Assuming, for the sake of argument, that such a fantasy 
was once an historical reality, where does one find the filmic rendering of that "vibrant 
place", that idea which is called “Palestine”?43  
                                                
42 Cited in Guy Hennebelle, “The National Question in Palestinian Cinema,” Cineaste 10/1 
(1979/80): 32. 
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Underscoring how cinema and national film festivals can become sites of contestation 
over historical truth and national legitimacy, particularly in relation to Israel/Palestine, the 
editorialist seeks to enhance his own credibility through reference to an absent Palestinian film 
archive.  Christison offers further explanation as to why there exists so much “proof” of the 
Jewish settlement of Palestine and little documentation of Arab Palestinian life.  Given that much 
of the archive that constitutes “Israel before Israel” (the title of Hillel Tryster’s often-cited book-
length study of pre-state Zionist filmmaking) was produced for propaganda purposes, it is no 
surprise for Christison that there was no equal effort to produce “Palestinian” films in that same 
period.  Since the Arabs inhabiting Palestine “felt no need in this early period to give expression 
to their attachment to the land,” and since they largely did not yet realize that the Jewish settlers 
aimed to create a state on that same land, there was little concentrated effort to produce a 
counter-cinema or a counter-propaganda effort to promote Arab nationalism in Palestine.44 While 
the Palestinians “perceived no need to organize, propagandize, or publicize in order to advance 
their goal of continuing to live and form a nation in Palestine,” the Zionists’ organizational 
efforts had resulted, by the First Zionist Congress of 1897, in “117 local Zionist 
groups…throughout the world,” 900 a year later, and a large body of Zionist writings that 
“defined a conscious and highly articulated sense of place, specifically because [they] longed for 
a land they did not possess.”45 Invocations of a readily available archive of “pre-state Israeli” 
films explicitly or implicitly tend to obscure the complex historical context of propaganda and 
settlement, whereby the Zionist project went to great lengths to establish the Jewish nationalism 
that was coming to dominate the Palestinian landscape. Wolfgang Ernst and Harun Farocki 
                                                
44 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 22. Also see Heiko Haumann, ed. The First Zionist 
Congress in 1897: Causes, Significance, Topicality (New York: Karger, 1997).   
45 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 22. 
   38 
underscore the stakes of mobilizing image archives in this way, arguing “instead of just 
collecting passively and subsequently storing these holdings, archives actively define what is to 
be known, remembered, and archivable at all.”46  
Established conventions of “first films” and cinematic origins further organize and frame 
the stories the archives are compelled to tell about cinema and history. The 1962 compilation 
film The True Story of Palestine, for example, takes advantage of the Zionist propaganda film 
archive, specifically the Carmel Films archive of footage shot by Nathan Axlerod, and presents 
them as neutral transparent historical documents of the “true story” of pioneering Jews 
reclaiming an unpopulated wasteland and related themes. This existence of a body of so-called 
“pre-state” film footage, including many preserved and digitized through the free online Steven 
Spielberg Jewish Film Archive, projects a kind of inevitability onto Israeli statehood (and 
specifically Jewish-Israeli nationalism) and Palestinian dispossession, since those films mark the 
success of settler-colonial Zionism, the failure of alternative Zionist visions (since there were 
competing and conflicting Zionist agendas in the early part of the twentieth century) and the 
ongoing obstacles to alternative modes for Jewish and Arab sociality in Palestine. Israeli film 
scholarship that takes advantage of narrow notions of the purviews of national cinema studies 
tend to reach back to primarily Jewish-produced films as “pre-state” thematic, formal and 
institutional predecessors for “post-state” cinema. In a variety of ways, then, cinema, and the 
kind of history it seems capable of telling and producing, becomes a source of confirmation of 
the legitimate founding of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, while denying legitimacy to 
Arab Palestinian claims to the land. A short article in an Israeli English-language arts and culture 
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magazine explained the contemporary Israeli cinema industry in similar terms, as being 
“connected to the national need for recognition. After all, the way [Israeli cinema is] perceived 
by the world is almost an Israeli obsession. The State of Israel is in a constant condition of 
insecurity.”47  
The construction and interpretation of national cinematic representational space in this 
context has taken on a particular urgency at different times in relation to the ongoing struggle for 
Palestinian political recognition. Palestinian film studies, though a smaller and more fragmented 
body of work by comparison, has in part worked to correct a cinematic history of Palestine 
dominated by Zionist narratives by carving out space for Palestinian cinema and its relation to 
Palestinian nationalism and subjectivity.  Edward Said, for example, suggests that each 
Palestinian film composes a piece of an archive of a lost homeland, which collects the experience 
of a now dispersed people across a diasporic geography.  “One of the efforts of these films,” he 
argues, “is to recollect and gather together what has been lost since 1948, often in the most 
simple terms of everyday life.”48 Like the lost homeland itself, the Palestinian film archive is in 
many ways unrealized in conventional terms, since there is no institutionally housed repository 
for collecting and preserving Palestinian film and video work. Hamid Dabashi, while remarking 
that Palestinian cinema gained a kind of international popularity “at a moment when the nation 
that is producing it is itself negated and denied,” suggests the need for Palestinian cinema to find 
“a way out of the cul-de-sac of representing the unrepresentable,” in this way setting up 
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representation as a reparative task. 49 While sometimes performing this kind of reparative 
historical work, Palestinian cinema studies has also largely emphasized that Palestinian films 
cannot be reduced to a rubric of representation or visibility. The “cul-de-sac” Dabashi describes, 
in other words, may be worth dwelling on for its critical implications, particularly the potential to 
challenge what might be considered the usual routes of national representability and 
intelligibility in Israeli national cinema studies.  
Critical inquiry into cinema’s role in constructing certain notions of national legitimacy 
has its own history within Israeli film scholarship, primarily through examining cinema in terms 
of representational politics. As already noted, Shohat was “to offer a coherent theoretical and 
critical account, within an East/West and Third World/First World perspective, of the 
development of Israeli cinema” and thus situates her work in terms of anti-colonialism.50  
Shohat’s discussion of Israeli cinema productively exposes the limitations of categories that 
typically seem to maintain a cinema’s national status, in this case emphasizing the conditions of 
visibility and representation for Israel’s “others.” She discusses not only how Orientalist 
discourse produces Israel as Western and thus “rational, developed, superior, and human” while 
constructing the East—the other—as “aberrant, underdeveloped, and inferior—in this case as it 
affects Palestinians and Oriental Jews,” but also draws attention to forms of non-representation, 
in which the other is not simply cast in negative terms, but denied representational space.51 Thus 
she refers to the “structuring absence” of Oriental Jews in some films as well as the way that any 
notion of Jewish liberation in Palestine depends on the prior destruction and continued negation 
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of Palestinian national existence.52 In other words, the seeming lack of a body of films that would 
challenge the dominant model of a Jewish-Israeli cinema as the only legitimate national cinema 
in the region tends to be registered in the films themselves through other kinds of absences and 
silences. Similarly, Nurith Gertz argues that early Zionist and Holocaust cinema attempts, and 
yet ultimately fails, to silence Israel’s oppressed ethnic others by presenting a homogenous 
version of Israeli visual history.53 She describes how these films typically include “a soundtrack 
that expresses an official ideology and a picture that contradicts it,” thus necessitating a 
“subversive” reading that attends to the way that the ‘visible’ is repressed or rendered seemingly 
irrelevant or illegible.54 Exploring not only what a film shows or says, but what it neglects to 
show, and, perhaps more to the point, what it renders seemingly unthinkable or irrelevant, has 
shaped certain forms of film interpretation and analysis in political terms. 
However, Israeli cinema studies in particular privileges a certain narrative of cinematic 
progress, one in which politics enters primarily in terms of demonstrating the diversity and 
internal heterogeneity of Israeli society, and which dismisses as anachronistic and politically 
backwards cinema that explicitly supports Palestinian resistance, or which foregrounds the 
occupation. A similar narrative frames Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi’s Palestinian Cinema: 
Landscape, Trauma and Memory, adopting a model of cinematic progress from Israeli film 
studies and applying it to Palestinian film history and suggesting it as the preferred mandate for 
future Palestinian cinematic practice. In the introduction to Palestinian Cinema, Gertz and 
Khleifi chart what they characterize as Palestinian cinema’s movement through periods of 
expressing national unity and opening up toward more heterogeneity and internal diversity. The 
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1960’s and 70’s documentaries produced in exile by Palestinian political organizations achieve 
“for the first time, a cinematic representation of the Palestinian traumatic history” whereby 
trauma “functioned as a unifying adhesive that enabled cinema to overcome controversies and 
differences.”55 Focusing on the films of Michel Khleifi in particular, the Palestinian cinema of 
1980’s is described by Gertz and Khleifi as “portraying an image of a utopian past and at the 
same time contradicting it,” since the films “both construct the nation’s unity and deconstruct 
it.”56 Moving into and beyond the 1990s, marked by crises including the First Intifada, the Gulf 
War, and the Second Intifada, they argue, “Palestinian cinema was recruited in favor of the 
national struggle that called for unity.”57 Compelled by this call to unity and homogeneity, Gertz 
and Khleifi describe, “as the threat to Palestinian existence and land increased, this cinema 
reaffirmed anything that might reiterate and stabilize them.”58   
By the end of the introduction, which frames a more extensive look at specific Palestinian 
films, directors, themes, and political contexts, it is clear that Khleifi and Gertz privilege and 
prefer a “heterogeneous and open nature” that they describe Palestinian cinema as attempting to 
achieve since the 1980s. They prefer this approach to the tendency of the films produced during 
political struggles in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s, described in terms of their “tendency…to 
freeze time and preserve a united, militant, homogeneous nationality.”59  The “New Palestinian 
Cinema,” most notably that of Elia Suleiman, they argue “has endeavored to establish a stable 
and durable narrative,” despite what they describe as its ambivalence and postmodern formal 
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techniques of non-linear narrative and unstable identity.60 Although they cite Suleiman in an 
interview stating that he is “trying to create an image that transcends the ideological definition of 
what it means to be a Palestinian,” they argue that his films are ultimately meant “to reunite the 
fractured space and to rejoin the divided identity.”61 
This is not necessarily a contradictory or simplified interpretation of Suleiman’s films, 
and yet it seems that Gertz and Khleifi are more concerned about fitting several decades of 
Palestinian cinema into a particular narrative of a tension between unity and heterogeneity, one 
which implicitly declares that there is no place for a militant cinema. At the end of their study, 
they leave the reader with examples of recent Palestinian films that serve as “testimony for 
Palestinian cinema to cross over the barriers that fixated it within a historical and geographical 
trauma….within unity that can only tell a single story with two protagonists, us and them.”62 One 
of the films they mention is Arna’s Children, directed by Juliano Mer-Khamis, who was 
murdered in 2011 outside the Jenin Theater by unconfirmed masked men. One year after his 
death, Middle East historian Mark LeVine referred to Mer-Khamis as a “cultural terrorist” whose 
artistic work and Jewish and Arab Palestinian identity “were radical challenges to both national 
identities, bringing violent reactions from those whose power and prerogatives he so directly 
challenged.”63 While Gertz and Khleifi praise Mer-Khamis for complicating an us/them 
framework and including Jewish Israelis in his films and his work with the theater, they would 
likely not want to associate this tendency with such a loaded term as “terrorist,” particularly 
given that they privilege “a new tendency to focus on conflicts and tensions within Palestinian 
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society, leaving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the background.”64 This echoes sentiments 
from Israeli Cinema studies closely in its call to leave the conflict behind and to focus on 
heterogeneity, leaving little room in either field to explore whether some Palestinian and/or 
Israeli filmmakers today take a more militant approach to cinema. Furthermore, I argue that this 
particular notion of cinematic progress ignores other affinities between more recent films by 
Palestinians and the earlier film practice of the 1960s and 1970s, especially what I characterize 
as a repeated skepticism about cinema’s role in either the narrow national unity or the 
progressive heterogeneity that Gertz and Khleifi apply to Palestinian cinema in general. 
Khleifi and Gertz’ framework cannot fully explain why many Palestinian films explicitly 
raise doubts about representability and recognition, which often emerge in the form of questions 
about the role of film production as a cultural and political practice.  In Rainbow (2004) by 
Abdelsalam Shehadeh, a film about the filmmaker Raed Mattas, shown searching through the 
rubble of his destroyed home after an Israeli strike that killed his wife and child. The film poses 
the somewhat obvious question—“what can the cinema do in this situation?” to which the 
filmmaker somberly responds that he had always dreamed of the camera, but “not filming 
death.” Shehadeh’s film suggests, in other words, that Palestinian cinema often faces the strained 
conditions of its existence, particularly in instances where filming seems both important, even 
necessary, and at the same time irrelevant. Dabashi describes this trend in Palestinian 
documentary as “traumatic realism,” which is “not a plain act of certificating a past history.”65 In 
Azza el Hassan’s Kings & Extras: Digging for a Palestinian Archive (2004), the director stops a 
woman on the street to ask her what she thinks of the filmmaker’s quest to find the nearly-
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mythical lost Palestinian Liberation Organization film archive, and the woman responds by 
asking “what good cinema can do” for Palestinians—calling into question the whole point of el 
Hassan’s film. Films such as el Hassan’s suggest a methodology comprised in part of a 
willingness to question their own legitimacy and purpose, as well as their tenuous and contingent 
relationships to Palestine. What does it mean to make films for people who might largely 
question the very practice of making films at all? What does it mean to make a film for an absent 
audience, an audience who neither could, nor would, be particularly interested in watching them? 
These questions point to a much broader question: why, how, and in what forms does cinema 
become a locus of nationalist struggle and protest in the global cinema context? Arguing that the 
preference for films that background struggle and conflict has made some Israeli and Palestinian 
film scholarship unable to allow for a consideration of a cinema critical of its own potential, I 
also want to suggest that scholars of Palestinian cinematic practice ought to remain open to 
understanding filmmaking that refuses to appease concerns about the appropriate political 
response to continued occupation. 
2.2 “BUT WHY THE CINEMA?” 
Echoing the concern raised by the woman on the street in Kings and Extras—“what can cinema 
do?” or, more directly, “why cinema?”—I have so far not addressed why cinema is an important 
frame through which to analyze or intervene in the ongoing reiteration of Palestinian 
dispossession as an “unrecognizable episode.” In 2005 essay titled aptly enough “Is There a 
Palestinian Cinema?,” Livia Alexander questioned whether or not there is a proper object of 
Palestinian film studies—“Palestinian dispersal and the absence of a nation-state to support film 
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production raise an important question: Is it possible to speak of a ‘Palestinian’ cinema at all?”—
while at the same time stating “cultural expressions of nationalism remain central to many 
Palestinian films.”66 This continued relevance of the nation in relation to an anti-colonialist 
Palestinian struggle is placed, for Alexander, in relation to “transnational and global 
influences.”67 
Yet, again, while Livia Alexander and others ask whether or not it even makes sense to 
talk about a Palestinian cinema, Israeli cinema studies has often unquestioningly relied on a 
settled nation-state status. Why is there not a similar question regarding “Israeli cinema”? 
particularly given the prominence of transnational cinema studies analytical frames, the 
potentially constraining effects of an Israeli Cinema Law that puts limits on what counts and gets 
funded as Israeli, the myriad forces affecting what counts as an Israeli film in Israel and abroad, 
the historical frame that construes all early Zionist filmmaking as “pre-state Israeli cinema,” and 
the predominance of co-production funding models? While I think the questions—is there a 
Palestinian cinema? Is there an Israeli cinema?—are worth asking, I also believe Palestinian 
cinematic practice suggests that a more compelling question, one that wonders not whether a 
Palestinian cinema exists, but why Palestinians make cinema in the name of Palestine and what 
cinema can do in the context of the Palestinian struggles for sovereignty, social justice, and the 
right of return. Sobhi Al-Zobaidi’s 2001 film Looking Awry explores these questions with self-
referential irreverence. The film opens with images of Al-Zobaidi’s wedding day in September 
2000 in the West Bank city of Ramallah.  This scene of dancing and celebration is interrupted by 
the voice of David, an American, who remarks that he “didn’t know there were black 
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Palestinians,” referring to Al-Zobaidi’s wife.  Al-Zobaidi is then shown sitting at a cafe with 
David and an American woman who are apparently funding his new film (which we realize must 
be this film) focused on Jerusalem.   
The Americans urge Al-Zobaidi to produce a positive film that will emphasize the 
inclusiveness of Jerusalem for all people, wondering specifically if Al-Zobaidi can find a vantage 
point from which to capture a mosque, synagogue, and church in the same film frame. When the 
film crew finally does get the shot, it is the menorah on top of Ariel Sharon’s home that 
deceptively serves as the synagogue. The remainder of Looking Awry follows Al-Zobaidi as he 
attempts to make this film and runs into various problems shooting and editing, including the 
death of a crew member (revealed through martyr photos pasted on walls in the city).  In one 
scene, the sights of Al-Zobaidi’s camera, panning up the Holy Sepulchre Church, correspond to 
the sights an Israeli rifle shooting Palestinian children through a sudden jump cut. In a 
subsequent scene in the editing room, the editor justifies the inclusion of such a shot in the film, 
arguing for its documentary value. Al-Zobaidi calls the Americans, however, who want to see a 
film on Jerusalem without soldiers, without settlers, and without politics. Realizing the 
impossibility of that film, Looking Awry ends with Al-Zobaidi phoning the Americans to tell 
them that he doesn’t wish to finish their film (saying it would be fiction, not the documentary 
they asked for) and that he wishes he could have made his “own film.”  This seems to reflect in 
some ways Al-Zobaidi’s own difficulties funding Looking Awry, which was initially proposed 
under another title and later found funding through the Bethlehem 2000 Project.68 
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While Looking Awry then appears to be Al-Zobaidi’s “own film,” this final scene 
distances even this project, pointing to the difficulty of making a film either of one’s own, or for 
a particular ideological purpose like the American-funded one.  Al-Zobaidi’s apparent choice not 
to make either film—neither the one he wants, nor the American Jerusalem film—suggests that 
he refuses or resists participation in a visual schema that makes easy distinctions between the 
visible and invisible.  Rather, Al-Zobaidi’s film emphasizes the likely unintelligibility of certain 
images even while he includes them in his film.  The film never simply reveals anything, and 
always takes a stance somewhat distant from or skeptical of the images in the film.  Thus the 
inclusion of the shot of Israeli soldiers shooting Palestinian children in Looking Awry is 
questioned for inclusion in the film-within-the-film regarding its political purpose and its 
capacity to successfully document the violence of the conflict.  
In this way, it is not as if Al-Zobaidi’s film asks us to look beyond ideological images in 
order to reveal the truth, since his film does not purport to offer reality either.  Even aesthetically 
beautiful shots are called into question—at one point in the film Al-Zobaidi’s wife directs the 
filmmaker’s attention to a group of religious women walking through an alley in the old city, 
saying it would be a nice shot for his film. Al-Zobaidi, the character, disagrees (though of course 
the shot appears in Looking Awry).  Yet another shot comes under similar inspection through the 
audio of a conversation between the filmmaker and his wife: a Jewish man and a Palestinian man 
meet in an alley to discuss arranged sex and who will fuck whom. Al-Zobaidi chimes in, “the 
Arab will fuck the Jew,” though this scene is also determined inappropriate for the film that the 
Americans want.  
Looking Awry seems to answer the question of why Al-Zobaidi does not, and cannot, 
simply make the film he might prefer to make about Israeli military control of Jerusalem 
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because, presumably, it cannot be seen. Thus Al-Zobaidi continually returns to questions about 
the limits of the seen and visible, and even the audible, as the film both enacts and refuses an 
attempt to revise frames of reference and fields of perception through which a Palestinian film 
might be seen. Not only do Palestinian films like Al-Zobaidi’s often index the conflicted 
contexts of their production, distribution and exhibition, they also suggest that Palestinian 
identity and subjectivity is formed through what would appear to be insurmountable obstacles 
and constraints. This explains, I argue, the wry humor, self-reflexivity, and irreverence marking 
the style and affective register of much of Palestinian cinema.   
Al-Zobaidi’s film underscores that Palestinian cinema ought to be understood not only 
through reference to unrecognizability—to the ways Palestinian narratives have been 
constrained, censored, restricted and denied. Palestinian expression ought rather to be understood 
to become possible precisely through reference to inexpressibility, since, as Said suggests, the 
Palestinian story is precisely the denial of a Palestinian story, and consequently its “characteristic 
mode” is non-narrative prose marked by formal instabilities.  In other words, the seeming 
inadmissibility of Palestinian narratives is deployed as a form of creative intervention, which 
cannot be fully explained as irony or subversive refusal. Palestinian expressions, as Said 
suggests, are composed of failed attempts that do not simply deny the structures that would 
determine them as failures, because to dismiss those forces would ignore the contradictions and 
paradoxes that structure Palestinian life in concretely material ways. 
 The cinema of Elia Suleiman, for example, lingers on these contradictions through 
seemingly disconnected, fragmented or inexplicably prolonged vignettes that suggest the 
repetition of failed attempts at Palestinian expression and intelligibility. In several of Elia 
Suleiman’s films, the director plays himself as the main character, a Palestinian filmmaker who 
   50 
does not or cannot speak, suggesting self-reflexively and somewhat paradoxically that the 
Palestinian film does not simply give voice to Palestinian nationalism. In Chronicle of a 
Disappearance (1996), for example, the director is asked to speak at a cultural event but each 
time he approaches the microphone he is interrupted before he even speaks by sound system 
feedback, ringing cellphones in the audience, and so on. The repetition of the theme of 
voicelessness not only points to the widespread non-recognition of Palestinian narratives, but 
also suggests that the Palestinian film does not and cannot simply give voice to the Palestinian 
cause or the Palestinian filmmaker.  And yet, the disconnected vignette-style present in 
Suleiman’s feature films suggest an importance to the proliferation of attempts at making 
meaning or interrupting the everyday modes of sociality under occupation. Hamid Dabashi 
describes Suleiman’s style in a way that suggests it can be understood through a kind of queer 
aesthetic: “It is defiantly sarcastic, creatively derisive, joyously flamboyant. It is mannered, 
stylized, graceful....His is a frivolity with a tad of arrogance, a smidgen of condescension, a flair, 
a pride, a pleasure in posing…”69 The kind of repetition of failure in Suleiman’s films is not 
limited to a kind of Palestinian self-critique, however, since the failure may sometimes belong to 
the viewer who cannot read the un-translated Arabic text that sometimes scrolls across the 
screen, explaining some of the “derisive” qualities and “condescension” that Dabashi 
characterizes. In a different way, Hamid Naficy interprets a Palestinian cinematic refusal to 
communicate in relation to oppressive conditions of occupation:  
the injunction may be instituted by the state prohibiting its citizens from communicating 
with one another either internally or from exile. Exiles from repressive societies have 
learned to get around the censorship and surveillance of their native or host governments 
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by developing  private encryption procedures for communicating with each other and with 
their compatriots elsewhere.70 
 
In other words, the perception of failed or restrained communication is also a familiar condition 
of life under occupation and diasporic life. 
The question “but why the cinema?” suggests the importance of immanent critique in the 
intersection of cinema and politics, not to mention the particular necessity for Palestinian 
filmmakers to make reference to the conditions, like occupation and diaspora, through which 
Palestinian stories become recognizable or are contained somewhat outside realms of political 
possibility. The French-Palestinian character Suha in Hany Abu-Assad’s 2005 film Paradise 
Now asks this very question, “but why the cinema?” at one point in that film as well. The debate 
around Paradise Now’s Oscar nomination for Best Foreign Language Film offers an opportunity 
consider the larger place of Palestinian cinema in relation to how cinema becomes enlisted by 
national and transnational discourses in various ways. Some US film reviews suggested the film 
dangerously held the potential to render Palestinian suicide attacks sympathetic or to humanize 
“terrorists,” although the real threat was probably that that the film might cause some to question 
the emphasis on an invigorated “we are all Israelis now” discourse after 9/11.71 Scholars like Ella 
Shohat and Robert Stam imply that the public designation of Paradise Now as a Palestinian film, 
which occurred when actor Will Smith announced the nomination for a film from “the 
Palestinian Territories,” inaugurates or legitimizes Palestinian nationalism to some extent.  For 
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Shohat and Stam, the scene of spectatorship in the theater screening a Palestinian film produces a 
kind of “provisional ‘nation’” through “the cinema’s institutional ritual of gathering a 
community—spectators who share a region, language, and culture—[which] homologizes, in a 
sense, the symbolic gathering of the nation.”72 Shohat and Stam imply that the multiple sights 
and sites of Palestinian nationhood in the film’s narrative, locations, mise-en-scene, exhibition 
and distribution have the potential to constitute a sense of Palestinian national collectivity in 
terms that challenge what is widely understood as its illegitimacy (in its proximity to terrorism, 
the subject of the film for many viewers and critics) or unrecognizability (as it gets lost in the 
Zionist narrative of Israel and a Jewish homeland).  
While Paradise Now retains its status as a Palestinian film made by a Palestinian 
filmmaker, it has rarely been screened in the Occupied Palestinian Territories or in Israel. The 
lack of a strong local audience for Palestinian cinema emerges as a topic of discussion between 
protagonist Said and Suha, a French-Palestinian woman who tries to convince Said to pursue 
non-violent resistance. While Suha tries to engage Said in seemingly flirtatious small talk, the 
violent reality of Israeli occupation inevitably spoils the moment: 
Suha: “Do you go to the movies?” 
Said: “No, there’s no cinema in Nablus anyway.” 
Suha: “I know.  Have you ever been to a cinema before?” 
Said: “Yes, once.  Ten years ago when we burned down the Rovoly Cinema.” 
Suha: “You did that?” 
Said: “Not alone.  There were lots of us.” 
Suha: “Why? What did the cinema do to you?” 
Said: “Not the cinema.  Israel.  When Israel decided not to employ any workers 
from the West Bank we demonstrated.  Then we ended up in the cinema and set it 
on fire.” 
Suha: “But why the cinema?” 
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Said: “Why us?”73 
 
Beyond serving as a somewhat straightforward commentary on the reality of the movie-going 
context in Palestine, the conversation between Said and Suha also functions as meta-commentary 
on Paradise Now, hinting that the film itself won’t have a large Palestinian audience.  Put 
another way, this conversation seems intended for the spectator who, like Suha, takes movie 
going somewhat for granted and associates film spectatorship primarily with leisure—hence its 
ability to engender intimacy. Said’s response acts as a kind of corrective, then, of the assumption 
that cinema can be a space of escape or distraction from occupation.  
Arguably, the film also makes reference to the early Palestinian cinema of resistance, 
particularly in a scene where Said is filmed reading a last will and testament, which we 
understand as a martyr video intended to circulate in the local area. In other words, within the 
rather mainstream narrative style of Paradise Now appears reference to the possibility of a 
cinematic practice more directly connected to armed resistance against occupation. But although 
the film cites this militant use of video technology, Paradise Now does not employ a 
revolutionary or verité style itself, and thus distinguishes its own style, and perhaps by extension 
intent, from that of the gritty video testimonial of the militant martyr video.  At the same time, 
the film does include a jarring scene in which Said speaks directly to the camera, likely 
surprising some viewers with his confident commitment to the plan to blow himself up. This 
scene serves as a different kind of martyr video, one that breaks the narrative wall and is less 
easily locatable within the stereotypical scene of the militant martyr video.  
In addition to the meta-commentary on cinematic style and its relation to politics and 
resistance, Paradise Now’s intervention into conversations about the struggle for Palestinian 
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rights and the role of cinema appears through a kind of tension produced between the temptation 
and denial of a heterosexual romance. The romantic potential between Suha and Said is 
portrayed almost exclusively through its repeated interruption by the reality of the occupation.  
Palestinian life in the territories is depicted in the film largely through reference to the kind of 
stalled or broken temporality described by (Edward) Said, which diverts from (hetero)normative 
time and forecloses the possibility for a classical Hollywood-style heterosexual romance that the 
film seems unable to sustain. Paradise Now implies that normative romantic tropes are not as 
readily available for Palestinian stories.  Yet, by continually holding those tropes at bay, 
Paradise Now undermines cinematic narrative expectation, leaving a seemingly inevitable 
heteronormative romance partial and purposefully, pointedly unfulfilled. It is not that the film 
forecloses heteronormative romance only to reaffirm heteronormativity as natural and ideal for a 
liberated Palestinian society, rather; I argue that the film invokes a kind of queer temporality, one 
which indexes a normative narrative timeline only to interrupt it, as a strategy for political 
intervention. Marking the contradiction of the situation of Palestinian cinema, the film invokes a 
radically different use of cinema—the martyr video—to mark its political and ethical imperative, 
yet within the frame of a film that is otherwise legible through the tropes of international art-
house cinema. 
Emphasizing the film’s questioning of cinema’s actual and potential role in the context of 
occupation, Said refuses to adequately respond to Suha’s question about why he and others 
burned the theaters, denying the action had anything to do with cinema. She presses the issue: 
“But why the cinema?” Said responds “Why us?” again re-directing the conversation toward the 
issue of Palestinian oppression and away from a statement about cinema per se. Said seems 
uninterested in claiming any importance for cinema, either as a tool or casualty of resistance.  
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And yet, since this conversation takes place within a Palestinian film, it begs the question of 
what director Abu-Assad might be suggesting about his own cinematic practice in relation to the 
Palestinian struggle against occupation and dispossession. Is Abu-Assad acknowledging the 
potential irrelevance of his own film in relation to other forms of resistance to Israeli occupation 
and siege?  Or, is he indexing the varied possibilities of a new context for a resistant Palestinian 
cinematic practice? The film at least raises the question of “why the cinema?” as an artistic or 
political form, and it remains an open question.  Likewise, Al-Zobaidi’s Looking Awry asks the 
viewer to consider not only why the filmmaker cannot make either the film he wants to make, 
nor the one the producers request, but also why it wouldn’t be seen within a broader context of 
the unrecognizability of Palestinian narratives. Put another way, the possibility for a seemingly 
more authentic and self-apparent Palestinian film is foreclosed not only by the problems of co-
production and foreign interests, but also because of the problem of representation per se—
particularly the urgency yet impossibility of simply representing, as in documenting and 
exposing, the violence of occupation. 
As Christison’s study of U.S. foreign policy underscores, without knowledge of the 
historical context of the ways in which the frames of reference that make Palestinian 
dispossession and the Palestinian struggle unrecognizable have been shaped, evidence that 
contradicts the absence or illegitimacy of Arab inhabitance of Palestine, and contrary to the 
notion of Israeli democratic tolerance, seems doomed to remain to some extent unconvincing or, 
worse, unnoticed.  This perspective also informs Al-Zobaidi’s focus on cinematic practice during 
the Second Intifada and the contradictory logic of inclusion and exclusion the film forefronts. 
Likewise, Christison argues that the Arabs in Palestine were not simply underrepresented or 
excluded, but rather were included in the dominant historical narrative about Palestine as figures 
   56 
out of place, few in number, non-nationalist, and so on.  In light of this, my argument that the 
sense of inevitability attached to Jewish nationalism in Palestine was, and still is, achieved 
through knowledge structures that have rendered Palestinian claims to national self-definition 
and dispossession largely “unrecognizable,” complicating the role cinema can play in a context 
that seems to lead only to representational traps.  
2.3 CINEMA’S EXPANSE 
By attempting to map some of the routes followed or implied by the disciplinary categories of 
Israeli and Palestinian film studies, I have so far adhered to “cinema” as a rather self-evident 
object of analysis, and have not yet explained what I mean by “cinema” in terms of my broader 
theoretical approach, nor in terms of “object,” or, rather, what I’ll be following around (to 
borrow an often-used phrase from Sara Ahmed) when I indicate “cinema” as a focus. I have 
already suggested the ways that transnational cinema studies has expanded frames for 
understanding cinema and challenging what seemed to be narrow and rigid national cinema 
models, and how it suggests conceptual and material expansions outside national borders. I argue 
however, that in the context of transnational studies of Israeli and Palestinian cinema, there are 
aspects of Palestinian media production that risk being overlooked since they do not make 
Palestinian cinema more recognizable as a field of study. Given that Palestinian cinema studies 
cohered as a separate field in English language academic spheres somewhat after Israeli cinema 
studies had established itself as a field with particular concerns, it has had to establish itself 
through clear acknowledgement of its own set of concerns, body of films, and notable 
filmmakers. The self-referential and immanently critical question of “why the cinema” appears 
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in so many Palestinian films, explicitly and implicitly, that it would seem remiss not to take this 
question seriously. Yet this question doesn’t offer an easy consolidation of either the field of 
Palestinian cinema as a legitimate and valuable concern, nor does it make a claim for the further 
study of Palestinian film from within film studies’ conventions.  
Furthermore, while Hamid Dabashi’s edited collection Dreams of a Nation: On 
Palestinian Cinema and Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi’s Palestinian Cinema: Landscape, 
Trauma and Memory marked out nation-production as a broad aim of Palestinian cinema 
production and offered a wealth of analysis from within that lens, it remains to be seen whether 
within the contemporary field of Palestinian cinematic and moving audio-visual media 
production the question of the nation is still pre-dominant. Are Palestinian filmmakers following 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions strategies in their production practices, for example? If so, 
they may not be working with particular notions of the “nation” in mind (since the official 
Boycott National Committee does not support any political party or border solution), and there 
may be other conceptions of modes of sociality and belonging behind the scenes as well as 
onscreen. These are not necessarily neglected through a national cinema frame, yet the contours 
of the question of the nation may have changed or taken on new forms in light of new strategies 
of Palestinian resistance and solidarity, in Occupied Palestine and in the diaspora. This 
dissertation explores some alternative routes for the study of cinema in the Palestinian context, 
which would allow for a further analysis of the question of the nation. First, though, I argue that 
the history of cinema in the region needs to be understood in relation to a broader visual culture. 
 “Cinema” in this context marks out not only a specific technology or set of media 
practices, but as a massive cultural apparatus—a matrix of audio-visual and textual forms and 
practices (including discourses of vision and visuality, and pre- and proto-cinematic 
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technologies) as well as a key component of dominant modes of perception. Because I believe 
that film studies has in many ways not fully accounted for cinema’s role in shaping the idea and 
place of historic and Occupied Palestine, I am less interested in the various media forms 
(photography, radio, television, internet) key to understanding cinema’s hybridity than I am in 
cinema’s relation to visualizing logics and discourses. These frames of reference inform and 
shape cinema and include text, landscape, and architecture, as well as human rights discourses 
around visibility, recognition and belonging (including contemporary discourses of gay rights in 
and queer Palestinian activism. While I am not advocating a kind of total disciplinary flexibility, 
the stakes of which will become more apparent in the next section, I do want to question the 
established boundaries of what becomes easily recognizable in national and transnational Israeli 
and Palestinian film studies in order to explore cinema’s less obvious investments (in state 
ideologies, for instance) and enlistments (in military occupation, for example), and ultimately its 
divestments, too (insofar as cinema can be a site of protest and refusal). 
Following Beatriz Colomina in her book Privacy and Publicity: Architecture as Mass 
Media, which aimed to understand architecture as “a series of overlapping systems of 
representation,” my approach to cinema does not mean abandoning the traditional film studies 
object, the film, similar to how Colomina’s approach “does not mean abandoning the traditional 
architectural object, the building.”74  But where Colomina was trying to bring architecture into 
the realm of representation, alongside “drawings, photographs, writing, film, and 
advertisements,” I follow “film” somewhat to the side of the realm of representation, at least 
momentarily, in order to understand its diverse roles as a technology related to other kinds of 
state and war technologies, to cite its influence and ongoing involvement in a variety of 
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discursive realms (political, artistic, militaristic, etc.), to explore its historic role as an archive 
preserving certain modes of belonging and denying others, and, moreover, to analyze it as a 
technique of power imbricated in a wider epistemological matrix, one that bears on recognition 
and intelligibility, and not just visuality and audio-visuality. For Colomina’s project, the “site of 
architectural production” is no longer only the construction site but “the rather immaterial sites 
of architectural publications, exhibitions, journals” which seem “more ephemeral media than the 
building and yet in many ways are much more permanent: they secure a place for an architecture 
in history, a historical space designed not just by the historians and critics but also by the 
architects themselves who deployed these media.”75 Similarly, I suggest that sites of Palestinian 
cinematic production, broadly construed, are also immaterial and material sites of nation 
production, maintaining and reiterating the terms through which a sense of inevitability attached 
to certain forms of nationalism is continually secured. This take on cinema “displaced into” 
seemingly immaterial sites (like Zionist Jewish Agency publications and lecture notes about 
cinema, early twentieth century Jewish immigrant artist discourse on Palestine’s perceptual 
problems, aerial photography and vertical imagery, and NGO human rights discourse) that are 
distinct from more recognizable cinematic sites (like the sites of film viewing, location-shooting, 
studio productions, and so on) is combined with an approach to locating more clearly material 
sites, yet still perhaps seemingly unlikely sites for a film studies project, including the Separation 
Barrier, Zionist settlement design, military training sites, and occupied Palestinian houses. This 
cultural studies approach to cinema studies is less common in Israeli and Palestinian film studies 
at this stage. This project locates cinema in larger processes of state-building that were to some 
extent documented and promoted through cinema and circulated as films about Jewish nation-
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building (for example), but which were also aided by cinematic technologies and by modes of 
perception, recognition and intelligibility that form aspects of the wider epistemological 
configuration significantly marked at the turn of the century by cinema as well as sexuality. 
In other words, through this approach I inevitably find cinema in seemingly odd places—
the seeing and non-seeing surveillance technologies used at the defacto borders of the Separation 
Barrier are one example of how film technology is incorporated into daily practices of 
occupation, but the site and sight of the Separation Barrier is tied to the cinema in less concrete 
ways as another technique of intelligibility and cinematic recognition. Given that the Jewish 
National Fund relied on film and photography in their early twentieth-century fundraising 
campaigns abroad, and that these films were seen by political leaders who could make 
transformative decisions regarding the fate of competing nationalisms and colonialisms in the 
region, the consequences of “cinematic recognition” cannot be reduced to representation or the 
circulation of meaning, since in that framework cinema too easily serves as a figuration of a 
conduit that transmits or reflects cultural meaning rather than shapes and produces it.  As Natasa 
Durovicova argues in the preface to World Cinemas, Transnational Perspectives, “as a product 
of later-industrial modernity, all cinema is marked by, and itself reworks elements (labor, capital, 
body, raw materials, ideology) it shares with other commodity production, as well as elements 
which wary from period to period and place to place (mise-en-scene, performance, 
representational forms of meaning-making).”76    
Cinema brings with it, and is embedded in, the historical and cultural formations of its 
technologies and practices—it indexes a wider epistemological configuration in multiple ways. 
In part, this means treating cinema like Derek Gregory treats photography in his study of tourist 
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photography in Egypt during the latter part of the nineteenth century, “not simply as a medium 
but as a discourse,” whereby photography “comprises agents and instruments, materials and 
images, conventions and practices, which are articulated through a complex actor-network that, 
like any such network, threads its way into many others; hence its imbrications in both the visual 
cultures of Orientalism and the cultures of modern tourism.”77 The medium/discourse split cited 
by Gregory is usefully complicated by the term “dispositive,” a translation of the French 
‘dispositif’ as used by Michel Foucault, for example, as described by Francois Albera and Maria 
Tortajada’s Cinema Beyond Film: Media Epistemology in the Modern Era. The dispositive, they 
explain, “includes everything that is laid out in front of the spectator, together with all the 
elements that allow the representation to be viewed and heard,” and furthermore, “by 
approaching dispositives from the angle of discourses,” as they do in the collection, they “are 
aiming to construct the conditions of possibility of the dispositives themselves as constituted 
knowledge.”78 Following Foucault, there is a distinction to be made between technologies like 
cinema and a broader cinematic discourse, since the “technologies of control (the key example 
being the panopticon) do not themselves define the category of dispositive, which is wider, i.e., 
the disciplinary regime or sexuality.”79 Neither cinema, in other words, nor “the whole collection 
of audio and visual ‘machines in themselves constitute ‘dispositives’,” but belong to a larger 
frame that is itself put in relation to cinema. Thus, “the knowledge of dispositives is not only 
constructed within the heterogeneity of sources and data, but also in the confrontation between 
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the discursive and the concrete historical object, the social practice that it implies, and so on,” 
and furthermore “is not determined by a type of enunciation or institution,” which would include 
cinema and media studies. Following this approach, I also engage the term “recognition” to 
index how value and intelligibility get parsed out within an epistemological frame, and also to 
complicate models and metaphors of inclusion/exclusion, visible/invisible, included/excluded 
that appear somewhat common sense in dominant understandings and discourses of cinema 
(where representation is often seen as positive and inclusive) and sexuality (where coming out is 
equated with freedom and path to rights and recognition, a point explored in the next section). 
Still, why cinema studies? There is no doubt that cinema has played and continues to play 
an important role in Historic and Occupied Palestine. Marking my approach in terms of cinema’s 
expanse is intended to show that cinema is in many ways more powerful than has often been 
accounted for, particularly given its interpenetration of other areas. Cinema, like what W.J.T. 
Mitchell calls images or pictures, are often both more and less powerful than sometimes 
assumed; in fact, “we as critics may want pictures to be stronger than they actually are in order to 
give ourselves a sense of power in opposing, exposing, or praising them.”80 Since wider 
epistemological configurations are not easily undermined, and yet undergo constant change, the 
concept of national intelligibility serves to continually point to possibilities and limits, and to the 
necessity for ongoing critique and investigation of new terms. While I hope to expand the diverse 
contexts for interpreting cinema, particularly to take seriously the question “why the cinema?” 
from Palestinian cinema, I also hope to continually pose cinema in the form of a question from 
within cinema studies. 
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2.4 WHAT’S QUEER ABOUT…?: QUEER RELATIONALITY AND CRITIQUE 
In addition to questions compelled by cinema—“why cinema?” and “what is cinema?”—
this project’s focus on queerness and engagement with a queer studies critical frame implies the 
parallel inquiries “why queer?” and “what is queer?”  For me, these questions are related to 
concerns raised by Judith Butler in the essay “Against Proper Objects,” which appeared in the 
feminist journal differences in 1994 and was addressed to feminist studies, gay and lesbian 
studies, and queer studies. Butler was responding in part to the terms through which a new book 
on lesbian and gay studies explained and grounded its project as distinct from feminist studies. 
Butler takes issue with what seemed to be a gesture to “include and supersede” feminism in gay 
and lesbian studies, through a repudiation and reduction of several decades of feminist theory 
and activism. In light of the many problems Butler detects in this move, she cautions: “I would 
insist that both feminist and queer studies need to move beyond and against those 
methodological demands which force separations in the interests of canonization and provisional 
institutional legitimation.”81 The stakes of how we define a field’s legitimacy matter, in other 
words, and, for Butler,  
what is incisive and valuable in feminist work is precisely the kind of thinking that calls 
into question the settled grounds of analysis. And even the recourse to sexual difference 
within feminist theory is at its most productive when it is taken not as a ground, 
foundation, or methodology, but as a question posed but not resolved.82 
 
In many ways, queer studies has broadly worked in the nearly two decades since Butler’s essay 
to produce a persistent question about what “queer” means, or what “queer” is doing, and this 
has continually shaped the field’s varied concerns.   
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In light of forces unleashed by the war on terror, including the “reactionary (identity) 
politics” aligning some gay and lesbian subjects with neo-liberalism, David Eng, Judith 
Halberstam, and Jose Esteban Muñoz in a 2005 special edition of Social Text, “What’s Queer 
about Queer Studies Now?” sought to return the category of “queer” to its full sense of engaged 
critique, since they sensed it might be undergoing some disciplinary settling.83 Since resisting 
categorization is part of its definitional character for many queer studies scholars, queer, they 
explain, can be understood as “a political metaphor without a fixed referent” always committed 
to a “continuing critique of its exclusionary operations.”84 In other words, queer indicates 
openness to the continued critique of its own critical methods—a “question posed but not 
resolved.” Queer is often also the temporary name given to whatever is marked unthinkable, 
impossible, or incalculable in the always-shifting terms of recognition and value in dominant 
social organizations in a historical moment and particular socio-cultural context. Lee Edelman 
argues something similar in his call to take seriously an association of queerness with negativity, 
and particularly with the psychoanalytic concept of the death drive: 
By denying our identification with the negativity of this drive, and hence our 
disidentification from the promise of futurity, those of us inhabiting the place of the queer 
may be able to cast off that queerness and enter the properly political sphere, but only by 
shifting the figural burden of queerness to someone else.  The structural position of 
queerness, after all, and the need to fill it remain.85 
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Expanding critiques of homonationalism, a term originating in Jasbir Puar’s Terrorist 
Assemblages that provided new currency and increased attention to racialization in Lisa 
Duggan’s term “homonormatvity,” argue for the centrality of this “shifting [of] the figural 
burden of queerness” in increased state attention to certain forms of gay and lesbian recognition 
as a way to distract from and further pursue military aims and geo-political dominance.  In light 
of this, does “queer” still have the potential to create forms of belonging and modes of sociality 
that challenge the state, as well as hetero- and homo-normativity, and that are transformational 
and not just bids for more inclusion or equality (aims readily associated with neo-liberal 
multiculturalism and capitalism)?  
The question of belonging forms another aspect of concerns about proper objects and 
“inhabiting the place of the queer” considered in terms of disciplinary inhabitance.  Who and 
what can inhabit, or find a home, in queer studies? Should queer continue to expand?  In the 
Transgender Studies Reader, Jay Prosser takes issue, for example, with Butler’s apparent desire 
to maintain queer critique as one that resists domestication and assimilation. Prosser disputes  
what is not a concern is whether queer should even attempt to expand; expansion, 
inclusion, incorporation are automatically invested with value. One wonders to what 
extent this queer inclusiveness of transgender and transsexuality is an inclusiveness for 
queer rather than for the trans subject.”86 
 
Jordana Rosengberg and Amy Villarejo echo this concern over queer’s conceptual expansiveness 
regarding intersections of queer studies and Marxist critique, particularly on the issue of totality 
and its frequent conflation with universalism, cautioning that “queer studies might find itself 
surprisingly in tune with the disciplinary trespass endemic to totalizing thought in its best, most 
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capacious versions.”87 For Prosser, this concern about “queer inclusiveness” returns us to 
questions about disciplinary homes and the possibilities for strategic alliances:  
Domestication appears to represent the assigning of subjects and methodologies to 
specific categorical homes, the notion that there is an institutional place to which they 
belong…To resist queer’s incorporation of trans identities and trans studies is not to 
refuse the value of institutional alliances and coalitions (in the form of shared 
conferences, journals, courses, and so on). But an alliance, unlike a corporation, suggests 
a provisional or strategic union between parties whose different interests ought not to 
be—indeed, cannot totally be—merged, sublimated for cohering—or queering—the 
whole.88  
 
Yet Nael Bhanji has critiqued Prosser’s own politics of home in his approach to transition 
narratives cited in Prosser’s Second Skins, which deploys migrant metaphors to stress the 
importance of belonging for livable identities based in part on “tacit discourses of citizenship.”89 
Bhanji compels us to question the goal of belonging altogether, through the disorienting presence 
of “the racialized body or Oriental” who “jeopardizes the fictive unity of belonging precisely 
because of its disorienting presence.”90 In other words, Bhanji questions whether the aim of 
inclusiveness is necessarily a positive or progressive one, given that the terms through which 
belonging is articulated often serve to mark out new spaces of unbelonging. This insight is 
important not only for my later discussion of solidarity and alliance in Chapter 4, but also for 
considering here how disciplinary belonging itself serves as a narrative of “fictive unity.”  
“Fictive unity” is an apt description of the neo-liberal multicultural and humanist 
discourses undergirding the narratives that often attend Israeli cinema and invest in the 
disciplinary tropes noted above (origins, archives, and representation). Israeli film studies, as it 
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coheres in it dominant form in journals, anthologies, and at conferences, increasingly denies 
continued exchanges between war, the Israeli state, and cinema, through reference to narratives 
of progress that have moved past these questions. The popular narrative of Israeli cinema’s 
progress charts a march from a propagandistic or useful cinema to a more mature and complex 
one, marked by a shift in focus formally and conceptually from the collective to the individual, 
from Orientalism to neo-liberal multiculturalism (marked by a focus on Arab Jews, ultra-
Orthodox communities, the LGBT community, etc.), and from what is seen as patriotism (in the 
war films of the 1970s, for example) to a nationalism with an anti-nationalist alibi (hence an 
Israeli film might be promoted in Israel as refreshingly European or universalizing, having 
“moved beyond” purely national concerns). 
Questions about proper disciplinary objects and proper disciplinary inhabitance bear, 
then, on how certain kinds of work and concerns become recognizable and on what terms. The 
concern raised by Bhanji about belonging in trans narratives is furthered through David Eng’s 
notion of “the forgetting of race,” whereby “ever since the Enlightenment race has always 
appeared as disappearing,” which can occur through other seemingly inclusive processes of 
addition and reparation.91  Progress narratives can maintain a certain degree of flexibility, it 
seems, as long as the dominant narratives remain intact and any real transformation is held at 
bay. In this way, the dominant Zionist narratives may have been unsettled by Israeli revisionist 
or “New” historians like Tom Segev, Ilan Pappé, and Benny Morris who revealed largely 
concealed violence at the heart of the state’s founding, for example, and yet the dominant notion 
of a contemporary liberal and tolerant democratic state remains today intact seemingly regardless 
of the acknowledgment of its founding. Racism is often approached in contemporary Israeli 
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political discourse through reference to a multicultural society (in spite of its imperative to 
maintain its Jewish majority) that simply needs to find ways to incorporate and assimilate racial 
minorities (who can easily be marked as unable to assimilate if they are non-citizen migrant 
workers, Palestinians, un-patriotic, etc.). For David Eng, the “racialization of intimacy marks the 
collective ways by which race becomes occluded within the private domain of private family and 
kinship today,” and in which “racialized subjects and objects are reinscribed into a discourse of 
colorblindness,” which has ultimately become an aspect of notions of progress within the liberal 
humanist tradition, including “queer liberalism.”92 Indeed, the Israeli state’s taking up of a gay 
rights liberal progress discourse a decade ago, through Foreign Ministry projects aligned with 
Brand Israel, has prompted queer Palestinian activism and solidarity activism to mobilize at 
times around the question “what’s gay (or queer) about the occupation?,” an issue taken up in 
more detail in Chapter 3, and which, for example, gives new contexts for understanding the 
relation between sexuality and nationalism.  
The notion of progress here seems to rely on the assumption that Jewish-Israeli society 
has moved from a predominant homophobia, exemplified by early Zionist patriarchal nationalist 
discourse and symbols, to ever-increasing tolerance. Only recently have critics begun suggesting 
that Zionism does not necessitate homophobia, but not many have posed the question of to what 
extent it ever did. Perhaps (and perhaps because of its highly racialized and ethnocentric 
formation) the security, unity, consolidation and maintenance of a sense of Jewish national 
belonging in Palestine relied less on binary gender and sexuality than it did on securing and 
reconstituting forms of national intelligibility that would continually render Palestinian 
dispossession and claims to self-determination unrecognizable to much of the world.  In light of 
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Edelman’s positing of the “structural burden of queerness,” it is tempting to conceptualize 
Palestine in terms of the queer negativity it becomes associated with through the homonational 
discourses marking Israel as gay-friendly. Palestinian society is largely marked as homophobic 
through this discourse, and queer Palestinians are construed only in terms of victimization. To 
suggest that Palestinian society is largely queered, in negative terms, through racialized 
homonationalist discourse is by no means to suggest that gender and sexual minorities in Israeli 
society are either not similarly queered (particularly if they are non-white/Ashkenazi), nor is it to 
analogize that Jewish sexual and gender minorities are “like Palestinians” in their subject 
positions, and it is also not to deny the grievances of gender and sexual minorities within 
Palestinian society. Rather, I am suggesting that Israeli nationalism emerged in part through the 
racialized categories of non-normative gender and sexuality emerging primarily from turn of the 
century medical discourse, and that homophobia cannot fully account for varied meanings and 
roles of queerness in this context. 
In a similar vein, the editors of the book Queer Theory and the Jewish Question suggest 
that in a variety of ways the Jewish question was always already a queer question. Zionist 
transformation of Jewishness cannot be reduced to a notion that Jews were perceived as 
“homosexual,” although new conceptions and categories of sexuality and gender as producing 
types of persons played key roles in the discourse on Jewish degeneration and Zionist 
transformation at the time. This racialized scientific and medical discourse was formed through 
negative associations with whatever was seen to constitute Jewish sociality from European anti-
Semitic perspectives—religious culture, the forms of habitation necessitated by ghetto, shtetl and 
other forms of oppressed Jewish life and modes of sociality, and, seemingly contradictory to this, 
a supposed suspiciously easy adaptation to cosmopolitan life (according to sexologist Max 
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Nordau). To suggest that all of these various, contingent and contradictory elements are what 
produced Jews as “queer” at the time is to recognize that a distinction between “normative” and 
“queer” does not rely on definitions of sexuality and gender alone, whereas within dominant 
liberal discourse on identity, rights, and recognition, the terms “gay” and “homosexual,” and less 
often “queer,” frequently attend the “forgetting of race.” In other words, gay progress in Israel is 
another way of forgetting race, since the intersectional roots of what rendered Jews queer is 
elided in the narrative of historical progress from a homophobic to a tolerant nation, one which 
can be understood at its core as a racist state. 
While the Jewish question, by all official accounts, seems largely solved through the 
establishment of the state of Israel, the “Palestinian question” appears to still be an open one that 
bears not only on Israeli society, but on international law, US foreign policy, on countries with 
large Palestinian refugee populations and, of course, it is a question that bears on a diverse and 
dispersed Palestinian society. The whole question of Questions, like the Jewish, Palestinian, and 
Queer Questions, is tied to this project’s critical and intersection approach. Joseph Massad has 
argued compellingly and convincingly “the persistence of the Palestinian Question…is the 
persistence of the Jewish Question,” since, in part, Zionism’s “persistence in oppressing the 
Palestinians is precisely its persistence in suppressing the Jew within.”93 “Both questions,” he 
concludes, “can only be resolved by the negation of anti-Semitism, which still plagues much of 
Europe and American and which mobilizes Zionism’s own hatred of Jewish Jews and of the 
Palestinians.”94  
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Massad’s point here must be understood in relation to his critique of the Gay 
International, which similarly focuses on neo-Orientalism and racism.  Yet, Massad has been 
criticized for the way that his critiques of gay imperialism leave little room to consider the varied 
approaches that queer Palestinian activists bring to intersecting struggles against occupation and 
discrimination. For example, the question of “queer Palestine” posed in terms of GLBT rights 
and recognitions at first appears as a question posed from without, from “the West,” from Israel 
and from international and Israeli non-governmental organizations. In other words, to inquire 
about Palestine’s queer population or Palestinian society’s perceptions of queerness, appears to 
emerge from the West, from the “Western male white-dominated organizations (the International 
Lesbian and Gay Association—ILGA—and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission—IGLHRC)” and their “missionary tasks, the discourse that produces them, and the 
organizations that represent them,” which together Massad terms “the Gay International.”95 But 
queer and GLBTQ identified and/or allied Palestinian activists have been working for over a 
decade critiquing the discourse of these organizations to articulate their own perspectives on 
queerness, gender and sexual diversity, and what it means to be Palestinian. In an article on Arab 
queer activism, for instance, Haneen Maikey and Lynn Darwich critique the tendency from 
within and outside Arab queer and feminist activism to apply a West/anti-West binary to 
conceptual models and practices. They explain that the discourse they have adopted in their own 
queer activism  “is the result of the summation of ten years of different grassroots experiences 
built on critiquing and rejecting power structures and dominance on the basis of ethnicity, 
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sexuality, gender, class (feminist) and on analyzing the limitations of identity-based LGBT 
organizing with a passion for equality (queer).”96 
Jason Ritchie’s ethnography of the experiences of queer Palestinians elucidates in depth 
the problems with Massad’s framework. Explaining how Massad “fails to appreciate the political 
and ideological effects of the Gay International in Western countries,” since Massad neglects to 
point out that it is queer Israelis, Europeans and North Americans who are the Gay 
International’s audience and not queer Palestinians, he also argues that Massad “vastly overstates 
its effects in the Arab World.”97 Ritchie asserts, “the assumption that the emergence of self-
identified Arab queers is a straightforward result of the Gay International’s (neo)colonial 
imposition of Western values is, at best, naïve.”98 While Massad’s work in some ways only 
affirms the dominant frame of reference that would mark queer Palestinians as victims, either of 
Palestinian homophobia or the Gay International, queer Palestinian activists have continually 
offered critiques to the NGO human rights discourses, to Israeli state and mainstream GLBT 
discourse, and to aspects of Massad’s theoretical frame. Massad argues, for example: “that it is 
the very discourse of the Gay International, which both produces homosexuals, as well as gays 
and lesbians, where they do not exist, and represses same-sex desires and practices that refuse to 
be assimilated into its sexual epistemology.”99 For Haneen Maikey, director of alQaws for 
Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society, however, “queer” is not an English word 
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that is borrowed by or imposed onto Arab Palestinians who use it; rather it is an “English/Arabic 
term,” which is “useful for the time being.”100 Maikey’s provisional formulation acknowledges 
and responds to an ever-shifting ideological terrain shaping the conditions on the ground for 
queer Palestinians in Occupied Palestine and in the diaspora. Queer Palestinian organizing draws 
attention to Palestinian visions for the future with a difference, bringing productive complexity to 
intersections of queer and Palestine and challenging assumptions about the issues key to social 
change and fighting occupation. Ritchie explains that many queer Palestinians manage “not so 
much in calculated acts of resistance or complicity as in manifest acts of survival, to formulate 
modes of queerness that allow possibilities—e.g., religious sentiment, familial bonds, political 
commitments—foreclosed in Western and Israeli discourses of queer liberalism.”101  This 
approach is reflected in the ever-changing strategies of alQaws’ political and cultural activism. 
Given what I have briefly laid out as the expanded role of cinema in reproducing the 
frame of reference of “unrecognizability” in relation to Palestine, this project invokes queer as a 
critical methodology attuned to recognition, intelligibility, disciplinary power, and process, as 
well as limits and possibilities. Queerness is intertwined with cinema in this history through, for 
example, the ways in which the progress narrative of Israeli film discussed earlier is often told 
through reference to increasing tolerance and democratic freedom, a point made through 
reference to gay rights and representation. An increasing turn toward racial, sexual and gender 
minorities in Israeli cinema since the 1980s supposedly marks the opening up of social taboos 
and a shift toward internal diversity and politics, in opposition to what is frequently posited as an 
exhausting pressure to always reference Palestinians, nationalism, and occupation. When Ilan 
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Avisar writes “after completing a full circle from initial nationalistic propaganda to apocalyptic 
visions of national disintegration, Israeli cinema appears now at a fresh beginning,” one of his 
examples of the “fresh beginning” is high-grossing and award-winning gay Israeli filmmaker 
Eytan Fox, suggesting that Israeli cinema takes queerness as a promising location from which to 
articulate national ideology102 Likewise, Amy Kronish and Costel Safirman’s concluding 
comment on Israeli cinema and its themes in Israeli Film: A Reference Guide tells a similar 
story, locating queerness not as a challenge to the nation, but as a sign of its “maturity”: 
as Israeli society is developing and maturing and is no longer obsessed solely with 
cosmic and political issues, the new emphasis on human portrayals of the ‘now’ 
generation should bring more portrayals of gay and lesbian issues to the screen.103 
 
Presumably, “political issues” refers to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians, occupation, 
settlements, and a number of other issues seemingly more overtly racialized and ethno-national. 
“Comic” issues no doubt refers to the bourekas films of the 1960s and 70s, largely characterized 
by Israeli cinema studies as melodramatic, escapist, and dominated by ethnic stereotypes, again 
suggesting that cinema that underscores racial tension (between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews in 
the bourekas, for instance, or between Jews and Arab Palestinians) is deemed anachronistic, 
immature, and irrelevant.104 Perhaps presuming “gay and lesbian issues” ensure racialized 
politics will be sidelined, Kronish and Safirman situate queerness in Israeli cinema’s progress 
                                                
102 Ilan Avisar, “The National and the Popular in Israeli Cinema,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Jewish Studies 24.1 (2005), 143. 
103 Kronish and Safirman, Israeli Film, 51. 
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overlook in their desire to leave such films behind because of their emphasis on social tension 
and conflict. Shohat cites filmmakers Nissam Dayan, Yehuda Ne’eman and others for their 
attacks on bourekas as variously “‘commercial,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘cheap,’ ‘dumb,’ ‘Eastern,’ 
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Politics of Representation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 114-115. 
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narrative as markedly apolitical and private theme, one which marks and mirrors Israeli society’s 
progress toward a pluralist, multicultural and truly democratic state. 
Even more blatantly drawing on a notion of queer progress to bolster a narrative of Israeli 
cinematic progress, Gilad Padva “reevaluates the journey of the Israeli Queer Cinema from its 
‘closeted’ days of the 1970s and 1980s to the dramatic changes in the 1990s and the new 
challenges of the 2000s” in an essay on “(r)evolutionary queer identifications of Israeli 
filmmakers,” invoking the assumption that queerness is necessarily subversive and 
progressive.105 Alongside what Padva remarks as the “tremendous progress” of Israeli New 
Queer Cinema’s march from “the closet days” to the contemporary moment, marked by a society 
“more tolerant and liberal toward sexual minorities,” is a comparative and vague parallel to 
progress for “diverse subcultures both outside and inside the mainstream queer community (e.g., 
Orthodox gays and lesbians, transgender people, Asian and Arab GLBT people) that were often 
secluded and mistreated.”106 In the introduction to the collection in which Padva’s essay appears, 
the editors affirm “the opening of Israeli culture to alternative, new, and diverse directions [] 
articulated through new approaches to gender and sexuality, which challenge by now obsolete 
cinematic and cultural models.”107 Padva’s argument underscores how a certain narrative of 
queer progress is invoked in dominant narratives reiterated in Israeli cinema studies about 
national and cinematic progress, drawing a neat arc from the historical origins of Zionism, 
cinema and the new discourses of sexuality to an inclusive, diverse, multicultural, tolerant and 
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democratic Israel, which is still allowed its specifically Jewish, and normatively Ashkenazi, 
ethnonational character.  
Yet, also quite recently, film scholars Boaz Hagin and Raz Yosef, who have consistently 
been highly critical of Fox’s films and their version of patriotic, masculinist, and 
white/Ashkenazi gay Israeli citizenship, argue that critiques of queer Israeli cinema have 
exaggerated the role of the Israeli state and the Israeli public’s financial and ideological 
investment in the notion of Israel as progressive due to its stance on gay rights.108 They argue 
that this kind of representation of gay characters and Israeli-Palestinian politics is largely a tactic 
to appease European and North American audiences, particularly since many of Fox’s films are 
co-funded by European countries (in addition to the Israeli Film Fund). Hagin and Yosef argue 
that scholars ought to see queer Israeli cinema in all its complexity (with examples that critique 
the military or challenge the gay liberation narrative), shifting the frame only slightly to highlight 
university-funded films over the more explicitly state-funded ones. Universities with film 
programs such as Tel Aviv University and the public Sam Spiegel Film and Television School 
similarly receive state funding. More research is needed to explore to what extent university 
funding decisions for film school projects are influenced by the Cinema Law (subject to Knesset 
influence) and discriminatory laws such as the Loyalty Oath. Controversy did arise over the 
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Oscar-winning Israeli and Palestinian co-directed film Ajami (2009), for instance, when one of 
the directors, Palestinian Scandar Copti, protested that the film’s designation as “Israeli” denied 
his Palestinian identity. This prompted some MK Michael Ben Ari to suggest changes be made 
to the Cinema Law to restrict funding to unpatriotic films. Ben Ari is quoted in an interview 
stating, “support for a film should not be granted unless the editors, producers, directors and 
actors sign a declaration of loyalty to the State of Israel, its symbols and its Jewish-democratic 
values.”109 Hagin and Yosef overlook the possibility of that kind of direct political influence 
when they claim that short student films with queer themes are “free to ignore or subvert the self-
othering formula that is the sine qua non for further distribution in art houses and dedicated 
multi-plex screens.”110 Hagin and Yosef’s essay itself was funded in part by an Israeli Science 
Foundation research grant, state-funding that further calls into question their critique that their 
need to “self-exoticize” according to norms and standards implied by North American journals 
and books in order to cater to a “Western” audience. They perhaps avoid a discussion of Israeli 
state funding to counter both increasing critiques of Israeli cinema’s involvement in a use of gay 
rights to improve its image abroad as well as to avoid real discussion of the Academic and 
Cultural Boycott aspect of the broader call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, a strategy to 
end Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, to achieve a right of return for Palestinians 
in the diaspora, and to bring about justice for Palestinians in Israeli society. They joke, “isn’t 
Judith Butler boycotting us?” to remark on their “uncomfortable position” in encountering non-
Israeli scholars who presume they are “representing and defending the country and its films,” 
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and yet they do not explain what the boycott entails, or what Butler’s role is.111  Butler has 
supported the boycott, which is particularly focused on encouraging academics to decline offers 
to present their work in Israel, in part because the occupation makes the participation of many 
Palestinians in such events impossible. While Hagin and Yosef in some ways contradict the 
progress narrative in Israeli cinema studies that privileges queer cinema as a marker of maturity, 
they do so only to replace the transnationally co-produced and globally marketed gay Israeli 
cinema of Fox (which follows a “festival film formula”) with the institutionally-produced and 
presumably more authentic (since not “self-exoticizing) queer films that “reject or subvert” the 
“individualist gay liberation narrative.”112 In this way, while Hagin and Yosef’s argument could 
productively complicate and contradict the gay progress narrative within Israeli film studies by 
detaching queer issues from national progress narratives, it at the same time leaves little room to 
simultaneously critique the politics of film funding and the continued intersections between 
Israeli cinema and occupation.    
The complementary narratives of queer progress and cinematic progress are so 
commonplace within the field frequently marked out as “Israeli Cinema Studies” that the 
invocation of one progress narrative frequently implies the other, which further compels my own 
desire to seek out disciplinary difference with regard to cinema, queerness, and national 
belonging. In the next chapter, I explore early Jewish Agency Zionist films through alternative 
routes, working against Israeli film studies’ tendency to historicize early Zionist films as “pre-
state” Israeli cinema, which implies the state had already established a sense of inevitability. I 
emphasize Zionist cinema’s fragmentation through examination of its history of collaborating 
with British Empire colonial and US Protestant Holy Land discourse, its role in funding 
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settlement and state-building, Zionist institutional disagreements over its ability to serve as a 
historical record of Jewish national homemaking, and its role in promoting a particular visual 
regime, in part through the figuration of the Sabra (the masculine figure of the New Muscle Jew 
and his pioneering effort) as a nationalist symbol. I draw on queer critique attendant to 
intersectional analysis of race, gender and sexuality in order to avoid the progress narrative I 
explored above, which tends to detach gender and sexual diversity from racialization and other 
categories in order to posit progress. In this way, queerness for me signals a kind of critique that 
is more concerned about how value and recognition get parsed out in any discourse of belonging, 
which means I am skeptical of attempts to mark out progressive moments. 
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3.0  CHAPTER TWO: ZIONIST “PALESTINE FILMS” AND THE SETTLING 
OF A JEWISH NATIONAL HOME 
In a 1922 letter, “A Voice from Palestine,” published in the American Cinematographer 
periodical, Cecil de Freitas describes his perceptions of Palestine during a trip taken the previous 
year for an unnamed film project: 
At the time of year I was in Palestine everything had about an inch of dust over it and the 
buildings are of dust color, so everything was very dull and dead looking.  As for the 
possibility of good composition there is some, but you have to watch very closely or you 
will not see it for only here and there is a tree of a curved line that will take off the hard 
look which things have.1  
 
Non-Zionist American cinematographer Freitas’ commentary suggests a detached observer’s 
perspective as he chronicles perceived perceptual and aesthetic problems through prevailing, 
commonplace Orientalist constructions of the Palestine landscape. Perhaps inspired by 
descriptions of Palestine from popular travel writers like Mark Twain, Freitas’ impression as he 
arrived at the port of Jaffa of the indigenous Arab Palestinian population is that they speak a 
language “that sounds like it came from the depths of hell.” Indicating that the account addresses 
fellow cinematographers and photographers, Freitas couches his more derogatory comments in 
the technical language of his trade. At the same time, Freitas locates the challenges posed by 
Palestine in the landscape itself, rather than in his own perspective or in the cinematic 
technology. A particular image of Palestine as a holy and beautiful landscape had been well 
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established, especially after wide circulation of illustrated Bibles, and so visual technologies such 
as cinema and photography produced images in a context of an existing field of visual 
expectations. New visualizing technologies entered an already fairly well established perceptual 
field, which, while not unchanging, did carry certain common sense terms of value. 
Consequently, the cinematographer suggests that “good composition” is an attribute of certain 
places, and not primarily a skill of the photographer who has to “watch very closely” for the 
apparently few opportunities for good pictures in Palestine. His report on the problems of 
properly visualizing Palestine in part underscores the construction and selection that any 
documentary footage undergoes, and yet it also suggests something of the cinematographer’s 
preconceptions of Palestine and its population.   
While cinematic and photographic technologies would change the perceptual field 
delimiting Palestine significantly, they emerged in relation to already existing ideas about 
Palestine as image, idea, and place. Cinematic interest in Palestine was not limited to Zionists in 
the US in the 1920s, though most American producers and investors considered longer-term 
commitments for film production in Palestine risky and better left to the Jewish Agencies.  By 
the early twenties when his letter was written, Freitas and his readers were probably aware of 
both the pristine image of the Holy Land depicted in biblical descriptions, as well as the negative 
perceptions of the contemporary landscape and its inhabitants from writers like Twain. 
Furthermore, a certain “Holy Land visual literacy” was well established through photography 
(especially after developments in the printing industry allowed for the mass reproduction of Holy 
Land photography), early cinema, and a variety of other media including panorama painting, 
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landscape architecture.2 Yet, perceiving the landscape as disordered, unorganized, and lifeless, 
which to him had both a “hard look” and was “very dull and dead” at the same time, the 
photographer perhaps unwittingly expresses something of his own disorientation and 
unfamiliarity with what he saw and attempted to render on film.  
The disorientation indexed in Freitas’ descriptions of the pitfalls of filming in Palestine 
emphasizes how dominant ways of seeing can produce contradiction, even while maintaining 
certain preconceived ideas about Palestine’s current and potential aesthetic value. Disorientation 
becomes important in this chapter’s analysis of the broader imbrications of cinema in shaping 
Palestine, as well as this project’s queer critical framework, for how it calls attention to processes 
of visualization and valuation and how they work through, and not in spite of, contradiction. I 
explore a loose network of other discourses of disorientation focused around early Zionist Jewish 
Agency moving images (including films and magic lantern slides), Zionist discourses on 
visuality, the Bezalel Art School, and Sabra imagery and discourse, in order to look more closely 
at the processes of negotiation within early Zionism between shifting terms of identity, 
landscape, and visualization that together formed particular notions about Jewish belonging in 
Palestine. Moments of disorientation offer a unique site for critiquing the making and re-making 
of ways of seeing and norms of recognition, since it allows a glimpse of them at work, or in the 
process of being undone, emphasizing the many failures inherent in the construction of the 
dominant that remind us of alternatives, even if they seem unlivable, unthinkable, or impossible. 
In this way, I see these sites of disorientation as indexes of when other modes and visions might 
have still been, and might still be, possible. 
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3.1 “PALESTINE FILMS” AND CINEMATIC ZIONISM 
The story of cinema’s influence on Zionist propaganda has been a compelling and lasting one. 
Most remarkably, it has been frequently noted that the birth of cinema coincided with the 
expansion of Zionism and the spread of images of the Holy Land.3 The World Zionist 
Organization was formed, followed by the First Zionist Congress in 1897, and as early as 1905, 
Lumiére and Edison sent film crews to shoot Holy Land films.4 Earlier photographic travelogues 
of “the Orient” and Holy Land include those of Maxime du Camp and Felix Bonfils, as well as 
indigenous Arab Palestinian photographer Khalil Raad who kept a studio in Jerusalem from 
1890-1948.5 An 1899 article in the Zionist newspaper Die Welt (whose editor would later head 
the Propaganda Department in the JNF Head Office in Jerusalem) suggests that the near-
simultaneous birth of Zionism and cinema is no coincidence; Avraham Neufeld proposed the use 
of visual propaganda and actively promoted its use by other Zionists.6 Theodor Herzl himself 
took interest in Neufeld’s proposals and encouraged production of a film on Eretz Israel.7 Zionist 
campaigns in Europe and North America subsequently began to rely heavily on photography and 
cinematography—including transparencies projected through magic lanterns, filmstrips used in 
filmoscopes, and motion pictures shown through film projectors—to secure political and 
financial support for Zionist land acquisition and settlement establishment in Palestine.   
                                                
3 See, for example, Hillel Tryster, Israel Before Israel: Silent Cinema in the Holy Land 
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(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2004), 71-72. Also see Raz Yosef, Beyond 
Flesh: Queer Masculinities and Nationalism in Israeli Cinema (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
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While not all early cinema in Palestine was explicitly produced with Zionist funding or 
involvement, it predominantly depicted Palestine from an Orientalist and Judeo-Christian 
perspective. Depictions of Palestine and its people as curious, exotic remnants of the past did not 
need to be posed in explicitly Zionist terms to sustain and consolidate the idea that the land of 
Palestine had a historical and biblical connection to the Jewish people—or at least that it was a 
land available for conquest and development. In the US, the support for Zionism by non-Jews 
was held in place primarily by “the notion which had been predominant among the Protestants in 
the Anglo-Saxon world since the 16th century that, in accordance with the correct interpretation 
of the Bible, the end of the Jewish Diaspora and the territorial concentration of the Jews in 
Palestine were a preparation for the return of Christ.”8 The correlation between the notions of 
New World and the Promised Land also secured this connection to Zionism; Monika Häfliger 
notes “Thomas Jefferson even suggested using the picture of Jews fleeing from Egypt as the 
official seal of the United States.”9 Still, much of the film production in Palestine at the turn of 
the century was conducted under the auspices of Zionist Jewish Agencies, such as the Jewish 
National Fund (Keren Kayemeth Leisrael) and the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod), 
which built prolific film units as part of the larger apparatus of settlement, fortification, and 
propaganda. 
Though pre-state Zionist films were produced in a context of already established ideas 
about Palestine, they also emerged in relation to, or even as a key component of, a re-invention 
of Jewishness.  Zionist leaders saw a recuperation or Jewish identity as a necessary step toward 
normative Jewish nationalism and toward a “return” to, and redemption of, the former Jewish 
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homeland and way of life. In Max Nordau’s words, the task of the Zionists was enormous in this 
respect, requiring physical relocation and transformation of Jewish productivity: 
Never before has the effort been made to transplant, peacefully, in a short space of time, 
on another soil, several million people from various countries; never has it been 
attempted to transform millions of physically degenerate proletarians, without trade or 
profession, into agriculturalists and cattle breeders, to bring townbred hucksters and 
trades people, agents, and men of sedentary occupation again into contact with the plough 
and mother earth.10 
 
Prominent Zionists argued that Jewry and Jewish tradition had been corrupted by exile, 
ghettoization, and oppression in Europe, and cinema became a key technology of reinventing 
Jewishness through Zionist lenses.  Although early Zionist films, like British and American 
productions, can be understood in some respects as expressing through the cinema already 
familiar notions of the Holy Land, and thus making Palestine visible only in terms that would be 
recognizable, Zionist films also emphasized and contributed to a deliberate and extensively 
planned and executed transformation of landscape, identity, and historical narrative. Not 
attempting to conceal their propagandistic nature, many of the Jewish Agency films have a kind 
of insistent and repetitive pedagogical mode of address that cannot simply be explained by their 
use as propaganda and Zionist education.  Rather, the overt ideological form and content of 
Jewish Agency films should be understood as part of an effort to shape the places and people 
they at the same time claimed to simply document or reveal.  While clearly circulating for 
propaganda purposes to primarily Jewish audiences, the Zionist films were also shown, in part or 
whole, to non-Jewish and not-specifically-Zionist contexts, such as Protestants in the US, as 
moving image travelogues and documentations of Jewish work in Palestine.  
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Company, 1905), 42. 
   86 
While the propagandistic use of cinema by Zionists is well remembered in film 
historiography, it has largely been subsumed under a narrative of progress within national 
cinematic terms11. This progress narrative has largely been told within the frame of Israeli 
Cinema studies and archiving, which retains a kind of blurring between the acknowledgment of 
early Zionist cinema as propaganda and an invocation of the films as documentations of 
historical reality in, for example, the Steven Spielberg archive’s “pre-state” film collection.  It is 
rarely noted that since many of the “Palestine films” were composed of shots arranged from 
other productions, and would be edited and re-titled to suit different needs, films that included 
scenes of Palestine were frequently only referred to as “Palestine films,” rather than by title, 
perhaps because of their fragmented nature and their similarity.  For this reason, it is misleading 
for historical film scholarship on “pre-state” Zionist films (a term frequently used in studies of 
“Israeli Cinema”) to focus too much on particular films as discrete and stable objects of study 
without reflecting on the unique contexts and varied forms of their production, distribution, and 
exhibition. The work of this chapter is meant to emphasize both how these films fit into larger 
discourses on visualization and their relation to transforming Jewish identity, the Palestinian 
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and national revival in Palestine” and more clearly reveal their own interpretation of history 
when they describe that “this pre-state Zionist cinema both expressed and determined the 
fundamentals of the inchoate Israeli culture.” Furthermore, they reveal a deep political bias when 
they imply that the only problems that remain for Israeli society and cinema relate to Palestinian 
“terror” and “other moral issues that keep haunting Israeli society and culture” in its “deep 
longing for a stable and untroubled existence.” Ariel L. Feldestein, in the same book, claims the 
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landscape, and the technology of moving images, as well as how these films productively disrupt 
certain stories within film historiography about the place of cinema in relation to Jewish and 
Palestinian belonging in Palestine and Israel. 
In a 1948 essay in Penguin Film Review aptly titled “Film Production Problems and 
Activities in Palestine,” the author E. Harris’ comments suggest how non-Zionists like him might 
not have fully appreciated the distinctly propagandistic intent, funding, and production of such 
films when he describes 
ordinary travelogues, made by every conceivable camera in the hands of every type of 
person, appeared as far back as the middle twenties.  The impact of Jewish nationalism, 
however, conferred some emotional quality, all being characterized by a feeling of 
exultation: ‘This is the land. See the houses we have built, the groves we have planted, 
we who used to be the People of the Book.’ There was the theme of the immigrant who 
reaches Palestine after great tribulations and discovers regeneration in tilling the soil.12   
 
While Harris characterizes the “primitive spontaneity of these early works,” he also 
acknowledges, “the Jewish Agency and kindred bodies like the Jewish Foundation Fund and the 
Jewish National Fund commissioned and financed these documentaries.”13  In other words, while 
this reviewer gleaned the ideological message of the films in direct line with their Zionist 
propaganda intent, he still attributes to them the matter-of-factness of something like home 
movies.  This seeming coincidence of interpretation aligning so closely with Zionist discourse 
suggests that the ideological message of the films was already so familiar that the films 
registered as innocent reflections of facts on the ground.   
By 1948 when this article was published, the notion of Palestine as a Jewish national 
homeland had firm governmental support (from the US and UK, for example) and already 
carried a sense of inevitability in the popular imagination of much of the world. Still, during the 
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earlier period of increased investment in settlement and filmmaking in Palestine, Zionism was 
composed of a variety of both conflicting and complementary political views.  At the 1899 Third 
Zionist Congress in Basel, where the Zionist Organization was formed and the foundation was 
laid for the creation of the Jewish National Fund, the “most important occurrence was the 
agreement on the ‘Basle Program,’ which remained valid until the formation of the state of 
Israel,” a statement that carefully declared Zionism’s general purpose toward establishing a 
“home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law.”14 The wording of the 
statement reflected a compromise amongst various parties whose views about a “home” versus a 
“state” greatly differed.  The statement attempted to “integrate different schools of thought 
within the movement equally: those in favour of colonization, the assimilated Jews, those who 
wanted to work in their own native lands, the national Jews and the cultural Zionists.”15 
However, even during this period of debate and division, some, like prominent political 
Zionist figure Ze’ev Jabotinsky who formed the Zionist Revisionist party in the twenties, were 
quite confident that the primary message of Zionism already taken hold.  Still, whereas the 
cultural Zionists were more interested in Palestine as a spiritual home, Jabotinsky and the 
Revisionists were insistent that a Jewish “home” ought to be a “state,” Jabotinsky even wanted to 
“enforce the concept of the state of Israel, uncompromisingly and with any and all means 
necessary, including armed conflict.”16 Reiterating the importance of “return” for most Zionist 
discourse, and indicating the apparently successful efforts to solidify this idea, already by 
1921—only 22 years after the First Zionist Congress—Ze’ev (then Vladimir) Jabotinsky was 
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15 Haumann, “Judaism and Zionism,” 14. 
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able to confidently remark that “the historic connection of Jewry with Palestine is recognized.”17   
Kathleen Christison argues that by 1920 “the frame of reference in which the Arabs of Palestine 
were viewed was already firmly set,” including the popular notion among Jews and non-Jews in 
the U.S. that Palestine was a Jewish land.18  Yet, while the notion that Jews belong in Palestine 
had been established, Zionists had different opinions and operational plans for creating the 
specific and concrete terms through which the idea of belonging would be solidified, protected, 
and maintained. Likewise, the film units of the various Jewish Agencies had varying and 
sometimes conflicting ideas about the themes, images, and forms (i.e. animated sequences, inter-
titles, and documentary footage) that ought to be promoted through the films.  
“Palestine films,” though not typically the main feature of a Zionist event like the kind 
Jabotinsky lectured at, were seen as an important aspect of fundraising and public relations.  As 
Hillel Tryster points out, Zionist events could charge higher admission when they coupled 
lectures and other presentations with film screenings or magic lantern slideshows. Typically, 
Tryster explains, collection boxes would circulate a before and after a screening, and a films’ 
success could be measured by its ability to draw out increased amounts of capital from Jewish 
audiences.19 Advertisements for films or magic lantern slideshows that would frequently 
accompany Zionist lecture circuits often include reference to a new “Palestine film” or magic 
lantern show that featured the Jewish colonies. 
As the founder of the Palestine Foundation Fund, or Keren Hayesod, which was formed 
in 1920 and began producing films in 1924, Jabotinsky was an important Zionist leader who, like 
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Herzl before his death, was keenly aware of how cinema could be mobilized in projecting the 
desired image of Jewish work in Palestine, in raising funds and awareness, and thus also in 
forming particular ideas about Jewish national belonging in Palestine. An article titled “She” 
written by Jabotinsky and published in a prominent Pittsburgh Jewish newspaper in 1924, around 
the time when Jabotinsky stopped in Pittsburgh on a national tour, on the topic of “Palestine 
films” suggests, through its matter-of-fact mode of address, that readers would have some 
familiarity with the films of the Palestine Foundation Fund.  In the article, Jabotinsky criticizes 
the apparent lack of representation of Jewish settler-pioneer women in British Mandate Palestine 
in a particular film. Regarding the non-appearance of “She” in this particular film, Jabotinsky 
laments: 
Some time ago I saw a “Palestine film,” showing the colonies and it struck me how very 
few Jewish women appear in it.  I am afraid this peculiarity may strengthen the 
impression already too widely spread among Jewish womanhood—that the upbringing of 
our Homeland is, after all, a man’s business.  This is a wrong conclusion.  The work of 
the woman, as usual, goes on in most cases behind the walls.  The man tills the fields, the 
man parades in the uniform of a Jewish Legionaire, the man lets himself be photographed 
as a member of innumerable committees; the woman keeps behind the walls, and you 
miss her on the film.  But her work, although less spectacular, is, too, the work of a 
builder.  Man and woman are building Jewish Palestine together, and I, though a great 
admirer of the manhood of Palestine, am not so sure as to whose share is the more 
important one.20 
 
In a correction of what is not visible in that film or in photographs, in “She” Jabotinsky uses 
detailed present-tense descriptions to project an image of what is not seen in the film but that, 
according to him, more accurately reflects the scene on the ground.  At the same time, Jabotinsky 
draws attention to the scenes of visualization and production of images—the man that “lets 
himself be photographed as a member of innumerable committees,” for example. As a corrective 
of the missing women in the film, he brings the reader into the following scene; “If you happen 
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to visit Palestine…you will see men and girls working side by side…The Halutzim are resting, 
and suddenly in the darkness you may hear a beautifully cultured soprano voice…”21 Perhaps to 
explain why cinematic technology misses the representation of the pioneer women, Jabotinsky 
describes a scene of “darkness” and the sound of a woman singing, both of which would not be 
represented in the “Palestine film” (likely unaccompanied by recorded sound) that he discusses.  
With his articles widely published across North America and Europe, combined with his 
appearance at Zionist events to give lectures and the other fundraising events that fueled (and 
were fueled by) Jewish National Fund and Palestine Film Foundation films, Jabotinsky 
maintained two driving concerns with regard to the broader visualization of Palestine.  First, 
Jabotinsky recognized and appreciated the importance of proliferating images of Palestine in the 
diaspora in order to fund colonization and promote the idea of Palestine as a future Jewish 
nation-state. Secondly, it was important to Jabotinsky, or so it appears given the trouble he goes 
to in order to construct through his article what the Palestine film seemed to omit, to show the 
Zionist pioneers who do the work of establishing the homeland for the Jewish people, 
particularly since the Jewish Diaspora needed to identify with and support this labor in order to 
donate money.  
On the other hand, it is also difficult to understand the relevance of this article by 
Jabotinsky, which poses a complicated relationship between a political Zionist leader (one who 
vehemently supported the creation of a state) and the propaganda film, to a history of the use of 
visual media by Zionist propaganda agencies. Jabotinsky neither simply promotes the film at 
face value as propaganda, since he has to correct its message, nor does he accept it as a reflection 
of the reality on the ground, since he questions its lack of women pioneers. It is not difficult to 
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point to discrete films and lectures that apparently did address the topic of women and Zionism, 
and which would fit neatly in a narrative of pre-state Israeli film historiography told through 
discrete films and arranged by topic and historical and cultural relevance. For example, a few 
later Jewish Agency propaganda examples were devoted to the topic of the woman pioneer, 
including titles such as the Jewish National Fund filmstrip The Woman in the Agricultural 
Settlements (1925-6), the JNF film The Working Woman in the Land of Israel (1935-9)22, and, in 
JNF lectures that accompanied filmstrips, subjects included “the Zionist woman and her part in 
the building of Eretz Yisrael” and “clinics for pregnant women.”23 A widespread association of 
Zionism with women’s increasing participation in national and political work is bolstered by the 
fact that women were afforded the right to vote at the Second Zionist Congress in 1898.24 Yet, 
even those films and slides that could be cited as discrete and topical examples of the 
representation of pioneer women ought to be considered in the complicated context of the 
multiple aims of propaganda and their relation to other sites where such topics were being 
debated, discussed, and constructed in particular ways as “topics.” Indeed, the actual possibilities 
afforded to women through Zionism were not as the leadership often claimed it to be.25  
Although claiming its place as one of the first feminist political movements, evidenced by the 
participation of women in settlement-building and other pioneering tasks, women were more 
often ascribed the same or often more limited roles in relation to family, society and politics. Yet 
even this point is often subsumed in Israeli film studies as evidence of progress from a 
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masculinist Zionist project and its “now obsolete cinematic and cultural models” to a more fluid, 
feminist, and inclusive society and cinema.26 
Perhaps Jabotinsky recognized that Jewish women could play an important role in 
fundraising and propaganda, and thus they represented an untapped fundraising market, but in 
the article the lack of women is repeatedly posed primarily as a problem of perspective and 
representation, underscoring to an extent the limits, rather than the potential, of cinema for 
political Zionism. “Cameras cannot move through walls,” as Jabotinsky puts it, and this prompts 
his intervention whereby the reader is invited to imagine what lies beyond, or rather within, these 
concealing walls—for “the woman keeps behind the walls, and you miss her on [sic] the film.”  
Through this projection of reality inside the walls, and filmic representation outside, Jabotinsky 
constructs an image of “reality” that both reinforces the scenes depicted in the film (since he 
declares them not precisely incorrect, simply an incomplete representation) and orients viewers 
toward his descriptions of what the film does not, and cannot, show.  This odd review-of-sorts of 
a “Palestine film” suggests Jabotinsky deliberately constructs and promotes the kind of proper 
visualization necessary for recognizing the truth of Zionist settlement in Palestine. The Jewish 
Agencies similarly seemed to recognize the potential for moving images to fail to fully reveal 
their intended messages, and so included detailed scripts and lecture notes with films and 
filmstrips intended to carefully direct viewers toward a single intended meaning. The seeming 
micro-management of the message also allowed for a certain malleability of the exhibition and 
production of the films and filmstrips since the same footage would be cut and re-cut to serve 
different interests, audiences, and political purposes (especially in the use of Zionist footage by 
British Empire exhibitions).  
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Although Jabotinsky attempts in “She” to make the supposedly invisible Jewish pioneer 
woman a recognizable, albeit reassuringly domestic, presence, he does so primarily through 
reference to her absence and to the apparent shortcomings of cinema’s inability to cross through 
walls. Jabotinsky perhaps unwittingly reproduces the conditions through which what should be 
easily recognizable (the woman pioneer) slips into a kind of illegibility, since he makes the 
absent-present figure of the Jewish pioneer woman imaginable as a visible presence through text, 
yet only to be un-locatable in the primary source of visualization of the Zionist project—the 
“Palestine films.” Even through the text, Jabotinsky constructs the woman’s presence through 
reference to sound (a “beautifully cultured soprano voice”) and invisibility (“suddenly in the 
darkness you may hear”).  Rather than assume this production of recognition through non-seeing 
is an accident or a contradiction, I think Jabotinsky’s complicated making-present making-absent 
of the pioneer woman well supported the conditions through which women were both 
incorporated and excluded by Zionism. A kind of paranoid knowledge seems to inform a larger 
rubric of national intelligibility in Israel and Palestine and explains how Palestinian claims to the 
Palestinian landscape and Palestinian dispossession became and have remained unrecognized 
even when visual evidence seems immediately available—for example, in the ruins of 
Palestinian villages in Israeli national parks today. Even though the remains of Palestinian 
villages “are highly visible in the landscape” of the national parks, “only 15 percent of the 
signposts include names of these villages.”27 Rebecca Stein describes the “abundant material 
evidence of pre-1948 Palestinian life” present in Israeli landscapes, yet these ruins remain largely 
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unremarked upon, uncharged with historical relevance, or described in terms of beauty and the 
picturesque. 28 
Rather than invoke Jabotinsky’s article on an unidentified “Palestine film” to argue for its 
inclusion in and contribution to a more historically accurate and complex picture of “Palestine 
Films” and their relation to Zionist and/or Israeli film and visual history, I am interested in this 
film review for the ways that it, like the Freitas’ letter and the Harris review, offer a more 
context-specific and contradictory perspective on the various processes through which the 
visualization of Palestine would undergo in relation to Zionist filmmaking and its related 
contexts. Directing his readers to view the Zionist films of the period critically, for example, 
Jabotinsky situated them in a larger context of a visualizing discourse that privileged certain 
ways of seeing over others. Since the diasporic Jewish community, like the large Jewish 
community in Pittsburgh for example, was more likely to see “Palestine films” than to visit 
Palestine and see the work of the pioneers themselves, this kind of training in proper 
visualization and conceptualization of the Jewish colonies in Palestine would likely influence 
Zionist fundraising in the U.S., but it would also inform what had largely already become, and 
would be continually reinforced as, a kind of common-sense visual and intelligibility schema 
through which Palestine would come to be understood and acted upon as idea and landscape.  It 
is this visual schema that I attempt to explore, not in its entirety, but in terms of its dominant 
modes of establishing terms of legibility and calculability that can still be detected at work today 
in the ongoing constructions of the idea, image, place and people of Palestine. 
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3.2 “AT ONCE REMOTE AND NEAR—A PARTICULAR PALESTINIAN 
PROBLEM” 
In 1906, the Bezalel School of Arts and crafts was one of the earliest Jewish cultural institutions 
founded in Palestine. As Tryster describes, “it was recognized as a Zionist enterprise by nature, 
and enjoyed official Zionist support in its maintenance.”29 The Zionist Congress had already 
recognized the importance of art in relation to Zionism, and “the first exhibition of in the history 
of Jewish art took place in 1901 during the Fifth Congress in Basel”; Bezalel was founded during 
the Seventh Congress.30 Out of Bezalel came the most prolific early Zionist filmmaker Ya’acov 
Ben Dov, and, as evidenced by the featuring of Bezalel in the 1911 First Film of Palestine by 
Murray Rosenberg, the school considered supporting film productions shortly after its founding. 
Eventually, after the war, Ben Dov convinced the Jewish National Fund to back his film 
endeavors, including a document of General Allenby’s arrival in Jerusalem in 1917.  In 1918, 
Ben Dov sent a letter to the Zionist Commission, which was affiliated with the British Foreign 
Office authority, indicating his interest in film toward the promotion of a future Jewish national 
homeland: “I am hereby honored to inform you that I have begun to collect and prepare various 
pictures of our present lives in Eretz Israel for a ‘national archive.’”31 At least from Ben Dov’s 
perspective, cinema could be enlisted beyond the present needs of Zionist campaigns. He 
imagined films as important documents in an archive that would facilitate future remembering of 
the building-up of the Jewish national land. Though Ben Dov was apparently personally 
committed to producing a historical record of whatever was occurring on the ground in Palestine, 
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the Jewish Agencies who contracted his expertise were more exacting in their decisions about 
what to film and how to film it.  Though Ben Dov’s filmmaking was frequently criticized and 
even derided for what struck some as a lack of technical knowledge, others considered his work  
“as not only the work of a good professional, but also that of a ‘true son of Bezalel’ who has the 
seeing eye of an artist and the emotional heart of a good Jew.”32 Ben Dov seemed to gain 
credibility through his association with Bezalel, given its early establishment as a Jewish art 
school in Palestine. 
Though Ben Dov, who was referred to later as the “Father of Hebrew Cinema,” was 
interested in filming for a specifically Jewish national archive, his work also came to serve the 
needs of the British Information Office and the Empire’s cinematic display of the colonies.  
British Instructional Films used portions of his 1924 Land of Promise (Banim Bonim) in a film 
survey of the Empire for the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley.  In exchange for footage 
that would appear in A Tour Through the Holy Land, Land of Promise was screened in its 
entirety at the Palestine Pavilion. The Land of Promise was “photographed on behalf of the 
Palestine Foundation Fund,” although its initial inter-titles credit both the PFF and the JNF for 
supporting the efforts of the pioneers—Chalutzim—depicted in the film.  Underscoring its use 
for propaganda and fundraising, the opening titles expand on the work of the PFF: “which is 
responsible for the immigration of the Chalutzim, their settlement on the land and in towns, 
Hebrew education, sanitation and the provision of all the other amenities of normal national life.”  
As Tryster attests, “the PFF enjoyed a number of notable propaganda successes with this film,” 
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and sections of it even appeared in Hearst’s “International Newsreel.”33 In promoting part of the 
Jewish Agency’s own agenda, the footage, though marking itself as “a pictorial record of Jewish 
work in the restoration of Palestine,” could also serve to promote British colonialism. In the 
overly didactic micro-management of image and interpretation common to many of the Jewish 
Agency films, Land of Promise uses matter-of-fact inter-titles and narration to guide the viewer’s 
eye and understanding of what appears onscreen. I take note of several visualizing discourses in 
these films, which appear in Land of Promise as well: a heavy-handed exposition of the idea of 
Palestine “laid waste”, which dramatizes the work of the Jewish pioneers, an emphasis on 
security and fortification through visual dominance (guards in watchtowers, aerial imagery, the 
dangerous proximity of Arab neighbors), and civilizational discourse that posits Palestinians as 
temporally behind. 
A common ethnographic trope that also appears in many of the Jewish Agency films I 
came across in my research, Land of Promise opens from the perspective of a ship arriving at the 
port of Haifa.  Given the context of the British Mandate rule, which at various times greatly 
limited legal Jewish immigration to Israel, arrival scenes are significant in Zionist narratives 
emphasizing the exultation felt by Chalutzim arriving “on the Soil of the Land of Israel at Last!”  
They set foot on land, after moving through certain checkpoints—what the film identifies as 
“customs” and “quarantine.” Excerpts from the American PFF Agency edit of the film reveal 
something of the intended purpose of the scenes that follow the arrival of the Chalutzim: “Jaffa 
has been transformed into a modern city resembling in many respects a bustling American 
town…Contrast those scenes of progress with typical Arab section—unchanged throughout the 
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centuries.”34  This particular kind of “contrast” was in fact common to many Zionist films of the 
JNF and PFF. 
 Appearing determined, strong and unified, the young pioneers dressed in white, “off to 
their first job,” approach an old man along the road. They gather round the bearded man as he 
gives voice to what was by then a rather familiar narrative: “I came here with the first pioneers 
forty years ago.  We found the land laid waste.” Images intended to illustrate “the land laid 
waste” shown after this inter-title include a static desert scene populated with what appear to be 
Bedouin tents. Immediately following this image, paved roads, a white fenced home, and men on 
horseback demonstrate: “but by great struggle and sacrifice colonies were built. With fine streets 
and houses. ‘GROVES’ where once were malaria marshes. And Palestine began to be one of the 
garden spots of the world.” Marking the young pioneers onscreen as the beneficiaries of a 
colonial legacy, the speech attributed to the old man passes the labor onto “the generation of the 
future”—the New Jewish native in Palestine: “The work is now in YOUR hands.  Rebuild the 
land of your Fathers for the sake of your children.”35 Throughout the film, a large group of 
Chalutzim marches across the screen and throughout Palestine.  All the while, the film continues 
its matter-of-fact inter-title narration that serves to guide the viewer’s eye and understanding of 
what appears onscreen, perhaps meant to take the place of a lecturer attending, for instance, 
Jewish Agency magic lantern filmstrips. “There”—the title seems to point—are “the new 
suburbs of Jerusalem!” the watchmen and guards of the colonies, the “bonnie babies” delivered 
by the Hadassah Medical Organization, the city of Haifa, “the Jewish garden city of Tel Aviv 
built by Jewish labor over sand dunes,” the “Building! Building! Building!” of houses, and so on 
until the final scene of Chalutzim dancing the hora in joy. “Seen from on high,” images of Tel 
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Aviv emphasize a modern city planned on a grid, with electric lines and a passing train 
emphasizing connection, prosperity, and modernity. A horse gallops next to the train, which 
quickly surpasses it and emphasizes the speed of the new technology.  
Given that Tel Aviv, and later the state of Israel, was founded after the invention and 
widespread use of photographic and cinematic technology (as the “seen from on high” aerial 
view, a new kind of image developed during World War I by mounting cameras on warplanes, 
emphasizes), it is perhaps not surprising that the narrative of the “first Jewish city” and the 
“Jewish nation” would rely heavily on visualizing discourse to gain credibility and legibility. In a 
scrapbook dated “approximately 1926” and titled Tel-Aviv (compiled by Avraham Soskin), for 
example, time collapses between pages of photographs that narrate the building of the “Jewish 
garden city.”  Photographs from the first few years of the construction of the city are laid next to 
those of the same city over fifteen years later.  In an image captioned “The meeting founding 
Tel-Aviv, 1908,” a group of over 50 men gather in the desert sand dunes seeming to mimic the 
buildings that will take their place in the coming years. In the next image in the album—“Tel 
Aviv 1926,” white buildings are stacked atop of one another, and the dunes have disappeared.  
The next image returns to the labor involved—“The leveling of the sand dunes, 1908.”  Turn the 
pages and various streets are shown before and after substantial construction—“Herzl Street 
1910,” “Herzl Street 1926.”36  While labor may seem mostly covered over in the temporal jumps 
between the static images that construct the narrative of this scrapbook, the hundreds of films 
shot in Palestine before 1948 focus almost entirely on the labor of the Jewish pioneer. Both 
photography and cinema could be enlisted, though, in this particular kind of representation of 
speedy Jewish settlement in Palestine, which was understood to align with modernity, whereas 
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the Arab Palestinian population was posited in terms of backwardness and slow-moving 
technologies like camel-drawn carts—“unchanged throughout the centuries” as Land of Promise 
puts it. That civilizational values are implied through the arrangement of photographs “spliced” 
together in a scrapbook invokes cinema as a metaphor. Jewish work in Palestine is seen to be like 
cinema insofar as they both become associated with modernity, speed, and the reinvigoration of 
Palestine as a valued cartography of time (i.e. a place that matters only when populated by Jews).  
This seemingly easy association of moving images with Jewish belonging in Palestine promotes 
the sense that Jewish national belonging in Palestine was inevitable, even going so far as in 
having been solidified as an assumption that there is nearly the sense that “if it can be seen, it 
belongs to the Jews.” Underscoring this connection between seeing and belonging, whenever a 
real or staged presence of the Arab population is visualized in Zionist Palestine films, it is nearly 
always in terms of negativity, backwardness, and a static, fixed image that doesn’t belong in the 
narrative of Palestine’s or the image’s modern progress. 
Land of Promise director Ben Dov is characterized by Tryster as someone who imagined 
cinema as a simple window onto the colonies, and who perhaps did attach a kind of ease to the 
project of visualizing Palestine, but the many problems of seeing and representing Palestine were 
apparently addressed and felt by other Bezalel visual artists. Zionist Jews who immigrated to 
Palestine were more directly confronted with the reality of that place—the landscape and 
population—than the Diaspora audiences of Palestine films, and had to alter their perspectives to 
construct their own ways to imagine and confront the challenges they perceived in their new 
surroundings. In other words, those Chalutzim, like the characters in Ben Dov’s film, probably 
had some difficulty seeing what the films and/or filmmakers and propagandists imply was self-
evident about their experience in Palestine.   
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In Art in Palestine, written in the late 1930s, Bezalel painter Elias Newman describes the 
experience of Jewish immigrant artists arriving in Palestine in the early 20th Century from Europe 
and their particular problems  “in the field of art requiring pioneer effort.”37 According to 
Newman, these newly immigrated pioneer artists, those whose work was featured in the New 
York World’s Fair 1939 Palestine Pavilion, had trouble relocating from their former 
surroundings: 
The light of Palestine dazzled them.  There seemed to be no color: the hot, brilliant sun 
turned everything white—or so it seemed to these newcomers.  The transparency of the 
atmosphere and the brilliance of the sun created new problems of perspective that had to 
be solved.  They set about seeking a way to give expression to this brilliant sun, 
experimenting with technical problems such as painting distance in a manner that makes 
it appear at once remote and near—a particular Palestinian problem.38 
 
Newman states that the dazzling effect of the environment on the artists was due to the 
unfamiliarity of the landscape and its quality of light that “turned everything white—or so it 
seemed to these newcomers.” Newman describes the experience of these painters and sculptors 
primarily in terms of a kind of visual and perceptual disorientation, remarking that not only did 
the artists find it difficult to paint the landscape surrounding them, they, similar to the 
cinematographer Freitas, found it difficult even to see due to problems of overexposure and 
contrast.   
Though at first glance it seems Newman locates the challenges confronting these artists 
in their own perception when he writes “or so it seemed to these newcomers”—which suggests 
they need to adapt their trade to “give expression” to the strange landscape surrounding them—
there is equal stress later in the book on the idea that the landscape itself needed to be altered. On 
the Jewish painter, architect and stage designer E. Luftglass (b. 1898, Poland), Newman sets up 
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the necessity for a mutual transformation of immigrant artist subjectivity and landscape: “An 
impressionist…but in Palestine he feels the approach to nature cannot be through impressionism.  
The Palestine landscape to him is static, and it must be recreated before an attempt is made to 
paint it.”39  With nearly all of the artists in the book, Newman describes an apparently necessary 
process of adjustment the artists had to endure before they could adapt their artistic techniques to 
the new, apparently static, environment.  One artist, after settling in Palestine in 1935, “is trying 
to orientate herself” since “a long transitional period must be passed through to understand the 
local life and problems of light” that are “still quite strange to her.”40  The Jews of Palestine, 
Newman writes, “are going through a period of readjustment, binding themselves to mother 
earth, and the future will most likely see a new type of Jew emerging—on that will express a 
homogenous Palestine.”41  Himself a fan of watercolor as “the medium best adapted to 
interpreting the brilliant transparent colors of the landscape,” he argued that it best enables the 
artist “to give spontaneous expression to the very transparent atmosphere.”42 In each of these 
examples, Newman emphasizes process, transformation and duration in the artists’ relationship 
to the landscape and its “problems of light,” inviting another comparison to cinematic modes of 
temporality and their association within Zionism with Jewish belonging, which was also seen to 
undergo a process of reinvention.  
While acknowledging that an artist like Luftglass recognized the need to adapt and 
change his artistic technique (impressionism was apparently not suited to Palestine), somewhat 
illogically Newman also remarks that transformations of the landscape (“recreation”) should take 
place before “an attempt is made to paint it.” Was the landscape being altered to suit 
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impressionistic painting styles, or did painting techniques need creative re-invention in order to 
adapt to the problems posed by Palestine’s unique quality of light and perspective problems? 
Mutual transformation was also for Newman in some sense a translation of artist subjectivity and 
landscape: 
Here are the struggles of the newly arrived artists with the strange environment, with its 
peculiar problems of light and perspective, and their efforts to translate the subjective 
material within their own individuality into the new language—the color of Palestine—a 
language all desire to master.43 
 
While the artist’s expression and even selfhood would come into being in a new way 
through translation into the language of “the color of Palestine,” they would in turn “desire to 
master” the very language that articulated them.  Again, the relation between identity, landscape 
and visualization are articulated in their mutual constitution and in their relation to process and 
temporary disorientation. 
In Palestine, armed as they were with the notion that they were returning on a Biblical 
promise to their authentic homeland, Newman’s Jewish artists, all European, would be familiar 
with Orientalist depictions of the Middle East. Thus they would in some ways be prepared to 
encounter a strange and distant landscape in Palestine. Adding to their feeling of bewilderment, 
Newman suggests that the artists struggled with unintentional appearances of European 
landscapes, their former homelands, as well as European formal techniques, in their work.  One 
artist’s “first canvases showed traces of the French landscape,” even as he attempted to paint 
what was before him.  As New Jewish artist-pioneers, then, they were tasked with representing 
Palestine as proximate—their new/old homeland—without at the same time rendering 
themselves distant, strange and other in relation to it. In other words, they needed to find new 
ways to identify with this place that carried the mark of the Orient and to “bring to their craft 
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Occidental invention plus the charm of the East.”44 Though Zionism was distinct in many ways 
from the British colonial regime, the Jewish immigrant artists reflected the similarities between 
Zionism and imperial nationalism, particularly in their approach to the landscape.  As Stephen 
Daniels argues:  
imperial nationalists, almost by definition, have been intent to annex the home-lands of 
others in their identity myths. They have projected on these lands and their inhabitants’ 
pictorial codes expressing both an affinity with the colonizing country and an 
estrangement from it. It is often the very ‘otherness’ of these lands which has made them 
appear so compelling, especially as a testing ground for imperial energy and 
imagination…Images of barrenness and ruins activated histories of past prosperity under 
ancient empires [for France’s Second Empire in orientalist paintings of North Africa].45 
 
Newman’s descriptions of these artists’ work suggest their struggle to establish pictorial codes 
that would negotiate their attachment to the new/old landscape.  
Offering a way to understand this seeming contradiction between near and far through 
her exploration of the phenomenology of Orientalism, Sara Ahmed posits, “orientalism involves 
the transformation of ‘farness’ as a spatial marker of distance into a property of people and 
places.”46 It is in this sense that I suggest that a particular kind of disorientation marked the 
experience of Jewish pioneers who, encountering the strange in their field of vision, experienced 
the threat of becoming themselves strange and distant. As Ahmed argues, one must always be 
oriented “toward something,” whereby things become graspable through our facing them.  
Things are oriented to the extent that they are “what we face, or what is available to us within our 
field of vision.”47 Though visuality and perception do not enter Ahmed’s queer phenomenology 
in any prolonged way, she suggests that the "reach" afforded through particular orientations is 
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not necessarily material or limited to bodily proximity and touch.  If things become available 
within a field of vision, then they can be understood as “within reach” and graspable, and able to 
be possessed and knowable, through affect and recognition and not simply through spatial 
proximity. Orientation determines what "matters," then, in a broader sense than the material or 
physical, and bears on the process of visualization and its relation to intelligibility, bringing more 
complexity and contradiction to models of visibility and invisibility as well.  Informed by 
Ahmed, “queer” can attend to the disorienting and incalculable aspects of processes of becoming  
“intelligible,” which may not align with what is “visible,” thereby placing affect and recognition 
in close relation to both visuality and spatiality. 
If “geographic space is phenomenal or oriented” in terms of “what is and is not within 
reach,” then the task that Zionism asked of the Jewish settlers was enormous: an orientation that 
was both a re-orientation to a rightful homeland and a dis-Orientation from “Oriental” Palestine 
and “Oriental” Jewry.48  At the same time, this process produced the possibility for the 
supposedly distant place grasp back and contaminate at the same time as it became available for 
conquest.  Thinking in psychoanalytic terms, Ella Shohat describes Zionism’s disavowal of 
Oriental (Sephardi) Jews as “the European ideal-ego, which phantasizes Israel as the 
prolongation of Europe ‘in’ the Middle East, but not ‘of’ it.”49 In a further explanation of the 
history of Israeli and Zionist racist discourse in relation to Oriental Jews, Shohat reflects on how 
Israeli leaders repeatedly cast such prejudices in civilizing East/West terms.  She cites Abba 
Ebban whose comments express the anxiety of another kind of orientation: that the “object 
should be to infuse [the Sephardim] with an Occidental spirit, rather than allow them to drag us 
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into an unnatural Orientalism.”50  The “drag” of Orientalism implies again the temporal aspects 
of civilization de-valuing that posits a kind of backwards and seemingly static, though wholly 
irrational, space. For Daniel Boyarin, dis-orientation might be understood as an aspect of what he 
describes as an ambivalence articulated by Zionist leaders between Jewish assimilation and 
colonialism, which he characterizes in terms of colonial mimicry. Theodor Herzl, for instance, 
“had come to the conclusion that anti-Semitism was essentially justified by the behavior of the 
Jews…that only a radical act of self-transformation would win the esteem of Christendom for his 
degenerate compatriots.”51 This would require Jews to “give up their primitive, ‘Oriental’ 
distinctiveness and become ‘civilized,’” according to the supposedly liberal explanation of 
Jewish degeneracy in historical and cultural rather than biological terms.52 
While watercolor was for Newman suited to depict the unique blurring of near/far and 
horizon/atmosphere in Palestine, heavily fortified colonies among other conditions of separation 
reinforced divisions between the new/native pioneers and the alien/indigenous Arabs. Still, the 
land must have felt as if it shifted beneath those early Jewish pioneers, threatening to dissolve 
them into the dust and desert surrounding them, as they built and were built by Zionist 
articulations of Jewish nationalism in Palestine.  Freitas and Jabotinsky hint at the particular 
problems this posed for cinematographers, given that for Freitas the problem was of dust and low 
contrast, and for Jabotinsky it was the sense that cameras cannot reach through walls to properly 
represent the reality of Jewish work. Given the importance of the horizon as a focal point in the 
European landscape tradition, the difficulty of seeing and locating a distinct horizon for the new 
Jewish immigrant artists in Palestine would undermine their ability to take up a familiar 
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viewpoint and arrange a familiar landscape composition.53 The problems of diffuse and 
overexposed light described by travelers, artists, and cinematographers would similarly challenge 
the ability to see or represent formal tropes for the arrangement of compositional elements and 
for the establishment of perspective.  
At the same time as the pioneers may have experienced something of this sense of 
blurring, dissolving and shifting in the environment surrounding them, they must have also felt 
themselves shifting in their own skin as definitions of Jewishness seemed to hinge on the Jewish 
pioneers and their ability to appear as such. “White”/Ashkenazi Jewishness positioned itself as a 
distinctly European and Occidental presence amongst the others of the Middle East as well as in 
relation to all those disavowed diasporic Jews—those Others of Europe.  By focusing on modes 
of disorientation, I mean to highlight the uncertainty, process, failures, and contradictions 
involved in the construction of particular modes of Jewish belonging in Palestine, as well as the 
many complex routes through which affect and recognition are constituted in the various Zionist 
Jewish Agency films, their directed inter-titles, various lecture circuits, textual reviews and 
revisions, and so on.  
Newman’s privileging of watercolor, for example, as well as the Bezalel mission to 
maintain something of the Oriental quality of Palestine and artists working in “Oriental crafts,” 
suggests that some forms of blurring of identity and place could be rendered non-threatening, but 
only through careful adjustments made to the way the landscape was perceived, as well as 
necessary adjustments to the landscape itself following the Zionist settlement project. Positing 
themselves as the rightful and proper, even natural, inhabitants of this place, the Jewish pioneer-
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artists of Bezalel could not simply project otherness, exoticism, negativity and anachronism onto 
the Palestinian landscape—unlike the British colonial artists in Palestine and the larger network 
of colonies. Furthermore, since pioneer-artists had previously only had access to the Promised 
Land in the form of what George Steiner calls a “textual homeland,” the landscape would appear 
suddenly available for more accurate, authentic, and passionate representation.  Shohat describes 
the recurring theme of the land and nature in Zionist films in terms of this newfound affection for 
the landscape: 
Two thousand years of living a vicarious textual geography through the scriptural 
The Zionist into a concrete touching of a palpable land transforms nostalgia for the
 Promised Land and of being forced into non-agricultural work.54 
 
And yet, considering the difficulties plaguing the Bezalel artists according to Newman, the land 
would not appear immediately available for something other than “concrete touching” without a 
period of transition and adjustment. Seemingly at risk of dissolving into the haze of an ill-defined 
contrast between horizon and landscape, between East and West, more confident modes of 
visuality and spatiality would seem necessary. Yet it would be too easy to claim that the pioneers 
simply negated, rejected, or ignored the present landscape and population. As Ahmed cautions, 
the  “fantasy of lack” involved in the desire for the Palestinian landscape and the apparent 
construction of its emptiness belies that Orientalism fills the Orient with “all that which is ‘not 
Europe’ or not Occidental,” thus creating its “farness” as a “supply point” that “pushes us toward 
that ‘not’.”55  More to the point, Ahmed argues “the directness toward this other reminds us that 
desire involves a political economy in the sense that it is distributed: the desire to possess, and to 
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occupy, constitutes others not only as objects of desire, but also as resources for world 
making.”56  
Lack describes how Palestine was constructed spatially and temporally empty, 
particularly in relation to the narrative of Jewish return, as described by Yael Zerubavel: 
Hebrew culture placed the Jewish settlement at the center of its geographical map and 
related to the territory surrounding it as a symbolic desert.  Within the context of the 
settlement process, these space metaphors assumed historical connotations.  The long 
period of Jewish exile from the homeland, galut, was negatively portrayed as a symbolic 
void or vacuum in Jewish history, a state of homelessness and lack that was contrasted 
with Jewish national life during Antiquity and in the modern period.  That state of lack 
was, in turn, inscribed onto the physical landscape of the homeland that Jews found upon 
their return.57 
 
While the Jewish settlers may have projected a kind of emptiness on the landscape they “found 
upon their return,” as Zerubavel puts it, this construction of lack also provided the resources for 
fulfilling a wish, in the form of a future nation, for Herzl’s “garden cities” with paved roads, its 
pine forests, its wall and tower homesteads, its drained marshes, the new/old ethno-national 
language, and Tel Aviv, the first Jewish city, which promised to be, as it’s insignia states, “a 
light to the Diaspora and a Gate into the Land of Israel.” The straight lines of the Jewish National 
Fund forestation projects and the pre-fabricated settlement outposts emphasized the broad scale 
of the colonial project of filling the lack, but the task of making the desert bloom was also given 
figural form through “Sabra” iconography. Especially in the early Zionist Jewish Agency visual 
propaganda, the figure of the Sabra came to dominate this visual and visualizing narrative of 
becoming rooted, oriented, and visually and spatially dominant in Palestine. The Sabra also 
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further emphasized the contradictory forms through which unrecognizability would be projected 
on Palestinian dispossession and legitimacy would be established for Jewish belonging. 
3.3 SABRAS BLOOMING (IN) THE ARID WASTELAND 
The formation of a Jewish identity in terms of being reborn or returned as a native of Palestine 
reflects the Zionist preoccupation with land as well as with transformations and translations of 
Jewish identity.  “Sabra,” the Arabic word for “prickly pear” cacti common in the region—a 
plant hard and thorny on the outside but sweet on the inside—was adopted to name the new 
native Jew in Palestine, a second generation born of Jewish immigrant-pioneers (mostly from the 
Second “Aliya” or in-gathering of Soviet Russian immigrants). The Sabras were envisioned in 
another sense as a first generation insofar as the Sabra was “born of the sea,”  “charting a new 
land-based Jewish identity” rather than a blood connection to diasporic Jewry.58 The Sabra was 
idealized in literary and filmic representation as European, muscular, and tan, dedicated to 
cultivating and defending Jewish national life in Palestine. While the Jewish Agency films 
helped give the Sabra cinematic and representational form, the Jewish agencies further brought 
the Sabras into being through what Oz Almog refers to as “Sabra institutions,” some of which, 
like the Hebrew educational system, were also funded by the Jewish Agencies.   
A key characteristic of the Sabra was that he embodied everything the anti-Semitic image 
of Jewish masculinity did not. For Joseph Massad, the transformation of “European Jewish 
                                                
58 Joseph Massad, The Persistence of the Palestinian Question: Essays on Zionism and the 
Palestinians (New York: Routledge, 2006), 37. 
   112 
bodies” into Sabras reflected “Zionism’s own embodiment as a project.”59 This embodiment, 
through turn-of-the-century writing by Zionist leaders like Max Nordau, posited a “pre-diasporic 
model of Jewish male bodies,” like Bar Kochba, to transform Jewish men into a “Jewry of 
Muscle,” the title of Nordau’s article.60 Heiko Haumann notes that Nordau’s idea of Muscle 
Jewry emerged out of discussions amongst Zionists who had “internalized the ‘Zeitgeist’” and 
“entered into the discussion surrounding the ‘Arian’ and ‘Semitic’ race.”61 Though this 
transformation turned away from European Jewish tradition in many respects, it still represented 
a historic continuity between pre-diasporic Jewry and what was envisioned as post-diasporic 
Jewry in Palestine.  Massad argues that this project was so successful that Jewishness has today 
become legible only through a relation to Israel—effectively making a secular, non-Zionist 
Jewry nearly unthinkable. 
Reflecting on the specifically gendered and racialized formation of Sabra identity, Raz 
Yosef argues that the Sabra, or  
the native-born Jew in Eretz Yisrael, is the Zionist prototype for the “white” male 
pioneer.  As a counter-image of the feminized and passive diasporic Jew, the Sabra was 
represented in Zionist national mythology as a healthy, strong, hard-working man, as well 
as being conceived out of pre-genital reproduction.62  
 
The Sabra was Zionism’s answer to anti-Semitism, but was articulated primarily in the same 
terms.  Similar to how the desolation of the landscape was constructed through scientific and 
medical discourse to explain how it fell into neglect out of a former fruitfulness, Jewish men 
were conceptualized by Zionism as having fallen into a state of degeneracy due to oppression 
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and isolation from nature.  For Nordau, this degraded state was symptomatic of the general fin de 
siècle affliction—marked by “convention, stagnation and decline”—referred to in his book 
Degeneration.63  Oscar Wilde appears amongst his examples of the degeneration of civilization 
brought on primarily by cosmopolitanism, whereby Wilde’s particular form of wit and 
obfuscation mark him as a degenerate male.  Though Nordau in that text only hints at Wilde’s 
non-normative sexual and gender identity as an aspect of his degenerate character, Nordau’s 
model of a Jewry of Muscle was posited in opposition to what he considered degenerate forms of 
masculinity afflicting Jewish Diaspora men. As Massad puts it, the characterization of “European 
Jews as ‘feminine’ are derived from the then dominant anti-Semitic discourse that posited Jews 
as the racial/feminine other.”64   
A “return” to a future/past homeland in this context provided a seemingly tidy antidote to 
the problem of cosmopolitanism and degeneracy since the New Muscle Jewry would define 
himself through a relationship to working the landscape. Yet the contradictory and confusing 
temporal metaphors of degeneracy and delay suggested by Nordau and embedded in the 
dominant Zionist narrative of Jewish “return” and reinvention suggest an investment in logics of 
colonialism and modernity. Invoking civilizational hierarchies according to similar temporal 
metaphors again invokes certain cinematic logics of montage such as the splicing of disparate 
time periods (whereby the past and current Jewish inhabitance of Palestine produce the proper 
narrative timeline), and meaning made through the passage of time (which could be posited in 
opposition to the kind of delay and degeneracy represented by the seemingly static backwardness 
of ‘Semitic’ Jewishness and the Arab Palestinians). 
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Shohat describes how the Sabra began to take more concrete representational form 
through cinematic representation after the 1930s, making filmic space a site of consolidation of 
the Sabra figure. The increasing use of close-ups in Zionist film at that time seemed to support 
the construction of the Sabra, since it allowed for a new emphasis on subjective desire and 
narrative tension within the otherwise collective-focused topics.  Shohat discusses one of the 
most well-known and popular films, Oded the Wanderer (1933), that form the individualized 
Sabra mythology and importance of landscape to the Sabra: 
The interaction of the Sabra with the landscape reveals still another dimension, one 
carrying with it a certain ambivalence.  Oded the Wanderer, in accord with Zionist 
thought, typifies a Romantic image of the Sabra.  The rootedness of the healthy, happy, 
proud Sabra, a member of the ‘generation of the future,’ forms an implicit binary contrast 
with the image of the presumably unhealthy, self-tormenting, and cowed Diaspora Jew 
lacking all concrete attachment to a land.65 
 
It is in a similar vein that Nurith Gertz and Yosef describe the opening scene of Avodah (1935), 
the title that translates to “labor” or “work,” as a kind of metaphor for Jewish masculinity’s 
progress out of fragmentation and death and toward a new Jewish life in Palestine.  Avodah 
opens with a figure only shown from the calves down as he walks what is constructed as a great 
distance through the joining of shots of disparate landscapes.  He walks over rocky landscapes, 
through water, and finally through British Mandate controlled gates when the camera pans up his 
body and reveals his smiling face.  For Gertz, the figure is finally represented as whole and 
unified, a complete body, upon his arrival in the Jewish homeland.  Similarly, for Yosef the 
Soviet-montage style (director Lerski was a Soviet filmmaker) and frequent use of close-up shots 
in Avodah are indicative of a kind of maturation of Zionist cinema from its early use of primarily 
long shots (in the cinema of Ben Dov, Natan Axelrod and Murray Rosenberg) that prioritized 
landscape and the pioneer in terms of collectivity.  In the later films of the 1930s, the more 
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common use of close-ups of the human subject is linked, for Yosef, to the construction of Zionist 
male subjectivity.  Thus, he identities “the subjective gaze of the new Hebrew male pioneer” as a 
characteristic of the close-up in pre-state Zionist films.66  For Yosef, the new possibility for 
subjectivity in the films allowed for desire, suspense, and fetishism to enter into the cinematic 
language of the Zionist films.  In Avodah, then, a suspenseful scene of drilling a well that finally 
and dramatically releases water becomes, as it does for Gertz, an occasion to dramatize and 
fetishize the male pioneer’s bodies and the fertile landscape in close, fragmented shots.  
Furthermore, Yosef argues that “the introduction of crosscutting editing to Zionist cinema in the 
film Sabra [1933] corresponded with the first cinematic representation of the Jewish-Arab 
conflict,” thus aligning new cinematic techniques with a progression away from “innocent and 
unconflicted” early Zionist cinema, and allowing for emergence of the “new Zionist 
heteromasculinity.”67 
The increasing use of close-ups might also reflect the ongoing management of the 
problems of nearness and remoteness that the Zionists encountered in their perception of the 
landscape and in their attempts to reconfigure Jewishness in relation to East-West ideas, 
Orientalism and the increasingly threatened Jewish communities in Europe.  Rather than a 
primarily technological or narrative advancement in cinema and a growing complexity in the 
Zionist construction of normative national subjecthood, however, the increased use of close-ups 
suggests more of the ambivalence of Zionist Jewish identity in its emergent national formation—
an ambivalence marked by the phenomenological problem of orientation posed earlier. Yosef 
similarly remarks on the “ambivalence, displacement, and disidentification” indicated by these 
techniques. I argue that Zionist Jewish Agency filmmakers and leaders used and discussed these 
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cinematic techniques in relation to what they posit as visual, spatial and temporal problems in the 
landscape. Orientation offers a frame for critiquing the relational terms through which a Jewish 
belonging and intelligibility was produced, which, while indebted to visuality and cinema, must 
be understood in its mutual constitution through other related factors, including a the association 
of Jews in Israel with life (healthy bodies, reproduction, proper vision) and Arabs with death 
(disease, cultural backwardness, problems with vision and rationalization).  
Achillé Mbembe explains how the historical trajectory of Zionism is better understood in 
terms of necropolitics, whereby Zionism’s aligns becoming a national subject with a right to kill.  
“In this case,” Mbembe writes of late-modern colonial occupation, “sovereignty means the 
capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not.”68  For 
Mbembe, the colonial occupation of Palestine is “the most accomplished form of necropower” in 
it’s “combining of the disciplinary, the biopolitical, and the necropolitical.”69  Early examples of 
the association of the Arab population with death suggest the establishment of some of the terms 
of necropower locatable in a trajectory of early Zionist settlement and later Israeli military 
occupation, as well as the use of cinema as a technology of colonial occupation.   
The Sabra describes not only an ideal type of person, but a particular process of 
becoming a subject through negation and struggle; in other words, the Sabra served as a figure 
through which to negotiate a variety of re-orientations of Jewishness in its threatening proximity 
to degeneracy and death. In necropolitical terms, the Sabra was a figure meant to project the 
death and degeneracy associated with Jews in anti-Semitic discourse onto the Arab population, 
who, through a contradictory and racist logic of social Darwinism and environmental 
determinism are marked for death through their own fault.  Commenting on how dominant 
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notions of Jewishness were closely related to ideas of non-normative gender and sexuality 
forming around the turn of the century, and the specifically heterosexual construction of Sabra 
masculinity, Yosef emphasizes the importance of sexual orientation in this analysis: 
Paradoxically, then, Zionism’s (homo)phobia of the queer Jew and the Zionist 
movement’s fantasy of a new heterosexual Hebrew male subject reinforced the same 
European anti-Semitic scientific-medical discourse that it tried to undo.70  
 
In other words, as dominant academic and institutional notions of what constituted healthy 
human bodies increasingly became understood in relation to dominant ideas about normative 
gender and reproductive heterosexuality, the Sabra appeared intentionally formed in response to 
ideas about Jewish queerness—thus the Sabra was understood as normatively masculine and 
heterosexual from the perspective of European institutional thought.   
In the introduction to Queer Theory and the Jewish Question, Daniel Boyarin, Daniel 
Itzkovitz, and Ann Pellegrini further establish how relational the figure of the Jew and the queer 
are: 
Jewishness and queerness…are bound up with one another in resonant ways.   This 
crossover extends to the modern discourses of anti-Semitism and homophobia, with 
stereotypes of the Jew frequently underwriting pop cultural and scientific notions of the 
homosexual.71 
 
Yosef, Massad, and Jasbir Puar are among recent scholars who have shown how Arab men have 
come to take up a similar queer resonance in Israeli and U.S. popular culture, revealing that 
racial, gendered, and sexual identities are never formed in isolation. In many ways, the Zionist 
construction of a New (male, Ashkenazi or “white”) Jew, evident in the construction of the 
Sabra, attempted to sever the connection between Jewishness and queerness, and to shift the 
definitional stress of “Jew” toward what European thinking would establish as the opposing 
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binary terms: male, heterosexual, Occidental.   
The dual project of re-building the self and the landscape became tied to particular ways 
of imagining subjectivity, embodiment and sexuality for Zionist discourse. Though aligned in 
many ways with dominant anti-Semitic discourse, Zionist re-imaginings of the Jewish man and a 
Jewish nation were never simply about racial difference. In other words, the Sabra was produced 
as “white” in relation to Zionist transformations in the embodiment of Jewish gender and 
sexuality, in addition to any characteristics that would mark him as civilized and modern in 
relation to Arab Palestinians. Yosef points out the relational construction of racialization and 
sexuality in this context, whereby “Zionist racial and racist discourse is not a byproduct or an 
effect of Zionist sexual politics, but actually a constitutive element of it.”72 Invocations of 
“queerness” in the historical context of Zionist and Jewish gender and sexual discourses should 
keep in mind, in other words, that the re-orientation of Jewishness did not rely on categories of 
normative gender and sexuality alone.73 Boyarin argues as much through a discussion of Freud in 
which he suggests that “in the context of postcolonial theory, Freud’s universalized theories of 
subjectivity, all centered on the phallus—the Oedipus complex, the castration anxiety, and penis 
envy appear as an elaborate defense against the feminization of Jewish men.”74 Yet Boyarin 
critiques Sander L. Gilman’s “recoding of race as gender” in Gilman’s reading of Freud “as 
responding to racism directed against Jews by displacing these differences onto an absolute (i.e. 
universal) difference between men and women.”75 Boyarin argues that although Freud had a 
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critical opportunity to critique the dominant paradigms of gender and sexuality aligning Jews 
with feminization, a gendered and racialized phallic lack, neither he, nor Fanon in this reading, 
“make that move away from an ultimately Eurocentric, colonized universalism, to both 
understand the antiphallus to which their colonized subject positions provides potentially 
privileged access and then move to a political demystification of the phallus as representation 
tout court.”76 
A description by the Zionist poet Jacob Picard of the Sixth Zionist Congress highlights 
this intersection of racialized and gendered discourse in the construction of the idea of the 
properly masculine Jew: 
I saw Herzl amongst the others, although I did not hear him speak, but I heard Max 
Nordau with his square beard and his shrill, high-pitched voice. And how exciting I found 
the large statures of the Caucasian mountain Jews, very masculine and warlike with their 
ammunition belts slung diagonally across their breasts.77 
 
While it would be easy to point to what seems to be both a homoerotic and homophobic affect in 
this description, it is undergirded and inseparable from the racialized description of these 
mountain Jews who fit the ideal type put forth by Nordau, himself described in derogatory 
racialized and gendered terms by Picard. Indeed the ongoing process of establishing and 
maintaining a certain kind of Jewish domination and belonging in Palestine today suggests that 
queerness can shift from a seemingly dominant homophobia toward the contemporary situation 
where Israeli state officials rely on a gay rights discourse to maintain legitimacy in the region 
and to cast a different kind of queerness onto Palestinians, a casting which must be understood in 
relation to the racialization of Arab Jews and Palestinians. 
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Yosef remarks on the distinct homoerotics evident in Zionist poetry and cinematic 
imagery, like the bursting well in Avodah, that evoke the masculine pioneering body’s working 
of the soil that releases the natural resources of the landscape.78 They imply that the Sabra does 
not simply represent heterosexual masculinity. For Yosef, Sabra homoerotics suggests a certain 
masculine anality of the landscape that distinguishes it from the more common postcolonial 
reading of feminized “virgin” landscaped penetrated by masculine colonialists.79  If the 
queerness implied in the notions of the land “laid waste” and the “degenerate” diasporic Jew 
together formed an implicit opposition to the New Muscle Jewry in Palestine, the opposing term 
to “queerness,” and specifically the queerness of perceived Jewish gender non-normativity, was 
not necessarily precisely “heteronormative” or “heterosexual.” In this way, queerness does not 
necessarily map onto what would then or now be understood (and by no means does 
“understood” mean to suggest a kind of stability was or is achieved through these terms) as 
homosexuality or gay identity, and suggests instead the need for a framework that attends to 
processes of national intelligibility, that is, to what gets cast as negative or unthinkable in the 
wake of positing or maintaining dominant and normative subjects and concepts of legibility, 
intelligibility and recognition.  
Following Yosef, if a male homoerotics can be associated with the landscape’s fertile 
reproductivity, I argue that a former queerness becomes attached to the landscape in its wasted, 
barren form, which is posited as queer because it is neither hetero- nor homo-normative. Given 
that Zionist and Holy Land discourse associate the land with either fertility or barrenness, the 
former queerness of the land during its period of non-Jewish settlement becomes aligned with the 
kind of supposed failed femininity and failed masculinity attributed to the Jew and the “queer” in 
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medical and scientific discourse. The Sabra narrative compels the idea that the land wants to be 
worked, but had lacked both the masculine attention necessary, as well as the properly feminine 
or reproductive fertility, and that the Sabra is the masculine character able to take up this work.  
The land and its non-Zionist Jewish population become associated in this way with a kind of 
negativity hinging not only on notions of normative gender and sexuality, but on other racialized 
categories of civilizational hierarchy and value that suggest who belongs and who doesn’t. Since 
this plays out in relation to the depiction of the landscape as much as in the depiction of the 
individual or collective pioneers, the focus on increased use of close-ups cannot fully explain the 
establishment of points out that “in Zionist medical discourse, the East’s geography, climate, 
natural resources, and people were invented, time after time, as objects of death available for 
Zionist research and domination.”80  In the context of the 19th century when Jews were widely 
perceived as unhealthy, degenerate and queer, the Zionist campaign worked hard to associate the 
New Jewish pioneer in Palestine with any and all projects associated with rebirth, life, and 
fertility.  Herzl, in his treatise on The Jewish State, for example, emphasized the importance of 
health and sanitation in preparing the Jewish people for nationhood, a familiar colonial sanitizing 
that emphasized the biopolitical aspect of Zionism’s project of helping administer life to the 
British colonies. 
Furthering the Sabra’s imbrication in notions of the landscape and the founding of a 
Jewish nation through a rootedness in the land, the negativity associated with diasporic life was 
often given further figural and representational form in the idea of the uncultivated and irrational 
desert. The desert already held a particular place in imperial imaginaries, which Stephen Daniels 
describes in relation to the French Empire: “under the mantle of modern empire, and its material 
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power, the desert might be redeemed, restored to its former civilized glory. But, no less, the very 
wildness of the desert, its silences and vast horizons, might redeem the very materialism of 
modern France.”81 If the notion of the diasporic “wandering Jew” was associated with the 
shifting dunes and infertile sands of the desert, the Sabra appeared as the figure equipped to 
found civilization in the face of desertification of landscape and identity—he would lay down 
roads, plant forests, build permanent settlements, make the desert “bloom,” and thereby 
“redeem” Jewry. Likewise, through sanitation projects closely linked to ownership and control of 
the landscape and population, a production of normative nationhood emerged to bring the Jews 
out of their association with death, with wandering, and with unhealthy and non-normatively 
gendered bodies. Furthermore, by administering to the Arab communities,” the Zionist 
institutions, following the British colonial administration, could mark themselves as bringers of 
life, of caregivers for the land and the natives who did not know how to care for it or for 
themselves. Jewish Agency film Behind the Blockade (1947) notes, for instance, that “Arab 
infant mortality is lower near Jewish communities” due to “modern sanitation and science, This 
discourse served to associate Jewish children with life and redemption over and against not only 
the Diaspora ghetto conditions, but the supposedly anti-nurturing aspect of Arab culture, as well 
as the currently diseased state of the landscape.  
That the Jews belonged properly in the Palestinian landscape was thus upheld both by 
environmental determinist explanations, as well as social Darwinist claims about the Arab 
population, marking them with a kind of un-belonging and death.  While the Jews were 
understood to have degenerated due to the negative and unnatural environment of the European 
ghetto, for example, their cultural superiority would be proven through their ability to flourish in 
                                                
81 Daniels, Fields of Vision, 5-6. 
   123 
the Palestinian landscape, which would itself be renewed through the productive Jewish 
pioneering effort. Though it would be easy to attribute a discourse of health and sanitation to a 
kind of innate necessity of any nationalist discourse for strong, young, masculine bodies, it is 
more apparent in the case of Jewish nationalism that all of these terms—racialization, gender and 
sexuality—were in the process of reconfiguration toward creating recognizably normative terms 
for Jewish national belonging.   
Medical humanities and history scholar Sandra Sufian provides a heavily documented 
and thoroughly researched context for the marsh-clearing projects which were undertaken in the 
name of sanitation and health, but which gave further justification for the acquisition of 
Palestinian land and the administration of life in Arab communities.82  Not simply ignored or 
excluded, the Arabs living nearby Jewish settlements were closely examined, studied, and tested. 
Though at the same time represented as diseased as the threatening marshes themselves, Arabs 
were also frequently understood to be innately immune to the diseases. Any justification could 
be given to mark them as aliens on the landscape, or at least aliens to health, vitality and fertility. 
Yoram Bar-Gal notes how the discourse of environmental determinism worked in contradictory 
fashion to construct Arabs as innately sickly while at the same time associating the health of 
Jews with the fertility of the land: “if it is the environment that produces health children, why are 
the Arab children not as successful as the Hebrew children?”83 As Bar-Gal notes, the 
environmental determinist discourse could be supported with socially deterministic explanations: 
“the Arabs corrupt their children and their health themselves.”84  In turn, this combination of 
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seemingly contradictory explanatory frameworks could justify the Zionist transformation of the 
landscape while at the same time claiming in some ways to be borne of its natural state: “[the 
Jewish National Fund] even makes sure that what happened to Arab children (rolling around 
among bare rocks) will not happen to Hebrew children: the JNF is planting forests on the 
wastelands of Eretz Yisrael and is making the lands flourish.”85 
Bar-Gal describes a Jewish National Fund filmstrip of fifty slides on “The Hebrew child 
in the Land of Israel: How the Jewish settlement raise their children,” which was produced for a 
Jewish audience in the Diaspora and meant to accompany a lecture, in terms of its construction 
of the exceptionality of the Hebrew child in contrast to the Diaspora and Arab child. In the 
transparency and lecture text cited by Bar-Gal, the negativity and death associated with the Arab 
child repeatedly aligns with a fascination with eye diseases, for example the “’filth, fleas, skin 
diseases, which often lead to blindness,’” as well as perceived problems of light and vision in the 
described natural environment. While the Jewish children grow “’under the wind-swept sunny 
sky,’” the Arab children are depicted (in the text of a transparency meant to be read aloud by the 
lecturer) “’rolling around among bare rocks, under the scorching rays of the sun, the babies 
among them with unprotected heads and all with bleary, diseased eyes.’”86 In another 
comparison, a healthy dancing Jewish girl is to be shown “’next to picture no. 49—a Bedouin 
girl with an eye disease, also dancing her fantastic dance in the centre of the field.”87 In relation 
to both the children and the landscape, negativity becomes attached to visuality either through 
reference to eyesight or sunlight. This oscillation between positive and negative aesthetics when 
describing the landscape is similar to how the experience of immigrant artists was depicted in 
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terms of the extent to which the landscape lent itself to accurate and positive representation on 
film (in the case of Freitas’ letter) and in painting and sculpture (in the case of the pioneer artists 
discussed by Newman). 
I argue then that the Sabra figure in Zionist discourse and visual culture served not only 
to re-orientate the gendered, racial, and sexual associations attached to Jewry and a Jewish 
homeland, but also to prioritize, naturalize and even nativize certain ways of seeing. In this way 
the Sabra can be located not only as a figure of the masculine Hebrew pioneer, but as a kind of 
locus of a proper re-orientation of race, gender, and sexuality aligned with a certain visual logic, 
which prioritized visual dominance over the landscape as well as an ability to recognize Jewish 
belonging in the landscape image. The Sabra is not just an image or representation himself, in 
other words, but represents a way of seeing that relied on visual and non-visual affirmations and 
re-orientations of Jewish belonging. The construction of certain ways of understanding and 
visualizing the landscape continues to be formative aspect of Israeli identity through a ritual 
called Yediat Ha’aretz that translates to “knowledge of the land,” a process legible in the 
pedagogical narrative and formal construction of many “Palestine films.”88 The ritual primarily 
consists of school trips and nature walks, and a working knowledge (in Hebrew) of the variety of 
plant and animal life in Palestine.  Orit Ben-David argues that post-statehood nature hikes are 
distinct from pre-statehood Zionist relationship which she describes as a “struggle against 
nature” that provided a basis for creating “legitimation” and a way to “reinforce their right to the 
land.”89 While blatantly ignoring even the possibility of shared or competing Arab Palestinian 
claims to the landscape, Ben-David suggests that Zionist “pioneers” shared with contemporary 
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Israeli hikers a desire to “mark out their possession,” in part through co-opting Arab Bedouin 
language, cuisine, and dress and thereby “managing the impression of a greater sense of 
belonging.”90 This sense of belonging is intimately tied to that possessive visualization of the 
landscape as property, through which one could not only belong to the landscape, but belong to 
oneself—be one’s own self through the ownership implied by the possession of the land.  
In a similar fashion, Mark Dorrian explains how the inauguration of oblique aerial views 
of the landscape through painting and cartography was linked:  
to transformations in English society in the 18th century, the ‘landscape idea’ emerged as 
the privileged representational form of the new landowning class. Landscape imagery 
served an ideological function: it provided representations of land and nature that 
naturalised the claim and position of the new landholders.91 
  
The sense of belonging established through the generation of the landscape “as an aesthetic 
object and as a zone of control” would need to be relearned and reiterated since at the same time 
that “the prospect is figured as a view that is grounded in a possessive, expropriating mode of 
vision” it necessitated “the estrangement of an observer who stood outside the landscape and 
looked in.”92 In other words, the process of Jewish belonging that must be learned and repeated 
through nature walks in Palestine can be understood in terms of its negotiations with otherness 
and through estrangement as much as with familiarity and possession. This marks a kind of 
ambivalence, for sure, but at the same time a dominant mode of knowledge was being reiterated 
nonetheless.  
Offering a more self-critical reflection on nature hikes and “knowing the land,” Israeli 
artist Larry Abramson describes his childhood experience: “I had been initiated into the 
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landscape; and I had forged my link with a long chain of pioneers who had—like me—sacrificed 
their comfort to become one with the Land.”93 While “knowledge of the land” serves in part to 
nativize and naturalize Sabra and Israeli identity, it at the same time underscores the constructed-
ness of nature and of national belonging since it a skill that must be learned and even adopted 
from others. Put another way, that dominant Zionist production of an arid and empty landscape 
allowed the Sabra to take root and re-orient Jewish identity, but the Sabras and pioneers were 
also given credit for “blooming” the land through which they built their own national identity. 
Through such a recursive process, the Sabra was always in the process building the landscape 
that built him. What can be readily “seen” or recognized in the landscape requires a specific 
knowledge adapted to promote Jewish belonging and to deny other forms of belonging.  
Hence, for Abramson, a later process of unlearning the geography of “knowledge of the 
land” caused a shift in his perception of a once familiar and gratifying landscape: “The pine 
forests, so enthusiastically donated by generations of Jewish children in the diaspora…and 
planted by the Jewish National Fund to ‘make the wilderness bloom’ now looked more like a 
Euro-centric desire to visually colonise the Levant, to conceal sites of depopulation, and to 
prevent Palestinian use of the land.”94 While the process of knowing the land was and largely 
still is considered a way to establish emotional and patriotic attachment by learning about 
topography in particular terms, the process was as much about un-learning those aspects of 
Jewish tradition and identity that became associated with the degeneration the Zionists hoped to 
leave behind.  It must also be a way of not-seeing the landscape in ways that would not serve the 
Zionist vision—i.e. the fertility of native plants versus the acidic non-native pine tree. As Oz 
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Almog argues, unlearning actually undergirded much of the early Zionist discourse and visual 
culture as well: 
The pioneer’s visual and verbal paean to the Israeli landscape—both the natural 
landscape and the landscape he domesticated—was also a way of saying that he had 
severed ties with the Diaspora’s landscape and thus with its culture and had put down 
roots in his new homeland.  It marked the pioneer’s translocation from the “hell” of 
Diaspora to the “paradise” of the Land of Israel.95 
 
Of course, again, the landscape in “the Land of Israel” was only described as “paradise” after 
Zionist intervention and the work of Jewish pioneers, or before the exodus of Jews thousands of 
years prior. Although Palestine in its depiction as an Oriental and Eastern landscape may have 
presented to Zionists what Ahmed refers to as “a lack”—where the Orient is all that the Occident 
is not, and in this case the Orient/Palestine is constructed as an empty space for Jewish 
reinvention—ambivalence over what aspects of Jewish identity would be recuperated and 
reinvented, in combination with the contradiction of a new/old homeland, together produced a 
certain anxiety over precisely what kind of orientation was being taken up in Palestine. Given 
that processes of national subjectivity are never finally determined or fixed, and thus always in 
the process of being taken up, this ambivalence, disorientation and at times even incoherence is 
in many respects iterated again and again in the reproduction of landscape and identity in 
constructing exceptional Jewish belonging in Palestine.   
The Sabra was thus an ideal figure for organizing the intersecting terms of Jewish 
transformation, identity and topography, in visualizing terms, in part because of how the Zionist 
mastery of landscape seemed to be the condition through which it could become not only 
rationalized, controlled and possessed, but also the condition through which it could become 
beautiful and recognizable as a “landscape view” tied to norms of legitimate national belonging. 
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In Birthday of a Prophecy, a film produced in 1947 that used a celebration of the UN decision to 
support Jewish nationalism as well as to solicit donations from a North American audience, the 
realization of the Zionist vision is quickly made literal through reference to a bust of Theodor 
Herzl and what he saw “with the brain behind these eyes.”  The “birthday of a prophecy” refers 
to the roughly fifty-year anniversary since Theodor Herzl described his vision of a future Jewish 
state.  The twenty-minute 16mm color film, produced by the United Israel Appeal in New York 
City, includes a catalogue of landscape views, urban aerial and street shots of Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem, close-ups of smiling Jewish immigrants and pioneers, workers in various trades from 
glass-blowing to textile production, and industrial and agricultural machinery. Three characters, 
a Polish immigrant, a Jewish Agency worker, and an American fundraiser, provide a creative 
frame narrative on the soundtrack accompanying these somewhat standard images for a Jewish 
Agency. Each discusses what they “see” in Palestine, and the fundraiser in Cleveland appeals to 
the American viewer by affirming his own connection to seeing Palestine only through film, 
“I’m not in these pictures, I’m 5,000 miles away in Cleveland, Ohio, but I too can see Herzl’s 
dream coming alive.” Emphasizing Zionism as vision, and specifically as a perspective on 
landscape and futurity, the film underscores that before the Jewish pioneer’s (re-)arrival in 
Palestine, the “Holy Land” image was an image of the past and “not as an image of the future.” 
On the image track, a camel pulls a cart past the static camera, and the next shot depicts an group 
of Bedouin while the narrator continues, “its sparse inhabitants clung to the past, the dim distant 
past, that constantly overshadowed the way they worked and lived…Herzl’s’ dream, they said, 
was a mirage.” An wide shot of a mosque in the desert emphasizes the “sparse” atmosphere and 
the identity of inhabitants, although the film never mentions the words Arab, Bedouin, or any 
other term that might indicate that Palestine was indeed still populated by people other than the 
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newly arrived Jewish immigrants and the small population of Jews already living there. 
The Jewish immigrant from Poland declares of his new homeland: “there is a view this 
time, a vista of peace and security, view of the landscape shown, a chance to work again, and as 
we build we build ourselves.” As the Polish immigrant describes a “vista of peace,” the camera 
pans across the side of an apartment building with balconies populated by Jewish men and 
women taking in the view. The relation between the sound track and the image track is markedly 
and almost distractingly didactic in their mutual confirmation, whereby the image primarily 
confirms the narration. For instance, the Jewish Agency worker, describing how her bureaucratic 
work with numbers supports productivity and state institutions, states that “our endless figures 
made it possible to turn a land of shepherds into a modern country…our planning and our 
people…for the people forged our numbers into reality.” When she says the word “forged,” 
speaking metaphorically, the image track, having just cut to an image of the Cluson Steel Works 
factory from the previous shots in a glass blowing factory, cuts to a series of medium close-up of 
two steel workers literally forging metal. After a few more shots of the steel workers’ process, 
the narrator refers to “forging a new nation,” furthering the metaphor. Throughout the film, cuts 
closely follow the cue of the soundtrack, seeming to reveal what the narrator has just described 
or is in the midst of describing. The literal and metaphoric sense of “vision” is emphasized 
throughout. Closely relating Jewish work in Palestine to self-work in stating “we build 
ourselves” with an ability to take in the “view of the landscape,” the figure of the Sabra is called 
forth metaphorically through the film’s emphasis on vision—in the narrator’s question “what do 
you see?” in the inclusion of numerous aerial landscape images with commentary such as “these 
wasted shriveled lands could hardly support a modern nation,” and in the realization of Zionism 
through the what is repeatedly emphasized as a process of visualization.  
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The many visual metaphors in the narration emphasize how this discourse works through, 
and not in spite of, contradiction. The Holy Land as a “sight” that should, but did not, “project[] 
an image of the future” is the first odd construction that suggests a hierarchy of images whose 
value is difficult to ascertain, similar to the contrast between Herzl’s “dream” and the derogatory 
sense of “mirage.”  The past is posited in visual and spatial terms, as both “dim” and “distant,” 
and as a place that the pitiable “sparse” inhabitants “clung to.” Yet the valued “image of the 
future” doesn’t clearly offer the clear contrast to the “dim” image of the past that the passage 
might intend to suggest. The counterpoint to those past-clinging inhabitants seems to be the fact 
that Herzl’s dream turned out to be reality, not “mirage,” and yet the “reality” of Holy Land is 
also implied to be a “sight” capable of producing further images. Dorrian elaborates on how the 
aerial view in particular—privileged in the many aerial shots of the desert, mountains, ports, and 
cities in Birthday—was established for imagining future, and specifically military, possibilities:  
This futurity in turn seems related to the military associations and functions of the 
oblique aerial view: the prospect is what the military general historically sought to 
command as it permitted the sighting of both the advance of enemy forces and a strategic 
overview from which the development of the battle could best be followed.96 
 
The aerial landscape view works, in other words, not only in terms of spatial organization and 
control, but in terms of mobility and temporality, the ability to ensure certain spatial trajectories 
through a kind of visual confirmation of futurity (i.e. “there is a view this time,” perhaps 
referring to the immanent declaration of Israeli statehood). The complicated and confusing 
layering of images, sights, and processes of seeing and knowing in Birthday’s narration suggests 
the importance of visualization to establishing terms of belonging, but in no simple terms.   
In Jewish National Fund and Palestine Film Fund posters, leading up to and directly after 
statehood, a single Sabra figure provided a more simple and static depiction of the importance of 
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visualization and sight. The posters frequently situate a single Sabra figure in the foreground or 
looming in the background, shovel, weapon, or other tool in hand, with an extended view of the 
landscape, dotted and grid-like with new settlements and cultivated fields, behind and below 
him. Visual dominance is reflected through the Sabra’s distinctly European and masculine 
features, which set him apart from caricatures of Diaspora Jewry, through the commanding and 
controlling view of the landscape. In Zionist films, this commanding view is represented not only 
through an increasing focus on the body of the toiling Jewish man in Palestine (or less often the 
image of women), but through an emphasis on advantageous perspectives and modes of 
surveillance. Towers, watchmen with binoculars, and aerial imagery make frequent appearances 
in Jewish agency films of the late 20s and early 30s.  This ability to take up proper vantage 
points can be understood in the case of the Sabra, then, as a kind of cinemato-geographic 
process, whereby the cinema not only helped produce the empty landscape that served as a 
staging ground for Jewish reinvention, but secured the Zionist visual and spatial conquest of 
Palestine.  
As already implied, however, “inevitably the oblique aerial view produces occluded or 
hidden zones within the representation.” As Dorrian explains: “the spectator remains like the 
Duke of Wellington – a famous occupier of elevated positions – who remarked that he had spent 
his life trying to guess what was over the next hill.”97 Likewise, even the early formation of 
Sabra identity was not as mutually exclusive of the supposedly invisible indigenous Arabs as a 
model of exclusion might suggest.  Oz Almog’s work on Sabra identity, for example, describes 
the various ways that the New Jewish identity, while violently excluding and oppressing Arab 
Bedouins, was also closely modeled after them. Even the name “Sabra” takes the Arabic rather 
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than Hebrew word for the prickly pear cactus.  Furthermore, the Sabras wore keffiyehs, rode 
Arabian horses, and so on.98 Jewish actors even occasionally played Arabs in Zionist and Jewish-
Israeli cinema, posing additional problems of proximity since, through what Carol Bardenstein 
calls “cross-casting” (a kind of racial passing), the Zionist Jewish Sabra would be presumed to 
have a kind of legibility as “Arab” to audiences abroad.99  However, it is also likely that even if 
audiences were well aware of the cross-casting taking place, this knowledge would do little to 
challenge the ideological and negative stereotyping of Arabs, particular in the U.S. where 
virtually no other model was available. In other words, the regime of visuality that cast 
Palestinians in terms of unbelonging and a certain degree of unrecognizability was already well 
in place. This chapter has argued that the Jewish Agency “Palestine films” contributed to a larger 
visual culture, epitomized by the Sabra, that supported Jewish belonging in Palestine through 
discourses of spatial and temporal dominance, as well as through proper racialized, gendered and 
sexual orientations.  The next chapter will build on this argument to emphasize the imbrication of 
architecture and landscape in this broad schema of recognition and visuality.
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4.0  CHAPTER THREE: CINEMATIC OCCUPATION 
With its opening footage of a printing press producing a facsimile of the newspaper The 
Palestine Post proclaiming “Built in a Day,” a 1938 Jewish Agency film of the same title, Built 
in a Day, sets forth as a story plucked from the headlines.  As its title indicates, Built in a Day 
constructs a narrative loosely structured around the network of early 1930s Zionist settlements 
designed primarily for overnight construction. The proliferation of Jewish settlements throughout 
Palestine, in the over ten years after the Balfour Declaration that saw British and United States 
support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine, appears early on in the film as an increasing 
number of points on a map.  Expanding networks of settlements spreading across ever-changing 
and Arabic-free maps are common in “Palestine films,” marking a technique that helped 
establish a newsreel or documentary style.  Emphasis on the speedy expansion of settlements, as 
well as their ability to maintain connection throughout the network complimented other 
commonly visualized contrasts such as Jewish pioneers on modern agricultural equipment and 
Arab farmers on slow-moving camels. Civilizational contrast forms a key implicit and explicit 
aspect of the Zionist “Palestine Films,” particularly in their distribution within pro-Zionist 
networks through lecture circuits and other propaganda events. Take, for example, two of the 
edited chapter notes (which may have also been inter-titles) for the Palestine Film Fund 
Agency’s version of the 1925 film The Land of Promise:  
4. Jaffa has been transformed into a modern city resembling in many respects a bustling 
American town. 
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5. Contrast those scenes of progress with typical Arab section—unchanged throughout 
 the centuries.1 
 
Depictions of the construction of Jewish settlements and the “development” (in the historically 
Arab port city Jaffa, for example) of the land in “Palestine films” appropriated familiar 
perceptions of Palestine as desolate, past-oriented, and neglected due to years of Jewish 
absence.2 Additionally, the comparison to a “bustling American town” shows how “Palestine 
films” could be tailored to suit British colonial and American Jewish and Protestant perceptions.  
The opening titles of Built in a Day, appearing as text from a Palestine Post article, 
similarly frame the film’s presentation of Jewish settlement building: 
There are many parts of Palestine, sandy waste and barren wilderness, where the land 
though bought by Jews, has not yet been settled…Young Jewish Pioneers—some little 
more than boys and girls—have pledged themselves to colonise these arid wastes by 
cooperative settlements. They will clear marshes, drain swamps, till the soil, bore wells 
for water and bring back to the land its long neglected fruitfulness.   
 
Black matte frames, combined with a camera zoom on specific words narrow the visual focus of 
the Post article on the Tirat Zvi settlement. Following this textual confirmation of the film’s 
ideological positioning, the Jewish pioneers set out—Off They Go!—in the Palestinian 
landscape, traversing the landscape on horseback.  Superimposed on the passing landscape, the 
words “Barren wilderness” appear and disappear.  Perhaps assuming the inability of images to 
simply speak for themselves, the large, bold English text, laid out to match the perspective lines 
of the landscape, renders the image hyper-legible (see Figure 1).  This officious text provides the 
landscape with an odd kind of disembodied subjectivity—as if the land itself declares its own 
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neglect and hails the pioneers, naming itself in terms that affirm their pioneering intervention. As 
speech attributed to the landscape, it appears as a cry for salvation and a return to its former 
fertility, having been “laid waste” and infertile since Jewish exile. This is a landscape wanting to 
be worked. 
Comparing colonial discourses surrounding the “holy landscape” of Palestine to the 
Western United States, W.J.T. Mitchell argues that landscape becomes an idol; “that is, a potent, 
ideological representation that serves to naturalize power relations and erase history and 
legibility.”3 In light of Mitchell’s analysis, the “Barren wilderness” landscape image compounds, 
even as it reveals, its ideological function. In other words, even though the text lays bare the 
Zionist ideological naming of the landscape as “barren,” this explicit propaganda does little to 
undermine what Mitchell describes as landscape’s ability to “naturalize power.”  
In their introduction to Sites Unseen: Landscape and Vision editors Diane Harris and D. 
Fairchild explain how landscape achieves a kind of ahistorical essence: 
Landscape is ‘always already there’ and thus seems not to have been created but simply 
to be, not a constructed form but rather a preexisting or even primordial one. It appears 
above all ‘natural’ because it is composed of plants, soil, geological formations, sunlight, 
and water and because it seems to exist in the absence of human management or design.4    
 
Given landscape’s apparently inherent and non-ideological character, it also forms a seemingly 
natural relationship to truthful representation. For this reason, the authors argue “of all the media 
and genres of imagery, landscape is the one that makes the constitutive blindness and invisibility 
of the visual process most evident.”5 As Tom Gunning writes of the emergence of cinema and its 
relation the landscape tradition in painting, “too often, discussion of landscape in cinema simply 
                                                
3 W.J.T. Mitchell, “Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness” Critical 
Inquiry 26 (2000), 194. 
4 Diane Harris and D. Fairchild, eds. Sites Unseen: Landscape and Vision (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 3. 
5 Harris and Fairchild, Sites Unseen, 35. 
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assume films, at least certain films, contain landscapes, positing a simple transfer of visual 
principles and effects from canvas to cinema screen.”6 As Gunning argues, cinema “transformed 
the possibilities of landscape, both as a form of imagery and a way of experiencing nature.” 7 
Extending this argument, if landscape is a mode of seeing and not just an object of visualization, 
it is also a technology imbricated in the visual and spatial logics of control and intelligibility that 
I argue continually shape the landscape and the idea of Palestine.  
Yet, if landscape appears self-evident, the interpretation of landscape imagery enters a 
tricky critical realm regarding the notion of surface versus depth readings. When the text “Barren 
wilderness” appears on the surface of the landscape image in Built in a Day (the text flashes on 
and off several times as the camera pans across a field of scrubs or grass), for example, it is the 
surface of the landscape image, which is also the surface of the filmic image, that is given visual 
priority. Rather than inviting the viewer to imagine the depth of the landscape using cinema’s 
illusionist and realist potential, the text calls attention to the surface of the filmstrip and to what 
might then appear as a perspectival trick, since the text appears to lay flat on the ground and 
recede into the background. Inviting a reading of the surface of the image that appears obvious—
i.e. the text seems to repeat what can already be “read” in the image—Zionist colonization and 
“development” of the landscape is naturalized and embedded precisely, and seemingly 
paradoxically, by exploiting the surface of the landscape image. In this way, the film invites what 
Mitchell refers to as a “surface model” that orients analysis toward “the remarkable capacity of 
the surface of landscape to open up false depths, selective memories, and self-serving myths.”8 
                                                
6 Tom Gunning, “Landscape and the Fantasy of Moving Pictures: Early Cinema’s Phantom 
Rides,” in Cinema and Landscape: Film, Nation, and Cultural Geography, eds. Graeme Harper 
and Jonathan Rayner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 35. Emphasis added. 
7 Gunning, “Landscape and the Fantasy of Moving Pictures,” 35-36. 
8 Mitchell, “Holy Landscape,” 195. 
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Yet, by using text to direct the viewer toward a narrow and official interpretation of the image, 
the technique also reaffirms a kind of raw illegibility associated with the apparently unaltered 
landscape, furthering the sense that the landscape requires interpretation and rationalization, just 
as much as it desires to be worked upon.  
The new “conspicuous legibility” of the barren landscape with the superimposed text 
suggests a similar logic to the a Balzacian detective story described by D.A. Miller in which 
“what had seemed natural and commonplace comes all at once under a malicious inspection, and 
what could be taken for granted now requires an explanation, even an alibi.”9 Suggesting the 
“sense that the world is thoroughly traversed by techniques of power to which everything, 
anything gives hold,” the word/image combination emphasizes that the landscape has been 
placed under multiple forms of scrutiny—visualization, valuation, and plans for development 
among them. 10 Like the nineteenth century novel as described by D.A. Miller, the narration of 
disciplinary power “bases its interpretive mastery on minutiae…that it elaborates into ‘telling’ 
details,” much like the overt “telling” of the text “barren landscape.”11 The seemingly natural 
landscape, as well as the seemingly legible landscape image on film, is visualized through this 
additional level of suspicion and detection, which for Miller shows “disciplinary power to inhere 
in the very resistance to it.”12 If a landscape image without text is worrisomely open to 
interpretation, thus potentially resistant to disciplinary power, the text underscores its potential to 
be articulated as discourse that proliferates justifications action. And so, once the “conspicuous 
legibility” and “alibi” of the “barren wilderness” has been established, Built in a Day describes 
the task of the Jewish pioneers: “They will clear marshes, drain swamps, till the soil, bore wells 
                                                
9 Mitchell, “Holy Landscape,” 195. 
10 Mitchell, “Holy Landscape,” 195. 
11 D.A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 29. 
12 Miller, The Novel and the Police, 27. 
   139 
for water and bring back to the land its long neglected fruitfulness.”   
Reflecting how the alibi for the landscape’s improvement was continually reproduced in 
terms of conspicuous legibility, The Jewish National Fund, whose other visual propaganda 
repeated similar “barren wilderness” themes, would post-statehood reposition itself primarily as 
a conservationist environmental organization, since land acquisition was no longer directly 
approached as such. Considering the historical context of Built in a Day, the phrase “barren 
wilderness” speaks primarily to the dominant Zionist narrative at that time to settle, transform, 
rationalize and utilize, rather than the later reframing of that discourse as a conservationist 
initiative to preserve and maintain “wilderness.” Yet, the contemporary conservationist angle of 
the Jewish National Fund only obscures its continued function of further land annexation and 
control of natural resources, in part marking a shift from a colonial to a neo-colonial discourse.13 
In both cases, the landscape and the landscape image are lent “conspicuous legibility” so that 
their interpretation fits the official narration of their use. This shift in discourse is evident in 
other aspects of Zionism’s trajectory before and after statehood, for example in the shift from a 
more clearly colonial pathology discourse regarding supposed biological differences between the 
New Jewish pioneers and the indigenous Arab Palestinian population, to a neo-colonial social 
Darwinist discourse around the cultural difference of, for example, the contemporary Bedouin 
                                                
13 For example, Jewish National Fund afforestation leads to the establishment of tree laws that 
allow the state to take over so-called uncultivated land, to raze pre-1948 Palestinian villages and 
their ruins (that in some place still visible in national parks), and to destroy Bedouin 
encampments through projects supposedly seeking to slow desertification. See the Jewish 
National Fund’s current website (http://www.jnf.org/)for more on their “conservation” discourse.  
Related to this discourse is a similar one regarding land supposedly, as W.J.T. Mitchell writes, 
“‘given’ to the Palestinians, with one catch. It is not to be developed. It is to be left as a ‘nature 
preserve’—in short, a landscape to be seen but not touched, not dwelled upon.” See W.J.T. 
Mitchell, “Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness,” Critical Inquiry 26 
(2000): 207. On the continued conflict over trees in legal, political and cultural spheres, see Irus 
Braverman, Planted Flags: Trees, Land, and Law in Israel/Palestine (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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population seen by the Israeli state as needing to assimilate to modern modes of urban living and 
citizenship.    
In Built in a Day, the conquest, development, and settlement of “barren wilderness” is 
emphasized in close relation to what is depicted in the film as the hostile and dangerously 
proximate indigenous/invader Bedouin population “and others,” which serve to dramatize the 
settlement-building narrative:  
But [the Jewish pioneers] cannot begin this work unless from the very first day they are 
able to defend themselves from attack by raiding Bedouins and others. THEY HAVE 
THUS TO BUILD A FORTIFIED HOMESTEAD IN A SINGLE DAY! 
 
Linking the landscape in its neglected state to the indigenous population, both appear out of 
place—as strangers in their own land. Consequently, when indigenous Palestinian Bedouins and 
Arabs do appear in pre-state Zionist films, what is presented as their inability to understand the 
value of the landscape—explaining both their neglect and their willingness to sell to Jewish 
Agencies—is posited as yet another symptom of their inability to imagine themselves as “a 
people” or “a culture.”  
The construction of proper (Zionist, British, colonialist) versus failed (Arab Palestinian, 
Bedouin, native) vantage points can be found in the early Zionist film as well as in later Israeli 
films depicting those time periods of Jewish settlement and Zionist Jewish Agency land 
acquisition and institution-building. It is particularly evident in the 1961 Israeli film They Were 
Ten, which depicts a scene nearly identical to Built in a Day but with a crucial difference. 
Produced in the early 1960s but set prior to the British Mandate in Palestine, They Were Ten was 
described by one U.S. reviewer as: 
An Israeli counterpart of an American Western, this one set on the frontier of Palestine 
back in the late nineteenth century when that ancient country was under control of the 
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Turks.14  
 
In They Were Ten, an Arab Sheik, ultimately emphasized as inherently greedy and cunning in the 
narrative, proclaims to the Jewish settlers that the Palestinian landscape they are entering is 
fertile and beautiful.  However, during this voice-over speech, a quite contradictory image of a 
desert landscape appears. As Ella Shohat explains, “the contradiction between the arid ‘reality’ 
on the image track undercutting the ‘unreal’ accusation of the Sheik is further underlined by a 
rhetorical panning of the camera along the desert sands following the Sheik’s monologue.”15 
Furthermore, and extending Shohat’s observation, the “reality” is marked as such insofar as the 
proper way of seeing the image is aligned with the Zionist Jewish appreciation and knowledge of 
the land, in contrast to the Arab Sheik’s apparent inability to see or to cultivate the land properly.  
The Sheik’s later complaint over Jewish immigration is rendered illegible precisely through a 
filmic construction of his flawed vision, one that contradicts the self-evident perspective of the 
narrative and the way of seeing it promotes. Following the officious narration, the viewer 
presumably cannot visually verify the Sheik’s description of the landscape, and the apparently 
self-evident mismatch between the Sheik’s speech and the landscape image aligns the viewer 
with a proper way of looking at and knowing the land.  This is not to say that other ways of 
viewing this landscape, as fertile (especially for native plants) and not barren, for instance, are 
impossible or even unlikely. I am interested in how this kind of example underscores the 
construction of particular ways of seeing and recognizing, which required reiteration precisely 
because they are not self-evident. So while there may be a rhetoric of the image’s veracity, it is 
undermined by techniques such as the super-imposed text in Built in a Day and the voice-over 
                                                
14 Bosley Crother, “Heym Hayu Assara [They Were Ten] (1960),” New York Times, April 18, 
1961. 
15 Ella Shohat, Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1989), 39-40. 
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narration in They Were Ten. 
Though the example in They Were Ten more literally associates the native Arab in 
Palestine with flawed vision and misrecognition, popular Oriental landscape imagery from the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century depicting native people as aspects of the landscape 
produces a similar effect.  In popular postcards, tour guide illustrations, and posed photography, 
Palestinian Arabs (or Jewish actors playing Arabs) appear in the foreground, and serve as a 
frame-within-a-frame for a more expansive view.16 Such framing of the Orientalized native’s 
vision within a larger frame (particularly if the figures are also turned toward the view) suggests 
a hierarchy of vision.17 Since the viewer’s perspective sees the native seeing, the landscape 
rendered cannot represent the native’s sight, but rather belongs to the figure behind the native 
(the viewer) who envisions the native as part of a landscape scene. Mitchell further explains how 
indigenous people become tied in this way to certain ways of thinking about perception and 
landscape: 
The primitive or aboriginal dweller on the land (the “pagan” or “rustic” villager) is seen 
as part of the landscape, not as a self-consciously detached viewer who sees nature for its 
own sake as the Western observer does.  In addition, the native dweller is seen as 
someone who fails to see the material value of the land, a value that is obvious to the 
Western observer.  The failure of the native to exploit, develop, and “improve” the 
landscape is, paradoxically, what makes it so valuable, so ripe for appropriation.18  
 
The failure of the indigenous Palestinian Arab to take up a proper vantage point suggests an 
inability to recognize either aesthetic or capital value in the landscape, and perhaps even the 
                                                
16 Gunning, “Landscape and the Fantasy of Moving Pictures,” 59 and 62. Gunning discusses 
such figures in relation to Native American staffage, “a long tradition of Indian staffage figures 
contemplating the landscape, providing a recognizable allegory not only of wilderness, but of a 
vanishing past.” 
17 One notable instance appears in a Guide to Israel tourist guide first published in 1955, and 
several other examples can be found in the paintings, postcards, and “valuable plate” collections 
in Hisham Khatib, Palestine and Egypt Under the Ottomans: Paintings, Books, Photographs, 
Maps and Manuscripts (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003). 
18 Mitchell, “Holy Landscape,” 198. 
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inability to see the landscape as landscape. Scholar of literature, history and art in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries in Britain John Barrell explains the emergence of the idea of 
landscape, whereby even “a person of much education in the eighteenth century would have 
found it very hard, not merely to describe land, but also to see it, and even to think of it as a 
visual phenomenon, except as mediated through particular notions of form.”19  Using the word 
“landscape,” rather than terrain for example, “we introduce, whether we want to or not, notions 
of value and form which relate, not just to seeing the land, but to seeing it in a certain way—
pictorially.”20 As James R. Ryan points out in his study of British Empire photography and 
visualization, “the concept of ‘landscape’ include that of ‘view’ and operated within a number of 
contexts, including artistic genre and scientific record,” and he cites a great deal of exchange 
between those realms as well.21 In this way, to look upon a landscape, either as picturesque or in 
its potential for rationalist and scientific civilization, already implied a privileged position. 
Indeed, the “very idea of Empire depended in part on the idea of landscape, as both controlled 
space and the means of representing such control.”22 Yet, while Ryan emphasizes how British 
photographers in the late nineteenth century “disguised their dependence on pictorial convention 
in order to promote photography as an objective record of sight, in the process reinscribing 
imperial landscape as a natural way of seeing,” the seeming exposure of certain pictorial codes 
and conventions on the surface of the film in Built in a Day and They Were Ten suggest a slightly 
different model.23  
                                                
19 John Barrell, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840: An Approach to the 
Poetry of John Clare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 2. 
20 Barrell, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840, 1. 
21 James R. Ryan, Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 47. 
22 Ryan, Picturing Empire, 46. 
23 Ryan, Picturing Empire, 47. 
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Depictions of the native Palestinian Arab’s flawed vision, as well as images that direct a 
narrow ideological interpretation of the landscape, further the justification for the Zionist and 
British colonial intervention of a variety of “modern” technologies changing the face of the 
landscape, while at the same time they underscore the discursive and visual constructedness of 
that project. It seems to matter little, in other words, that films like Built in a Day and They Were 
Ten emphasize their own production of the native’s vision and anachronism in colonialist terms. 
The cinematic construction of a “barren wasteland” in Built in a Day underscores how cinema, 
even through a contradictory self-exposure of ideological construction, makes landscape 
available to be imagined in particular ways, and in this case in ways that uphold Jewish national 
belonging and deny belonging to Palestinians. Moreover, this discursive and visual construction 
of the barren landscape was not only a key tool of Zionist settlement of Palestine, particularly 
since it provided the justification for specifically Jewish development and improvement of the 
land; it also helped establish certain dominant ways of seeing and intelligibility that serve as 
foundations for normative Israeli belonging today (discussed further in Chapter 4). Perhaps 
because Zionists were keen to promote the transformation of the landscape, which was seen to 
have fallen from a kind of ancient picturesque natural beauty into current disrepair, they did not 
need to disguise the codes and means of the construction of a re-visualization or representation 
of the view. 
Cinema, in this context, does not simply reflect or passively participate in visual and 
spatial strategies of occupation through its propagandistic function; rather I would argue that it 
ought to be understood as a technology and a mode of visualization that consolidates, furthers, 
and contributes to the set of relations and material realities of Zionist settlement, and later Israeli 
occupation of Palestine. Cinema, in this analysis, takes on an expanded meaning not only in 
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terms of understanding its relation to historical conditions and sites of influence, but also in its 
form. This chapter explores the fragmentation and dispersal of cinema and cinematic technology 
across media to examine its diverse roles in relation to Zionism, Israeli occupation, and 
Palestinian society, and emphasizes cinema’s inter-relatedness with architecture, remote-sensing 
surveillance technologies, landscape and geography, photography and painting, and in the 
dominant visual and spatial logics and discourses that surround and inform each of these. I use 
two main tropes, which are also concrete sites of power, of visuality and spatiality to guide this 
expanded understanding of cinema that are bound up with the linked history of Zionism, Jewish 
and Palestinian belonging, and cinema—the Wall and the Tower.   
4.1 THE TOWER AND THE VERTICAL IMAGE 
Jewish settlements in Palestine, which are the main subject and financial beneficiary of early 
Zionist films like the 1938 Built in a Day, are bound up with the history of cinema not only 
because of the financial support they received through Jewish Agency films and their subsequent 
propaganda function, but also through their use of proto-cinematic technologies.  In the mid-
1930s, Zionist architects and planners initiated a settlement design that can be detected in the 
architectonics of the contemporary Separation Barrier and international court declared illegal 
(and moreover unjust) Jewish settlements. Homa Umigdal, or Wall and Tower, was conceived of 
as more than a style of settlement architecture, it was a “system of settlement” that Israeli 
architect and scholar Sharon Rotbard characterizes as “seemingly defensive but essentially of 
offensive form,” and that was initiated in 1936 on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund. 
The militaristic settlement outposts included housing for a “’conquering troop’ of forty people,” 
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a quickly constructed wall of wood, gravel, and barbed wire, and a pre-fabricated tower.”24  
These key elements of the settlements suggest a preoccupation with managing problems of 
distance, such as the relative distance between the settlements as well as the perceived proximity 
of enemies.  As Rotbard describes, the “primary tactical” purpose of a Wall and Tower 
settlement required not only that it should be built in a single day or night, but that “it had to be 
situated within sight of other settlements and be accessible to motor vehicles.”25 With the added 
help of proto-cinematic communication and surveillance technologies such as light projectors, 
flashlights, mirrors, and Morse code, settlement outposts quickly formed a network, in part 
through visual connection over long distances.  
Through the consistency of their design, the settlements were even more striking when 
visualized—photographed, filmed, drawn, or imagined—from the aerial perspective. They 
achieved further visual control and strategic vantage points through enclosed towers that allowed 
for a commanding view of the surrounding landscape and that was seen to enhance fortification 
and connection. Emphasizing the importance of the visualization of an expanding network of 
settlements in Zionist films (see Figure 2), Rotbard explains the function of the proliferation of 
settlements as points on a map: 
As a strategy, Homa Umigdal realized the impulse for expansion through territorial 
conquests by establishing new ‘settlement points’, a term that in itself hints at the fact 
that the ‘point’ on the map was more important than the ‘settlement’ itself.  The location 
of the settlement as part of a greater strategic plan was of greater importance than its 
actual existence, and the location was determined according to optimal vantage points: 
the Homa Umigdal network was spread out in such a way that every outpost had eye 
contact with another.26 
 
                                                
24 Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman, eds. A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture 
(Tel-Aviv-Jaffa and London: Babel and Verso, 2003), 42. 
25 Segal and Weizman, A Civilian Occupation, 43. Emphasis added. 
26 Sharon Rotbard, “Wall and Tower,” in A Civilian Occupation, eds. Rafi Segal and Eyal 
Weizman (Tel-Aviv, New York: Babel, Verso), 48. 
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In other words, the strategy of maintaining commanding vantage points was built into nearly 
every aspect of the settlement design, particularly the design’s emphasis on speedy 
multiplication and connection to a larger network. Built in a Day renders such a strategy 
cinematically recognizable by using animated map images that appear in the overtly didactic 
opening sequences to frame the narrative of a single settlement’s construction.  
Tailoring settlement construction to achieve maximum visual control and fortification, 
Wall and Tower settlements were intended to achieve “optimal vantage points.” In the early part 
of the twenty-first century, settlement networks continue to expand, and the speed of the 
construction of the Separation Barrier has struggled to keep up to trace what become defacto 
borders of Israel. The contemporary mountaintop Jewish settlements in the West Bank, which 
form concentric circles around the apex of a mountain or hill, fulfill strategic political goals and 
serve as military surveillance sites. Rotbard argues that this mix of civilian and military 
operations in the contemporary settlements constitute “a military operation camouflaged in 
civilian clothes, civilians recruited under the patronage of the army.”27 Indeed, many settlers 
willingly take on the dual obligation of defense (by carrying weapons) and control (through 
surveillance afforded by the hilltop location). From this protected vantage point, settler-soldiers 
can shoot from their position while remaining shielded and hidden by the Barrier themselves; a 
tactic Paul Virilio has called the “art of hiding in order to see.”28 The spectacular visual presence 
of modern hilltop settlements similarly serves as a deterrent, insofar as it establishes visual 
control over low-lying Palestinian villages, prompting Israeli architecture critics Eyal Weizmann 
and Rafi Segal to characterize settlements as “optical devices, designed to exercise control 
                                                
27 Sharon Rotbard, “Wall and Tower,” 52. 
28 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception (London: Verso, 1989), 49. 
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through supervision and surveillance.”29 Similarly, Weizman notes the red-tile roof standard of 
the settlement homes, which from the aerial view reaffirms Jewish presence throughout Israel 
and in strategic positions in the West Bank (particularly when compared to the organic shape and 
natural color of traditional Palestinian Arab towns).30 The internationally illegal and officially 
“unrecognized” settlements effectively alter the route of the Barrier, which snakes within the 
West Bank to protect these enclaves that serve equally as fortresses and watchtowers. Further, 
the settlements and their vantage point support the early dominant Zionist and European-colonial 
ways of viewing Palestine that continue to inform Israeli state policy toward, and dominant 
justifications for, the strategic appropriation of land for Jewish settlement and for maintaining a 
Jewish majority, one that can be easily visualized in ever-fragmented and contested maps. 
Not surprising in its paradox, the way of seeing suggested by the Wall and Tower design 
is fully shot through with blind spots and other manifestations of not-seeing.  While towers allow 
a more privileged vantage point through sightlines that connect a network of settlements and 
transform them into military force, walls seemingly obstruct the view of the very landscape that 
the settlement project sought to control. The figure of the Sabra, the masculine icon of New 
Jewish nationalism in Zionist discourse that was reiterated through the Jewish Agency films 
(discussed in Chapter 2), similarly exemplifies the contradictory logic of Zionism in Palestine. 
Though the Sabra was envisioned as the New Jewish native taking root in his new/old country, 
the Sabras could also be spotted in towers, keeping guard over the landscape obscured by the 
walls on the ground and more readily available to the oblique view from the tower (see Figure 3).  
It was this view afforded by the tower that would seem to reassure the formation of a unified 
                                                
29 Segal and Weizman, A Civilian Occupation, 86. 
30 Sina Najafi and Jeffrey Kastner, “The Wall and the Eye: An Interview with Eyal Weizman,” 
Cabinet 9 (Winter 2002/3), accessed December 2, 2012. 
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/9/wall.php. 
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Jewish national belonging, since only from that vantage point could the individual settlement 
make contact with the larger expanding network. But the supposedly necessary vantage point 
would also to some extent uproot the Sabra and place him in an ambivalent relationship to the 
landscape he was supposed to be born from. 
Privileging aerial vantage points suggests a particular perceptual logic that emerged with 
the early Zionist settlement plans and continues to shape contemporary Israeli national discourse 
today through a reliance on satellites, missile defense systems, and remote-controlled drones, to 
name a few. Zionist discourse has for a long time attended a particular fascination, in other 
words, with what Mark Dorrian calls “the vertical image,” which Dorrian argues emerged 
through new cinematic and photographic technologies and their use in military reconnaissance in 
World War I with the “strategic linkage of the camera with heavier-than-air aircraft”.31 For the 
Jewish Agency funded settlement of Palestine, the tower inaugurates the dominance of the aerial 
perspective and the vertical image in the visual and spatial logic of Zionist settlement and later 
Israeli military and civilian occupation. While the “oblique view” already supported visual 
regimes of control in its ability to “look down upon” the world below, the vertical aerial view 
was “uniquely non-aesthetic, non-auratic, instrumental, disenchanted, and technical – by virtue 
of its gaze directly downward onto the ground, by virtue of its historic relationship with 
photography, and because of the specific historical conditions of its emergence in World War I,” 
and thus raises important ethical questions. Paul Saint-Amour, for example, describes how aerial 
perspectives diminish and dissolve individual bodies, which are “made visually contiguous with 
the material fabric of the city as viewed from above.”32 Such an “aesthetics of the surface,” as 
                                                
31 See Mark Dorrian, “The Aerial View: Notes for a Cultural History,” STRATES 13 (2007), 
accessed December 2, 2012. http://strates.revues.org/5573. 
32 Paul Saint-Amour, “Modernist Reconnaissance,” Modernism/modernity 10.2 (2003): 352. 
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Susan Buck-Morss argues, “gives back to the observer a reassuring perception of the rationality 
of the whole of the social body, which when viewed from his of her own particular body is 
perceived as a threat to wholeness.”33  In other words, while the vertical perspective of the 
Separation Barrier, from satellite imaging for example, and its visible organization of the 
landscape reveals such a unifying effect through the appearance of brightly demarcated borders, 
the horizontal perspective tends to offer less-reassuring way of seeing, such as when one faces 
the towering bald concrete wall or electrified fence. Visible from many miles up, concrete 
borders presumably reassure Zionist-Israelis about the defense and the continued existence of the 
State of Israel, which is rhetorically under constant threat. Thus the red-rooftop standard of 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank, as well as their concentric circle layout on mountaintops, 
suggests the continued investment in architecture and settlement as nationalist visual spectacle, 
“an assertive, dominant and spectacular presence.”34 Such aerial perspectives follow in a longer 
tradition of visualizing otherness by establishing distinctions between fields of perception, and 
therefore value hierarchies. As an example of this kind of valuing at work in the touristic 
visualization of Egypt, tourists went “to extraordinary lengths both to produce and to police 
boundaries between the observer and the observed: to enforce the distance and detachment 
necessary to obtain ‘perspective.’”35 
Yet, while aerial perspectives can be said to unify a social body that is reassuringly 
rationalized and protected, the individual Jewish-Israeli body on the ground is construed as 
constantly under threat from viewing potential enemies. In other words, while the logistics of the 
                                                
33 Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered,” October 62 (1992): 35. 
34 Segal and Weizman, Civilian Occupation, 47. 
35 Derek Gregory, “Emperors of the Gaze: Photographic Practices and Productions of Space in 
Egypt, 1839-1914,” in Picturing Place: Photography and the Geographical Imagination ed. Joan 
M. Schwartz and James R. Ryan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 211. 
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gaze enacted by hilltop settlements can be said to organize and rationalize the landscape, the 
view from the particular Jewish-Israeli body of Palestinian villages still acts as a threat to 
wholeness. In light of this, encircling Palestinian communities through the construction of the 
Separation Barrier can be understood, in part, as an attempt to frame the problem and contain the 
threat. In mainstream Israeli political discourse, the threat is  “demographic” because of a 
growing Palestinian population with Israeli citizenship, as well as a large non-citizen migrant 
worker population, who are not demarcated by borders or a wall but through legal measures 
meant to protect the state’s Jewish identity.  
One of many examples of this dual containment and re-drawing of the physical, legal, 
and conceptual borders of the state is the case of Al Wallaja, a Palestinian village near Jerusalem. 
Al Wallaja resident and activist Sheerin al Araj is considered by Israel as a “present-absentee” 
since although her family was forced to flee their village in 1948, they returned and lived in 
nearby caves for over a decade to prevent becoming permanent internally displaced refugees. 
After the settlements Gilo and Har Gilo were constructed on parts of al Wallaja, the Separation 
Barrier also began construction, and not on the hillside of the settlements, but on the opposite 
hillside, inside the Green Line, and cutting through al Wallaja cemeteries and the grounds around 
homes. An article from Electronic Intifada describes al Araj’s situation in 2012 in telling terms 
invoked by al Araj herself: “her house is trapped in between a settlement on one side, an Israeli-
only road on another. A tunnel to connect the two runs under her house. She jokes that she will 
build her house upwards just to infuriate the authorities.”36   
This idea of building upwards as the only, even if absurd and unviable, option left for 
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Palestinians has been taken up elsewhere. Eyal Weizman describes the three-dimensional aspect 
of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in which Israel controls the airspace and the 
underground aqueducts.37 Palestinians have only enclaves of self-governance (Area A, the 
smallest portion of the West Bank, is the only area left to Palestinian Authority civil and security 
control), and in the West Bank Jewish and settler-only highways pass over and under Palestinian 
towns, which are already encircled by the Separation Barrier and the hilltop settlement-
watchtowers. The concept of a contiguous Palestinian nation-state has in this way been rendered 
nearly impossible to imagine, thus complicating even further the notion of discrete national 
identities and areas separated by clear borders.  
Contemporary Palestinian artist Larissa Sansour’s photographic series Nation Estate 
similarly draws from the increasingly strained possibility of a contiguous and grounded 
Palestinian state. Her photographs became well known in part due to controversy around its 
source of funding, since although Nation Estate was initially nominated for a Lacoste-sponsored 
Swiss Musée de l’Elysée photography prize, which means her project was pre-approved and 
provided funding for its completion, the nomination was rescinded for political reasons. Sansour 
was asked to announce that she had decided to pull out of the competition after Lacoste 
complained the work was too pro-Palestine and contradicted the prize’s theme of  “joie de vie,” 
even though artists were encouraged to respond to that theme with full artistic license.38 The 
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Nation Estate is a series of digitally manipulated photographs depicting an imaginary high-rise 
luxury apartment building in which each floor houses a different Palestinian town, layering a 
national geography otherwise fragmented and denied nation-state or “nation estate” status. 
Suggesting the need for a structure that would both contain, nurture and allow for growth for a 
Palestinian national space, the image “Olive Tree” has Sansour watering a single olive tree that 
appears to have pushed through the concrete floor of a fluorescent-lit industrial style flat, with a 
view of the al Aqsa directly out the large window. Another image has Sansour stepping off the 
elevator on the third floor, “Jerusalem” or “PL3,” where the al Aqsa mosque appears 
immediately accessible to the viewer/visitor under the high ceiling and placed directly on the 
floor’s surface.39  
Nation Estate suggests that possibilities for visualizing a Palestinian state exclude the 
more traditional sort of mapping that emphasizes connection through a visualizable network of 
points enclosed by distinct borders. That said, this imagined three-dimensional tower has its own 
quality of flatness—since it would be built upwards, an aerial view (from a satellite or aerial 
vehicle, for example) would conceal the topographic details of each town stacked up and 
concealed within a single structure of the high-rise. Presumably, the Nation Estate from the non-
stereoscopic aerial view would appear as a flat rectangular shape, quite distinct from the typical 
topographic lines determined by political and geographic factors. This view would conceal the 
details of each region, offering a fantasy of privacy through the housing of entire cities in a 
single building, invoking a different meaning of “coverage” (as in covered, concealed) from that 
of the coverage (as in expansion, exposure) suggested by expanding settlements. In another way, 
the tower denies the totalizing view at the same time as it offers a vantage point and easily 
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accessible floors. This makes sense to the extent that Palestinians are already denied a 
comforting view from above of a contiguous or connected landscape of belonging, whereas the 
high-rise suggests a kind of closed, residents-only, and internally secure space.   
The figure of the tower typically suggests a kind of scopic regime, involving dominance 
over the regions visualizable from the high point. The Nation Estate tower constructed by 
Sansour suggests an inversion of the usual visual and spatial modes of the tower, whereby it 
collects the view of Palestinian towns in order to stack, conceal and archive them, protecting 
them from further destruction and disconnection. Even the image, “Olive Tree,” which offers a 
view “outside” the tower, only provides another view of an internally contained region. In other 
words, the outside is already inside, and one looks across to see a place that is also understood to 
above or below. In this way, the ideology of the oblique view and its hierarchy of vision are 
disrupted through Sansour’s series. 
Another instantiation of the three-dimensional nation-state appears in a very different 
context—the Israeli Arrow Missile Defense system, which envisions a kind of absolute security 
and surveillance through total aerial and visual control. The Arrow Missile Defense System is an 
anti-ballistic Israeli and United States collaboration, overseen by Israeli Ministry of Defense 
Homa (which means rampart or wall) division and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency that began 
development in 1986.40 One of the most advanced in the world, the system is portable and 
combines early warning radars, a launch control center and the Arrow hypersonic anti-missile 
interceptor.41 The Israeli Ministry of Defense’s online English-language portal explains the 
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Arrow system with a simple interactive tutorial, similar to a video game interface, which draws 
attention the ideological priorities of the program. The program is described in three steps: The 
Threat, The Solution, and the Concept of Operation. In the first step, “Israel” is depicted on the 
left side of the screen as a highlighted green area, surrounded by a single bright green border, on 
an otherwise brown, borderless and unmarked rendering of the region, with some topographic 
detail and the curvature of the earth suggesting the scale of the map. The Palestinian Territories 
are not demarcated in the image, and a small replica of an urban area implies Tel Aviv as an 
important “target” area for security attention. Three missiles are surrounded by flashing red 
targets in areas likely representing missile launch centers in Iran, Iraq and Syria, that, when 
clicked on, launch a missile that explodes in Tel Aviv. Advancing to Step 2, the Arrow Missile 
Defense System appears and the entire map takes on a green shade, though the area marked out 
as “Israel” remains a brighter green.   
At this point only the missile from the area likely representing Iran appears, and when 
hovered over launches only to be intercepted and destroyed by the anti-ballistic system. While 
the online presentation of the Arrow system implies total expansiveness, especially as the entire 
visible portion of the globe becomes green during “The Solution,” it also creates a kind of 
bubble, an imaginary border in the sky. The Arrow online demonstration supposes a drama 
between security and threat, insecurity and vulnerability, as much as it highlights military might 
and technological advancement. To interact with the Arrow system’s online marketing platform, 
in other words, is to continually re-invest in the idea of Israeli vulnerability amongst a block of 
Arab enemies, since one is able to remain at Step 1 “The Threat,” launching missiles over and 
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over to momentarily conceal the unmarked Israeli city behind flashes of yellow light. Here, the 
nation is rendered three-dimensional through a combination of radar, missile, and satellite 
technologies that expand the nation’s reach, even if only to consolidate the impenetrability of its 
desired borders. 
Suggesting a similar logic at work, Rotbard explains how the imagined visualization of 
settlement cartography was indistinguishable from, and yet in some ways more formative than, 
the concrete carving out of the Palestinian terrain: 
[The functions of fortification and observation] molded the entire landscape as a 
 network of points, as an autonomous layer spread above the existing landscape, 
 transforming the country by dividing it, not according to natural, territorial divisions, but 
 according to dromological divisions, according to the speed of transportation and the 
lines of infrastructure.42 
 
In other words, mapping works to construct the landscape toward particular uses and ways of 
seeing that quickly come to dominate and overcome traditional demarcations like thousand-year-
old roads that gain significance from their repeated use throughout various periods of domination 
and rule, rather than through unilateral city/state planning.   
Emphasizing the role of temporality, indeed a fourth dimension for imagining the nation-
state and its recognized modes of belonging, Rotbard argues that the settlement design supports 
connectivity at the speed of modernity, whereby Zionist rhetoric instrumentalizes landscape as 
evidence of “Western civilization.” This logic of progress banishes the presumably past-oriented 
Arab communities to the margins of a civilizational discourse that naturalizes the disappearance 
of racialized peoples, even or especially when their disappearance is in direct relation to 
colonialism and its attending technologies of ethnic cleansing, genocide, disease, war and so on.  
Although Zionist “Palestine films” can be explored to find evidence of the Arab Palestinian 
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society that much of Zionist discourse seeks to deny, those appearances for the most part 
manifest through a framework that not only served to delegitimize Arab nationalism in Palestine, 
but that also posited that Palestinians were not “a people” in line with civilization or humanity in 
the way that Jews were becoming “a people” through the establishment of a state. It is not so 
important to determine whether or not they were visible, but through what terms they became 
recognizable, particularly if that recognition occurs through negative terms (i.e. recognized as 
not “a people”). 
Johannes Fabian has explored this kind of civilizational hierarchization through temporal 
and spatial categories in terms of how anthropology posits its objects and others. Fabian explains 
how time became an important mode of classification: “by allowing Time to be resorbed by the 
tabular space of classification, nineteenth-century anthropology sanctioned an ideological 
process by which relations between the West and its Other, between anthropology and its object, 
were conceived not only as difference, but as distance in space and Time.”43  Furthermore, and 
with great significance for this analysis of visual and spatial logics of national intelligibility and 
occupation, Fabian extends this analysis to suggest that anthropology’s other needs to be distant 
and visually fixed— 
To use an extreme formulation, in this tradition the object of anthropology could not have 
gained scientific status until and unless it underwent a double visual fixation, as 
perceptual image and as illustration of kind of knowledge. Both types of objectification 
depend on distance, spatial and temporal. In the fundamental, phenomenalist senses this 
means that the Other, as object of knowledge, must be separate, distinct, and preferably 
distant from the knower. Exotic otherness may be not so much the result as the 
prerequisite of anthropological inquiry. We do not ‘find’ the savagery of the savage, or 
the primitivity of the primitive, we posit them, and we have seen in some detail how 
anthropology has manage to maintain distance, mostly by manipulating temporal 
coexistence through the denial of coevalness.44 
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Fabian suggests how anthropology produces its object through notions of spatial and temporal 
distance, which produce the other as a kind of image viewed from afar. If, in the analysis of 
Zionist and Israeli visual and spatial logics, the tower suggests the potential for infinite visual 
dominance, where the further it expands upward the farther its visual control can reach (as the 
settlement network suggests), the wall, understood as necessary for defense and fortification 
purposes, suggests a potentially troubling or contradictory spatial limit and visual obstruction.   
However, the wall can equally be understood in terms of managing distance in another 
way, in terms of creating a material distinction and fortification in order to maintain at least the 
concept of strict boundaries, since in many places, like al Wallaja for example, the contemporary 
Barrier is neither complete nor contiguous. While the wall may at first seem to suggest a 
conflicting logic to that of the tower, upon closer consideration it seems that the wall and the 
tower support a dominant, if contradictory, intelligibility logic that carves out belonging 
according to certain visual, spatial and temporal logics and material technologies. The visual 
control and seemingly limitless expansiveness of the tower is contradicted by the limit 
constructed by the wall, and vice versa, but at the same time each requires the other to establish a 
fortified border and visualizing dominance. The complexity of the visual and spatial logic of the 
wall suggest that it is never simply a visual obstruction, but is yet another perceptual device and 
technique of knowledge that bolster a dominant schema whereby Palestinian attempts to shape 
the idea and the land of Palestine are posited as illegitimate and unintelligible, and Jewish 
belonging is further consolidated and naturalized in an ever-fragmented and militarized 
landscape. 
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4.2 THE WALL AND THE HORIZONTAL IMAGE 
Paul Virilio’s notion of “perceptual” warfare seems particularly apt in relation to Israel and 
Palestine, and the Wall and Tower’s relation to this type of warfare is especially evident in the 
contemporary Jewish hilltop settlements and the Separation Barrier.45  Beginning construction in 
2002, as of August 2008 more than half of the approved route of 723 kilometers of the 
Separation Barrier was complete.46 Most of the length of the barrier consists of electrified 
fencing fortified with some combination of deep trenches, barbed wire, radar systems, 
surveillance cameras, watchtowers, intrusion-tracking dirt roads, and paved roads for armed 
Israeli Defense Force patrols. In urban areas, the barrier takes its most visibly intrusive and 
structurally oppressive form as concrete blocks reaching up to 25 and 35 feet high. Israeli 
Defense Force-controlled gates and checkpoints provide the only authorized sites of passage 
through the Barrier, though Israeli-only routes allow easier access for primarily non-Palestinian 
citizens. According to Virilio, seeing machines like the cameras and watchtowers attending the 
Separation Barrier are extensions of the “war machine;” “the eye’s function being the function of 
a weapon.”47 But non-seeing machines, such as radar and electronic tracking, actually serve a 
similar function in their role as what Virilio calls “invisible weapons that make things visible.”48  
Along the electrified sections of the Barrier, for example, the Israeli military uses remote 
sensing to detect if the fence has been touched and a patrol car can be immediately dispatched to 
that area. That Virilio’s conceptualization of the imbrication of war and cinematic technologies 
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provides an opening to consider visibility not only in opposition to invisibility and suggests that 
a model of recognition and intelligibility is useful in terms of unraveling some of the complexity 
of how things become visible, what the terms of that visibility are, and to what ends discourses of 
visibility and invisibility are mobilized.  This is particularly relevant in the context of security 
rhetoric after the policies introduced under the auspices of the global “War on Terror.”  
Sara Ahmed, following Brian Massumi, suggests that War on Terror discourse of the 
terrorist continually insinuates that the terrorist “could-be” anyone, and, especially in light of the 
increasing use of imaging technologies, “could-be” hiding in plain sight. This informs the 
creation and use of ever-new surveillance and detection technologies for military operations, in 
urban spaces, and in airports, for example, which reinvigorate the process by producing detection 
failures at every site. Ahmed argues “it is the structural possibility that the terrorist may pass us 
by that justifies the expansion of these forms of intelligence, surveillance and the rights of 
detention.”49 The most relevant aspect of surveillance imaging technologies in this context may 
be, in other words, that they continually fail to find “terrorists” or determine “terrorist-
characteristics,” and thus continually justify further policies of detection, invasion, and 
classification.  To return to Miller’s analysis of detective story narration, “this world is not so 
much totally intelligible as it is totally suspicious,” suggesting in this context that detection 
technologies ensure that disciplinary power will continue to seek out and proliferate ever-new 
areas of supposed incalculability.50 Jason Ritchie, in his ethnography on “queer checkpoints” and 
queer Palestinian subjectivity, similarly describes how, in this example, the literal checkpoint 
functions even when it seems to fail:  
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Sometimes, the checkpoint works: queer Palestinians ‘answer’ as expected and are 
rewarded with access to a given ‘space.’ But even when the ‘answer’ is wrong—when 
one refuses to ‘be Israeli,’ for example—the checkpoint still works: identities are 
checked, and the movement across space is properly regulated. 146-7 
 
Ritchie suggests that in the terms of the checkpoint’s logic, failure occurs when “a potential 
threat…slips through,” implying that the “’anticipated’ violence” of the checkpoint subtends its 
disciplinary function, in other words the checkpoint relies on failure in order to reveal the 
justification for its security purpose. Like the “structural possibility that the terrorist may pass us 
by” described by Ahmed, Ritchie’s “queer checkpoints,” literal and metaphorical (for example 
the compulsion to “pass” in Israeli queer scenes as Jewish), rely not only on the ability to see and 
detect queer Palestinians, but the possibility and the threat that they might be not-seen. 
While these logics of detection suggest a kind of compulsory visibility at their core, the 
ideological, political, military and other everyday material effects of Separation Barrier do not 
rely solely on a drama between visibility and invisibility, though its function of concealing and 
obstructing might suggest so at face value. Though he does not mention the historical continuity 
with Zionist wall and tower construction, Meir Wigoder, in his article on photographing the 
contemporary Separation Barrier, characterizes the wall in terms of vision, perception, and a 
particular kind of orientation:  
The Separation Barrier-Wall is only a crude concrete variation of the invisible walls that 
have existed ever since the first Zionist pioneers propagated their ideology, envisaging 
themselves as a people without a land for a land with no people.  The real purpose of the 
wall is not to protect the state from terror or to demarcate new borders, since Palestinians 
live on either side of it and the Israeli army patrols both sides.  Rather, it enhances the 
Israeli aspiration to see the Palestinians removed from their sight, as though the entire 
wall were like the blindfold that covers a captive’s eyes to disorientate his or her physical 
and mental relationship with space.51 
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Interestingly, this excerpt posits the Zionist-Israeli position, in its desire to not-see, as captive of 
itself; Wigoder suggests Israelis perform a willing captivation to overlook the geopolitical reality 
of the Palestinian-Israeli shared landscape and conflict.  For Wigoder, disorientation is therefore 
in some sense inherent to a Zionist perspective, much like the disorientation I explore in Chapter 
2. Yet positing the wall as a blindfold suggests that its removal will reveal the truth—that 
Jewish-Israelis will be forced to face the Palestinians within an unobscured field of vision once 
the concrete obstruction is removed. This metaphor, and the metaphor of a wall that simply 
conceals, however, oversimplifies not only the surveillance technologies and the visual spectacle 
that are also aspects of the Barrier, but also the way that vision itself is constitutive of blind 
spots.  I want to emphasize that walls in this context are not simply obstructions to seeing what’s 
really there, implying that a model of inclusion/exclusion applies, but rather that walls constitute 
a way of seeing marked and undergirded by structural absences and not-seeing, by logics of 
compulsory visibility and calculability, but maintained through a constant reinvestment in areas 
of incalculability, “suspicion,” “could-be” terrorist, and so on.  Furthermore, the metaphor of the 
blindfold, and the idea that Israel wishes to not-see Palestinians neglects the importance of the 
civilian surveillance function of the West Bank settlements in particular, as noted by Weizmann 
in the design of hilltop settlement homes: “knowingly or not, settlers’ eyes…are being ‘hijacked’ 
[by the state] for strategic and geopolitical aims.”52  
Perhaps nothing exemplifies the kind of visuality that complicates a visible/invisible, 
seen/unseen, inclusion/exclusion binary better than the tromp l’oeil paintings that surrounded 
parts of the Jewish settlement Gilo outside of Jerusalem until the end of 2010 (I photographed 
some of the paintings the day before they were suddenly dismantled). Although constructed by 
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the Israeli Ministry of Defense with the stated purpose of defense from sniper fire originating in 
the neighboring Palestinian village of Beit Jalla, Jewish residents in Gilo apparently did not 
immediately appreciate the gesture. Ugly concrete blocks suddenly obscured the view of what 
was for many a pastoral Biblical landscape (and perhaps a large reason for moving to the 
“disputed neighborhood,” as it was frequently called in Israeli as well as US media, a rhetoric 
that waned when Israel began to dismiss Obama administration pressure to halt the expansion of 
Gilo and other settlements), and the residents reportedly covered the wall in hostile graffiti. This 
prompted municipal authorities to commission artists to paint the concrete blocks, and Jerusalem 
Municipality official Shlomo Brosh had no illusions about the intention of the project: “the idea 
was to make the wall transparent.”53 For Brosh, the paintings represented a defensive response to 
Palestinian aggression: “if they have forced us to shield ourselves, then we decided that at least 
we wouldn’t give up the landscape that used to be there.”54   
As W.J.T. Mitchell notes in his short article on the paintings, the artists commissioned to 
recreate the disappearing landscape were recent Russian immigrants who questioned the ethical 
implications of the aesthetic forgery. Mitchell describes the experience of the artists who used 
“what they considered a ‘sad’ style of painting, derived from socialist realism, which they 
regarded as a relic of ‘the Soviet system…of living with lies.’”55 Ruchama Marton and Dalit 
Baum, who see the paintings as a realization of the contentious Zionist axiom “a land without a 
people for a people without a land,” further articulate this complicated set of lies: 
the painting is meant to conceal the wall itself by reconstructing the concealed view by 
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concealing the concealment. The reconstructed view serves as a second concealment, 
since the painted houses on the painted hills are devoid of people.56  
 
For Marton and Baum, the paintings activate a particular kind of willful nonseeing mechanism 
for Jewish settlers in Gilo. Consumption of the landscape is crucial particularly to settler 
ideology in the West Bank since, as Weizman shows, “the admiration of the 
landscape…functions as a cultural practice, by which social and subjective identities are 
formed.”57 However, what make the landscape Biblical and pastoral in the traditional sense are 
the Palestinians, who cultivate the land and whose architecture is typically admired. One 
message of the painting is, Weizman argues, “the Palestinians are there to produce the landscape 
and then disappear.”58 Of course, both the landscape and the progression of time work against 
this illusion of a static ideal landscape. Trees grow larger than the painted trees and create a 
disjunction, the wrong time of day sends shafts of light and shadow to reveal the two-
dimensionality of the illusion, and even the view that looks at the picture askance will reveal the 
forgery.  
The paintings disappear the wall, to some extent, but they also equip the wall with a 
disappearing function. The wall collapses distance and produces a two-dimensional picture of an 
imagined Palestine, yet the illusionistic paintings do not simply disappear or destroy in a more 
concretely violent sense. Rather, they support an old logic whereby Palestine is always already a 
picture—an ideal image of the pastoral homeland.59  Put another way, the wall paintings in Gilo 
also suggest that the “problems of perspective” in Palestine identified by Elias Newman in the 
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thirties (discussed in Chapter 2) were not overcome with the establishment of the Jewish state.   
The watercolor style privileged by Newman in his Art in Palestine survey of Jewish 
artists has further correlation to the soviet realist style of the Gilo mural shown above as well as 
to a dominant painterly movement that emerged around statehood and that Israeli artist Larry 
Abramson identifies as Lyrical Abstraction, lead by Yosef Zaritsky who came to Palestine in 
1923.60 Abramson describes how Zaritsky made watercolor studies in the hills around Jerusalem 
around the same areas where Abramson had gained his own “knowledge of the landscape” 
growing up in Israel.  He describes Zaritsky’s paintings through his own experience: 
Remembering Zaritsky’s Tsuba watercolors, I went back to look at them and was amazed 
to discover that for al his plein air pathos, he had ‘not seen’ the deserted Palestinian 
village; it had disappeared from sight in his delicate harmonies of abstracted form and 
painterly valuer.  I had stumbled across the missing art historical link, the long overdue 
explanation for the almost universal acceptance of ‘Lyrical Abstraction’ as the 
quintessential Israeli visual style.  Abstraction—even more than forestation, archaeology, 
cartography and nomenclature—was the ultimate Israeli ‘scopic regime’, an ‘Art of 
Camouflage’… 
 
What both Abramson and Wigoder identify is a way of seeing that they argue undergirds Israeli 
national discourse reflected in not only aesthetic production, but through the logic of Jewish 
National Fund afforestation projects, settlement design, architectonic solutions to problems of 
security, and so on.  In this way, paintings and films are never simply metaphors for more 
obvious structures of the occupation, nor are the more concrete obstructions to seeing and 
structures that constitute an “Israeli ‘scopic regime’” simply metaphors for what Wigoder 
describes as the purposely unseeing Israeli captive. Rotbard, likewise reminds us that “beyond 
the fact that the wall was a program, and was destined to become an ‘ideology’, it was, first and 
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foremost, a wall; it was a plain wooden mold of 20 centimeters width filled with gravel.”61 For 
these reasons, revealing the forgery of the mural paintings, their constructed-ness, and their 
historical legacy in earlier attempts to not-see, or rather not-recognize, the Palestinians, does 
little to undo their ideological function in relation to the consolidation of Israeli national 
intelligibility. Consequently, although national intelligibility is invoked in this analysis as a 
revisionary process, there are historical conditions and processes that can be recognized as 
repeatedly holding certain ways of not/seeing in place and maintaining a certain status quo or 
common sense notion of the facts on the ground.  
Although artists and artist-collectives, including individual activists and others, find ever 
new creative ways to protest, “disappear,” poke holes in, circumvent, expose, and educate others 
about the devastation to Palestinian and Israeli society caused by the Separation Barrier in 
particular, Wigoder argues 
All the creative attempts to dematerialize the wall are admirable, but in the end they must 
only be seen as artistic weapons meant to raise our awareness of the existence of walls.  
To photograph a wall as a protest is also to acknowledge the impotency of the 
photographic act.62 
 
Thus, rather than (only) searching for “creative attempts” or subversive modes to challenge 
scopic regimes or scripts of national intelligibility that repeatedly condition perspectives on and 
material conditions in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, this study aims to identify 
the working and re-working of norms of recognition that continually mark Palestinian belonging 
and dispossession as unrecognizable. Rather than imagining that analysis and uncovering, 
revealing and unmasking, could fully dismantle such scripts and norms, I aim in part to better 
understand the ways that Palestinians have experimented with ever new modes of sociality, 
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visualization, recognition, spatiality, and belonging in spite of, or even through, this context. I 
suggest that when we attempt to put aside the compelling and commonplace idea that exposing 
and revealing are the only modes of resistance, reparation, response and critique, a host of other 
possibilities and failures appear at work, which will be discussed in this chapter and others, and 
which may not be properly named “resistant.”   
With this approach in mind, it still proves fruitful to consider some of those “creative 
attempts” to make the wall invisible, particularly since several of the projects Wigoder alludes to 
equally serve to emphasize the both the impossibility of dematerialization through visual tricks, 
as well as to point out the ways in which the Barrier maintains a rather contradictory relationship 
between seeing and not-seeing. Saree Makdisi offers an account of the wall’s effects on the 
relation between erasure and visibility that suggest such attempts can be useful for reminding 
Israelis of the erasure taking place, since:  
From the Israeli point of view, the effect is not only to render the Palestinians on the 
other side invisible but, even if only in fits and starts, to render the process of rendering 
them invisible itself invisible.  When possible, then, the wall as the signifier of erasure is 
itself erased in turn—as though there were some magic trick that could erase the 
Palestinians from the landscape without the trace of that erasure being evident.63 
 
Abramson, the painter and scholar noted above, produced a painterly response to state-
commissioned murals that lined Highway 443. Paintings on the walls on both sides of Highway 
443 from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the controversial Israeli-only highway that passes through 
Palestinian areas to reach West Bank Jewish settlements, are another example of disappearing 
both the wall and the Palestinians in one swift brush stroke. The murals give the illusion of an 
architectural structure with arches providing identical mini-views of a minimalist landscape to 
the drive-by viewer.  This peripheral illusion reinforces the stated purpose of the wall—a 
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reminder that Israel cannot have real arches because Palestinian snipers would use them to shoot 
through—and thus justifies its existence.   
Conceived as an act of resistance to the illusory images of Highway 443, Abramson, for 
the 2005 exhibition Three Cities Against the Wall, painted “Israeli Abstraction,” probably an 
allusion to the Lyrical Abstraction movement cited by him above.  As he writes in his artist’s 
statement,  
In 2004 I appropriated the wall’s green/blue ‘ideal’ landscape, put a vertical black ‘zip’ 
across it, and published it under the title ‘Israeli Abstraction.’  Amazingly, within days 
the streets of Tel Aviv, and later of other Israeli cities, were covered in graffiti based on 
this image, the work of anonymous street artists seeking for an icon to express their 
desire for peace and coexistence.64   
 
Although the Separation Barrier serves as a canvas for state-approved messages, like painted 
murals or advertisements, the wall is also a surface for the inscription of protest messages—
against the barrier, against the occupation, and a variety of other non-state messages of political 
affiliation, of hate and of peace. Approved messages (when seen from proper vantage points) 
draw attention to the wall, with bright colors and optimistic scenes, while attempting to draw 
attention away from the negative effects of the structure—it appears to beautify public spaces 
rather than fragment, obscure, obstruct, and destroy. Beautiful pictures ask to be looked at and 
their ideological effect is to normalize the presence of the wall by framing it as an artistic object 
for public appreciation, as a proper part of the landscape. Protest graffiti messages also draw 
attention to the wall but point to its negative, chaotic, and fragmentary effects, re-inscribing its 
concrete presence with explicit and implicit messages and meanings.  These inscriptions 
interrogate the blank concrete wall, what John Berger calls its “expressionless face of 
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inequality,” which says so much even without words or pictures.65 For Makdisi, the “brutalist 
design” of the wall seen from the Palestinian side “communicates unequivocally to the 
Palestinians what Israel thinks of them.”66 
So-called Art Terrorist Banksy, a street artist from Bristol who became an international 
art world star, began painting on the Separation Barrier for the Occupied Space-Art for Palestine 
Exhibition in London in 2006.67  In one of the graffiti paintings on the Barrier in the West Bank, 
a child stands triumphantly on the rubble left from a blasted hole in the wall; the blue skies 
beyond announce the liberation of the once obscured view.  In another image, children play near 
a hole in the wall that reveals a picture postcard view of an ideal tropical landscape.  This image, 
with its striking photorealism, appears as a direct critique to the walls in Gilo and the Highway 
443 murals. Banksy undermines and critiques the practice of disappearing the wall to imagine an 
ideal view by presenting the viewer with an impossible view. The viewer is reminded that any 
attempt to render the wall transparent is to willingly participate in a collective fantasy and to 
ignore the violence of the Separation Barrier and the occupation.   
 Artists Without Walls, a collective of both Israeli and Palestinian artists, similarly 
created a virtual hole in the concrete Wall in Abu-Dis for several hours with a real-time 
participatory video event. Abu-Dis is a Palestinian neighborhood outside of East Jerusalem that 
had at that time recently been divided by the Separation Barrier. In the exhibition catalogue for 
Three Cities Against the Wall, Artists Without Walls explain the project; “A closed-circuit of 
two video cameras was positioned at the same spot on opposite sides of the wall.  Each recorded 
the view facing away from the wall.  The cameras were connected to two video projectors, each 
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one projecting in real-time the image on the opposite side.”68 In their search to find an 
appropriate critical response to the wall, Artists Without Walls have criticized the use of the 
barrier as a canvas or screen, arguing that treating the wall as a kind of neutral ground amounts 
to tacit approval of its existence.  
The event in Abu-Dis seemed to dissolve the material presence of the wall for several 
hours, overcoming the obstacle placed between the two communities and providing a window to 
dialogue and critical artistic practice. Rather than provide yet another illusory view through 
images that would beautify or distract from the obstruction, Artists Without Walls re-presented 
the concealed view to the communities on both sides of the barrier in a way that would call 
attention to the wall’s violence as well as the inadequacy of visual exposure, temporary exposure 
at that, to contest the harsh visual and spatial logic of 25 foot high concrete blocks.  In other 
words, the project seemed to emphasize in part its failure to provide connection, since the video 
projection provided only the illusion that the wall was disappeared, and underscored the 
frustration of the unattainability of crossing the short distance between the communities on either 
side.  While the ability for the camera to move through walls may serve the military interest of a 
full penetrability and malleability of space, the Artists Without Walls project necessarily 
provided a more complicated relation between visibility and invisibility, since the re-
appropriated vision of the other side of the wall did nothing to challenge its physicality or its 
legal, military and ideological infrastructure and underpinnings. 
In another way, this temporary hole allowed for the temporary claim on a particular 
vantage point otherwise denied, the obstruction of which can sometimes be the primary effect of 
the wall’s concrete sections in certain areas. For example, in the Palestinian village Mas’ha, Abu 
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Nidal’s home is surrounded by the Separation Barrier in its towering fence form, except for the 
length of the property that would otherwise allow a view of Mas’ha. A 24-foot high and 40-
meter long concrete section of the Barrier stretches for about the length of the home and yard. No 
such concrete barrier separates Abu Nidal’s home from the settlement homes a literal stone’s 
throw (or aren’t we supposed to imagine worse—like a rocket’s throw?) away.  If the primary 
purpose of the wall was security, as the government has consistently claimed, why is there only 
concrete where the Nidal family would see their village?   
In 2004, artists and peace activists from the San Francisco Break the Silence Mural 
Project and the International Women’s Peace Service joined children from the nearby village of 
Biddia to paint a mural on the concrete section of the wall outside Abu Nidal’s front door.69  In 
January 2012, I met Abu Nidal and saw the Barrier surrounding his home, as well as the striking 
proximity of the settlement.  I had seen the mural in photos by Israeli feminist/queer anti-
occupation activist and scholar Dalit Baum online years earlier, but since then they had been 
covered over in white paint except for a bird with open wings that resembles a phoenix.  The 
care it would take to paint around the bird, painted in strokes of yellow and red, suggest that 
someone other than the military had covered over the mural’s many colorful animals and 
flowers, perhaps disturbed by what could seem an attempt to beautify the structure. 
Another painting from the “West Banksy” series depicts a cartoonish living room scene 
that sets a homey scene for a framed image of a landscape painting. This particular wall painting 
takes aim at the collective illusions of normalcy around the Separation Barrier, particularly in the 
settlement home where the preoccupation with “taking in the view” comes into tension with the 
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notion of security that justifies the installation of a major obstruction to the settlement vantage 
point. The painting depicted in the living room image is like a picture window that reveals a view 
of a what looks like an ideal European landscape, one distinct from the Middle Eastern landscape 
but which appeared in early Zionist art (like the Bezalel European-trained Jewish artists’ work), 
and which also seems to mock the Jewish National Fund’s privileging of non-native pine species 
in their afforestation projects.  
Like Banksy’s living room image which seemed to reference the settlement home’s ideal 
and imagined view, Weizman and Segal describe mountaintop Jewish settlements as “optical 
devices” due to the spectacular presence of concentric circles they draw around the apex of a 
mountain or network of mountains (like the five-finger style of the massive Ma’ale Adumim 
settlement near Jerusalem). Banksy’s living room painting underscores the contradictory visual 
and spatial logic of the wall and tower figuration by the concealment and replacement of the 
supposedly pastoral, and natural landscape, which takes place on the concrete manifestation of a 
state project carving up and destroying that same landscape.  
The idea that a living room window can act like an “optical device” appears in a 
combination of film and architecture theory in the work of Beatriz Colomina, whose 
conceptualization suggests that we might also see the settlement home itself as a kind of picture-
taking mechanism that relies on a certain cinematic logic. With living rooms organized around 
picture windows that capture views of holy and picturesque landscapes, settlement homes 
establish particular looking relations with low-lying Palestinian towns. Colomina argues, 
“architecture is not simply a platform that accommodates the viewing subject. It is a viewing 
mechanism that produces the subject. It precedes and frames its occupant,” insinuating in this 
context the contradictory logic that informs Israeli national belonging. To belong in such a home, 
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like the settlement home, does not simply connote a kind of familial, safe, and private comfort, 
but is fully enmeshed with a militant ethno-nationalism, as Colomina writes “the view enters the 
house.” Weizmann and Segal describe how the state has at times built settlement homes faster 
than they can fill them (in other words, the construction is not “market based but state directed”), 
suggesting that, in their words, “the civilian occupation relies on the presence of civilian 
architecture to demonstrate a Jewish presence across the landscape.”70 The private living room 
view from the settlement home suggests, in other words, suggests how the logic of the tower and 
the wall work in tandem to construct a schema of visual, spatial and classificatory logics that 
hold in place certain notions of proper belonging in Palestine. 
4.3 CINEMATIC OCCUPATION 
In August 2011, The Guardian ran an article about twin brother filmmakers in Gaza.  The article, 
by Gaza-based reporter Harriet Sherwood, was titled “Tarzan and Arab: The Gaza artists 
determined to make it against all odds,” and included a tagline that read “despite a lack of 
training, equipment, funding or an audience, Gaza’s twin artists are determined to succeed as 
film directors.”71  One of the brothers, whose actual names are Ahmed and Mohamed Abu 
Nasser, describes what its like to be a Palestinian filmmaker in Gaza: “let’s be realistic. Our life 
is under siege, under control. People don’t have time for art. They spend all their time looking 
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for crumbs. They say, ‘What use is art? Art will not give you bread.’”72 The brothers aspire, it 
seems, to make feature films, but, given their limited resources, in the meantime they make 
posters and long-form trailers for films that don’t exist.  The production company for these 
impossible films is called “Gazawood,” an unimaginable counterpart to Hollywood.  In one 
trailer produced by the brothers, the camera spins around the two brothers on a rooftop, catching 
them in a dramatic but generic standoff. The trailers and posters emphasize the impossibility of 
making films under military occupation and oppressive local governance, not to mention the 
complex situation created by the interaction between the Palestinian factions as well as between 
those political parties and the more powerful Israeli control of the region. A series of film posters 
point to the ridiculously cinematic grandeur of the names the Israeli military gives to its 
operations in Gaza: Autumn Clouds, Cast Lead, Summer Rain, Colorful Journey, and Cloud 
Pillar (also known as Pillar of Defense). “The idea is you look at the poster and imagine the film. 
But there is no film,” one brother explains, but in addition to foregrounding the many 
impossibilities and restrictions facing Palestinian cinema, especially in Gaza, they also explain 
that occupation itself has a cinematic aspect.73  
Tarzan and Arab’s story both corroborates and challenges the question of whether it 
makes sense to talk about a Palestinian cinema. How can there be a Palestinian cinema when 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories rarely see, let alone have opportunities to produce 
Palestinian films?  At the time of the interview, the brothers have never seen a film in a cinema, 
even though their own trailers and posters have now been exhibited at some cinemas in the West 
Bank and elsewhere.  Livia Alexander asked this question in an essay titled “Is There a 
Palestinian Cinema?: The National and Transnational in Palestinian Film Production,” that, 
                                                
72 Sherwood, “Tarzan and Arab.” 
73 Sherwood, “Tarzan and Arab.” 
   175 
rather than offering a clear response, maps the many obstacles, the industrial and cultural context 
as well as transnational, global and local national struggle influences that explain why this 
question arises so frequently in relation to Palestinian film studies. Alexander also identifies 
motifs such as land, struggle for decolonization, and a “complex notion of Palestinianness.” 74 
Alexander points out that Palestinian cinema is caught between national cinema modes and 
transnational or exilic modes, it is “neither national nor transnational, but a hybrid cinema that 
offers a complex relationship between the two,” but many now question whether there is any 
cinema that maintains strict national boundaries or entirely surpasses them.75 The twin brothers 
in Gaza challenge the idea that Palestinian cinema is a European phenomenon (as some primarily 
Israeli film critics suggest given that most Palestinian films are backed by European funding), 
since they not only make films in Gaza, they make films that offer their own critique of the 
restrictions limiting Palestinian cinema.  
The story about Tarzan and Arab exemplifies Palestinian cinema under siege (what might 
be called occupied cinema), but at the same time shows how Palestinian films take the question 
of their own possibility head on to critique their situation and to fuel their artistic vision.  
Furthermore, the posters for films named after Israeli military assaults index multiple forms and 
modes of the violence of occupation, rather than attempting to document violence and ignore the 
role of cinematic form in producing the limited frames through which Palestinian dispossession 
are understood.  Film scholar Terri Ginsberg critiques North American Palestine solidarity film 
and video on similar grounds, arguing that their reliance on cinema verité conventions to 
document the violence of occupation serves to  
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offer little more than generic compilations of albeit damning footage juxtaposed with 
albeit revolutionary testimonials, which [], in their relative aesthetic alienation from 
larger explanatory contexts, [supply] limited and sometimes ironically self-contradictory 
counterproof.76 
 
Tarzan and Arab’s trailers and posters in contrast index the conditions of their own un/making 
rather than make film more explicitly “about” the occupation and the conditions in Gaza.   
While Tarzan and Arab’s film posters only hint that there is something cinematic about 
Israeli occupation, the Israeli military-constructed “city” called Chicago suggests more concrete 
collusions of cinema and military occupation and the enlistment of cinematic technologies and 
techniques toward militaristic and ethno-national ends. Constructed at the Tze’elim base in the 
Negev desert, Chicago serves as a military training ground and, perhaps like many military 
training grounds intended to replicate urban civilian areas, it resembles a film set. Alexander 
Trevi, discussing photographs of Chicago by Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin, described 
Chicago this way: 
This is where generations of Israeli soldiers rehearse over and over again like actors in a 
Hollywood studio set. Here, with props on hand or littered about, they perfect their stage 
presence, try out some new moves and hand gestures, and fine tune their dialogues in 
front of cardboard cutouts of generic terrorists.77 
 
Trevi invokes cinema as a metaphor, where soldiers are “like” Hollywood actors. Eyal 
Weizmann, elaborates on a further Hollywood connection to Chicago, noting, “this was to 
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become the world’s largest mock-up oriental city erected since the filming of Ben-Hur.”78  
Chicago has served since the early 1980’s as a training site for multiple Israeli military 
operations in Lebanon, in planning to assassinate Saddam Hussein in Tiqrit, and during the 
second Palestinian Intifada Chicago was altered to mimic Palestinian urban areas, including a 
section meant to resemble a refugee camp. According to Weizmann, the military “employs a 
stage-set designer normally employed in a well-known Tel-Aviv theatre to provide and organize 
the relevant props and effects.”79  The military’s adoption of cinema and theater industry 
conventions, techniques, skills and technologies runs deep in order to construct the most realistic 
“scenes” of war:  
In similar mock-up sites, simulations have been designed by fun-fair, theme-park and 
filmset specialists. Action film directors are brought in to help military planners think up 
possible scenarios for complex urban fights. Soldiers, actors, civilians — and sometimes 
prisoners — simulate urban crowds. Special effects and ‘cold-fire’ systems, recordings of 
urban life, the sounds of planes, tanks and gunfire, and the revolting combination of 
smells from cooking, decomposing bodies, sewage and stagnant water are released 
throughout this and other mockup cities, to give military forces a ‘taste’ of the ‘urban 
mayhem’ of refugee camps and urban slums.80 
 
An attempt to recreate visual and sensorial spectacle of armed conflict is assumed to benefit from 
the expertise of technicians who create the experience of cinema-going and theme-park 
attendance. The cinematic aspects of the mock-city training site conspire in this way with a 
rhetoric of “smart destruction” of buildings in urban warfare, suggesting that the credibility of 
the notion of so-called “surgical” destruction as a more humane form of warfare relies on the 
acceptance that the cinematic scene of warfare training can be mapped onto the reality of urban 
warfare.  It is not clear in such a scenario, in other words, when the cinematic and theatrical ends 
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and “real” warfare begins.  As Weizmann explains, the tactic of removing the inner wall of a 
building allows the military to move through a city undetected from the air—to walk through 
walls, as the IDF refers to it.  Since, as Zionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky noted in a 1924 
newspaper article on the lack of women in “Palestine films” that “cameras cannot move through 
walls,” the Israeli military has found a way to thwart the visual logics of warfare and cinema, to 
cause seemingly invisible forms of destruction, a technique discovered with the help of cinema 
and, as Weizmann notes, through adapting Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s notion of smooth 
space to conquer the striated space of Palestinian urban environments.81 Imagining the 
Palestinian urban space as a cinematic set, while at the same time evading a visualization of this 
destruction that would expose its violent effects on Palestinian lives, suggests that “perceptual 
warfare” is not fully explained in terms of visualization, but draws on cinema for non-visual 
forms of recognition and of making spaces available for military penetration.  The “smart” 
advantage of such concealed technologies of destruction might be that they remain hidden from 
the documentation of human rights non-governmental organizations that increasingly rely on 
visual forms of proof of destruction of civilian areas.   
Furthermore, while both the wall and the tower seem to invite theories of violence based 
on visual control and the military use of visibility as tactic of war, the many gaps and holes in the 
route of the wall, for example, suggest that these devices work as much through strategies of 
indirect, suspended and often affective violence, like humiliation, insecurity and intimidation, as 
through spectacular and highly visual forms of violence such as military incursions into urban 
spaces, demolitions, and surveillance.  In this way, Virilio’s important observation that “if you 
can see it you can kill it,” which seems especially relevant in light of the increasing use of 
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unmanned drones today, perhaps overstates the visualizing aspect of camera-equipped war 
machines, since while such technologies visualize in order to destroy, they also alter the ways in 
which space is made recognizable and available for military conquest, for security, containment, 
and other functions. In other words, the organization of visual fields and spaces of control is not 
solely a process of making-visible, since the proliferation of un-recognizable or un-visualizable 
spaces is also an effect of these technologies and their attending discourses of exposure and 
concealment. 
4.4 QUEER CINEMATIC OCCUPATION 
The 2011 documentary Invisible Men, directed by Yariv Mozer, claims to tell the “untold side of 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”—gay Palestinian men escaping what the director calls the 
“ghettos” of the West Bank for Israel’s “most liberal city, Tel Aviv.”  Although the film at least 
in part purports to document Israeli deportation and lack of protection for queer Palestinians, it 
also reiterates a familiar narrative of Palestine as “closet” under the claim that this “untold” story 
is being exposed “for the first time” (as the project’s Indiegogo page argues).  As growing 
critiques of Israeli pinkwashing have shown, the “untold story” of tolerant gay Tel Aviv and 
homophobic Palestine has actually been told and retold, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry has 
invested heavily in promoting it. The first spoken line of The Bubble, the 2006 internationally 
screened Israeli film by gay Israeli power couple Eytan Fox (director) and Gal Uchovsky 
(screenwriter) about a doomed gay Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian love story, suggests that film’s 
similar investment in the logic of an “untold story:” the words “you can’t film here” originate 
from an Israeli soldier shown through the video camera perspective of a checkpoint watch 
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activist in the first few seconds of The Bubble. That this prohibition on filming is introduced in 
the film’s opening scene of gay cruising at a military checkpoint underscores my attention to the 
specifically cinematic terms through which Israeli pinkwashing’s so-called untold stories have 
been able to be told over and over, and yet still maintain an alibi of being hidden, and of 
requiring a kind of repeated exposure. In that film, scenes that emphasize mediation create the 
sense that Palestine can only be viewed through screens and frames, placing it is some 
distance—spatially, temporally, and conceptually—from the Jewish-Israeli spaces of the film. 
As a homonational discourse, the “untold story” promises to never find what it is looking 
for, which in turn seems to justify its continued reiteration. Like the still expanding use of new 
bio-imaging and surveillance technologies to detect potential “terrorists” mentioned above, the 
continued failure to provide security serves as the alibi for the increasing use of tracking 
technologies and the suspension of basic protections against surveillance, illegal detention and 
even assassination. Since this kind of paranoid knowledge, as Eve K. Sedgwick following D.A. 
Miller would call it, both produces and claims to expose what is purportedly hidden, counter-
narratives offered by queer Palestinian and solidarity activists and critics are often wary of 
reproducing similar tactics of exposure. In the context of Israeli pinkwashing and global 
homonationalism, in other words, visibility and representational strategies are fraught, since 
while the discourse of the “untold story” claims to want to locate and even “save” queer 
Palestinians (for example), it at the same time continually reproduces queer Palestinians in terms 
of invisibility and un-locatability. In the popular Israeli documentary on the 2006 World Pride 
parade in Jerusalem, Jerusalem is Proud to Present, Jason Ritchie’s detects a similar narrative in 
the film’s larger theme of “the dangers of religion” to queer liberalism. Boodie “disappears as a 
character in the story” after recounting a familiar story of victimization by Hamas activists, while 
   181 
“the film’s other queer victim, Adam Russo,” who Ritchie describes as “the posterchild for queer 
liberalism in Israel,” is cast as the hero of the film.82  While the film “works hard, in line with 
liberal discourses of tolerance, multiculturalism, and diversity, to equate the suffering of queer 
Israelis and queer Palestinians,” by the end of the film “the queer Palestinian fades away, an 
unredeemed victim of the hopeless illiberalism of Palestinian culture.”83 In this way, the queer 
Palestinian fades from view, while at the same time maintaining a kind of hyper-visibility as 
suffering victim, in the broader ideological project of improving Israel’s image. 
In the context of Israeli pinkwashing and global homonationalism, strategies of visibility 
are fraught for this reason, since while the discourse of the “untold story” claims to want to 
locate and even “save” queer Palestinians (for example), it at the same time continually 
reproduces queer Palestinians in terms of invisibility, un-locatability, and suffering. Haneen 
Maikey, director of alQaws for Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society, and other 
queer Palestinian activists have been critiquing the discourse and effects of pinkwashing since its 
beginnings, and before the term took on a kind of widespread use after Sarah Schulman’s op-ed 
“Israel and ‘Pinkwashing’” appeared in the New York Times in November 2011. In a 2009 
Ha’aretz article, Maikey suggests that the perception of Palestinian society already well in place 
in the mainstream media, for example, made the media well primed to accept the narratives of 
pinkwashing: “each time a journalist from the western or Israeli media talks to Haneen, she hears 
the same questions: ‘How many gay people were killed by their families last year?’ and ‘Can you 
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help me find an oppressed gay Palestinian that has suffered an attempted honor killing by his 
family?’”84 
Pinkwashing as a state strategy has changed somewhat since its beginnings. As an article 
in the independent media collective indybay.com put it well, “Brand Israel was launched in 
response to the recognition that Israel is the worst-received brand name in the world.”85 Since as 
early as 2002, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the help of British and US PR firms, has 
made it official policy to attempt to re-brand Israel.86  During this process, the re-branders 
determined that one sure-fire topic would convince even the most anti-Zionist activists to 
associate Israel not with conflict, occupation and deserts but with beaches and tourism, 
democratic values and tolerance, was gay rights. In 2009 group of student fellows with the 
California-based multi-million dollar pro-Israel group StandWithUs (which in their words is “an 
international education organization that ensures that Israel’s side of the story is told in 
communities, campuses, [and] libraries”) received scholarships to design and implement an 
Israel advocacy scheme, and they decided that GLBT rights were the perfect issue to promote 
Israel to an anti-Zionist constituency. Program organizer Noa Meir explained, “when people see 
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that Israel is so progressive on this issue, they realize that it can’t just be on this issue, and realize 
this must apply to Israel as a whole.”87 
However, even before official Brand Israel, mainstream Israeli gay rights groups were 
working on their own public relations with Israeli state institutions, primarily toward the agenda 
of representing a certain kind of gay white/Ashkenazi Jewish- Israeli as normative and patriotic, 
what Joshua Gamson calls a “soldiers and mothers” discourse; gay men as good soldier-citizens 
and lesbians as good mother-citizens.88  So, for example, in 1998, the first gay Israeli theater 
performance Words of His Own toured the US “as part of the country’s fiftieth anniversary 
celebrations, under the auspices of the consulate general.”89 Even earlier, in 1979, a meeting of 
the World Congress of Gay and Lesbian Jewish Organizations raised money to plant 3,000 trees 
in the Negev and demanded recognition from the Jewish National Fund.90  As discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, the Jewish National Fund, founded at the First Zionist Congress, was tasked 
with conquering the Palestinian landscape for Jewish settlement and was also the primary 
producer of early Zionist propaganda films depicting the New Jewish pioneers settling and 
cultivating what they depicted as barren wasteland. While early normative gay Israeli politics 
looked to the JNF for legitimacy in the eyes of the state, in this decade, the JNF’s more recently 
formed gay and lesbian committee seems intended to lend a more positive, tolerant face for this 
core Israeli state institution. 
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Evidence of pinkwashing ranges from clear-cut cases of Israeli Foreign Ministry funding 
for specifically LGBT-focused events like film festivals, to more convoluted and bizarre 
strategies such as a YouTube video, quickly exposed as a hoax, in which an Israeli gay actor 
purports to be an American activist turned off by what he claimed to be homophobia and links to 
Hamas in the Gaza aid flotilla movement. Critiques of pinkwashing have also changed over time, 
particularly as North American and European activists, academics and others have caught up 
with the critique first articulated by Palestinian queer activists.  The increasing use of Jasbir 
Puar’s term “homonationalism” has both allowed for a larger context for critiquing Israeli 
pinkwashing, and caused some differences in approach and focus of activism and research. For 
Puar, “homonational” is a term that allows us to see how “the nation is not only heteronormative, 
but also homonormative” and to consider the racialized split between “proper, national (white) 
homosexuality […] and improper (colored) nonnational queerness.”91 Whiteness, in other words, 
undergirds the ability for some GLBT identified people to access rights and privileges of 
citizenship, achieving a kind of normative recognition previously largely considered impossible 
through conceptions of the nation as always and everywhere exclusively heteronormative and 
patriarchal.  In a recent Jadaliyya.com article “Gay Rights as Human Rights: Pinkwashing 
Homonationalism,” Maya Mikdashi writes “critics of pinkwashing who assume an international 
queer camaraderie repeat a central tenet of homonationalism: homosexuals should be in 
solidarity with and empathize with each other because they are homosexual,” citing Schulman’s 
op-ed as an example. Mikdashi argues, in other words, that “both the Israeli government and 
pinkwatching—not pinkwashing—activists partake in different aspects of homonationalism 
because they must in order to be heard by the same intended audience: white gays who have 
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economic and political resources.”92  Mikdashi’s critique suggests that it is no longer enough to 
simply enumerate examples of Israeli pinkwashing—as she suggests pinkwatchers do—, if it 
ever was, since the terms of the critique may only further entrench its effects. 
Furthermore, while some Israelis have joined the critique, they frequently curb the 
harsher criticism with a reminder of the undeniability of Israel’s progressive gay rights record. 
For example legal scholar Aeyal Gross criticizes that “gay rights in Israel and the relative 
liberalism of Israeli society in this area are flaunted and used to paint a picture of Israel as a 
progressive liberal democracy,” points out that the notion of Israel as a gay haven for 
Palestinians is a “false narrative,” and argues that “gay rights have essentially become a public-
relations tool,” he also argues that “we must not deny the progress” of LGBT rights in Israel.93 
Given that the recognition entailed in “not denying the progress,” is, I believe, the primary goal 
of Israeli pinkwashing, particularly as conceived by the StandWithUs fellows, Gross’ form of 
critique shows how pinkwashing survives in some instances its own critique, or, put another 
way, pinkwashing works in part through a neo-liberal version of difference, which allows for the 
strategic inclusion of rights discourse but without significant transformation of legal, state, or 
institutional structures maintaining gender, sexual, economic, racial and other forms of 
inequality. This accounts for why some supposedly staunch anti-pinkwashing critics remain 
skeptical of, opposed to, or even unknowledgeable about the Palestinian civil society call for 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions to end Israeli occupation and to call for real justice for 
                                                
92 Maya Mikdashi, “Gay Rights as Human Rights: Pinkwashing Homonationalism,” Jadaliyya 
December 16, 2011, accessed December 2, 2012, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3560/gay-rights-as-human-rights_pinkwashing-
homonationa. 
93 Aeyal Gross, “Israeli GLBT Politics Between Queerness and Homonationalism,” Bully 
Bloggers, July 3, 2010, accessed December 2, 2012, 
http://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2010/07/03/israeli-glbt-politics-between-queerness-and-
homonationalism/. 
   186 
Palestinians.  While pinkwashing critiques seem to allow for some liberal hesitance about calling 
for real social change, BDS aims at the core issue that Israeli pinkwashing itself hopes to 
obscure—Palestinian liberation from Israeli military occupation and injustice. 
The Bubble reflects this liberal mode of discourse insofar as it seems on its face to be a 
film critical of Israeli society, taking the teeth out of some of its best critiques that rightly accuse 
the film of promoting pinkwashing. While Rebecca Stein notes that “for many Israeli audiences, 
the figure of the gay Palestinian from the territories was already legible and indeed permissible 
within the terms of popular Israeli discourse about the persecution of homosexuals within 
Palestinian society and their efforts to seek refuge within the tolerant context that Israel 
provides,” her reading of the film relies almost exclusively on narrative, plot points and dialogue. 
Stein focuses on the political terrain of the film, the conditions that she argues allowed for the 
subjects to become “possible as an object of cinematic inquiry,” and thus explains how the film 
participates and makes meaning in the context of larger cultural conditions.94  Written and 
directed by gay Israeli power couple Eytan Fox and Gal Uchovsky, The Bubble, like other films 
by Fox including the 2002 Yossi and Jagger, has been screened at a number of Ministry-funded 
LGBT-themed festivals abroad, including the 2010 Out in Israel festival in San Francisco and the 
Toronto International Film Festival’s focus on Tel Aviv in 2009, which occurred at a time when 
Toronto was a major testing ground for broader Brand Israel advertisements selling Israeli 
companies and tourism. Fox’s films have been critiqued for their tendency to normalize, 
nationalize, and largely militarize a certain vision of gay Israeli citizenship. At both the San 
Francisco and Toronto festivals, queer activist organizations such as Queers Against Israeli 
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Apartheid (in Toronto) and Queers Undermining Israeli Terrorism (of San Francisco) headed 
protests and called for cultural boycotts.95 
My aim is also to suggest the necessity of thinking about how pinkwashing works 
through, and not just in spite of, contradiction, failure, and exposure, and thus how critiques of 
pinkwashing need to be careful not to stop at pointing to and exposing those many contradictions 
and failures, since this has not stopped pinkwashing as a strategy, nor as an ideology from 
spreading, and in some cases it has multiplied its effects.  As Invisible Men suggests, the “untold 
story” of queer Palestinians, especially in the wake of US threats to pull funding from countries 
that don’t respect LGBT rights, is more popular than ever. Yet, while this sense of a queerly pre-
occupied cinema, enlisted by Brand Israel pinkwashing, reflects what might be seen as a merely 
cultural and discursive phenomenon, a patriotic pornographic film shoot in a depopulated and 
destroyed Palestinian village offers a more concrete meeting of queerness and military 
occupation. I am referring to ultra-conservative Michael Lucas, known for his anti-Muslim 
scorn, whose film Men of Israel included scenes shot in a Palestinian village that was ethnically 
cleansed around 1948.96 Lucas Entertainment’s description describes that on that day of the shoot 
the cast and crew “went to an abandoned village just north of Jerusalem. It was a beautiful 
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ancient township that had been deserted centuries ago…however that did not stop our guys from 
mounting each other and trying to repopulate it.”97 Lucas’ film serves as a type of Brand Israel 
gay tourism promotion through its emphasis on natural and distinctly “Israeli” settings. 
Lucas’ film also underscores the violence that underpins the production of normative gay 
Israeli citizen-subjects as well as how both cinema and queerness are enlisted and embedded in 
occupation. His films re-stage the occupation through Ashkenazi male homosexuality and 
emphasizing the potential for homonationalism to work alongside what was previously presumed 
as an exclusively heteronormative nationalist project. In other words, dominant discourse on 
normative citizenship in Israel does not simply find oppositional categories in the identity 
positions suggested by GLBT, rather, queer negativity is produced through intersecting and 
shifting terms such as racialization and the projection of illiberal and unmodern attitudes and 
behaviors such as ‘closeted homosexual,’ homophobia, hetero-patriarchy, religious piety, and so 
on.  In spatial terms, this kind of queering posits Palestinian society in the Occupied Territories 
as a homophobic enclave—a large closet, uninhabitable by the kind of proper homonational gay 
citizen subject imagined through the kind of gay rights discourse promoted by Israel and the U.S.  
This figuring of Palestine as closet participates in what Jasbir Puar marks as a symptom 
of “sexual exceptionalism…enacted via the discursive tactics through which the identity 
categories of ‘homosexuality’ and ‘Muslim [or Arab] sexuality’ are relegated to mutually 
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exclusive spaces.”98 Puar’s focus on racialization and racism in the conceptual framework of 
homonationalism is a reminder that insofar as queer is meant to mark a structural negativity, it is 
not simply a synonym for gay or homosexual, and indeed ongoing intersectional and relational 
analysis is needed to detect shifts in the formation of new modes of normativity and non-
normativity, value and valuelessness, and life and death.   
While Lucas’ occupied location shoot suggests a queer cinematic site that takes 
advantage of the infrastructure of occupation to play out sexual fantasy in close relation to 
Zionist and nationalist fantasy, the term “occupation” after the Occupy Wall Street movement in 
the U.S. has taken on a resistant meaning, indicating the collective possibility of the protests. The 
occupation of the NYC LGBT Center by Queers Against Israeli Apartheid and others is one 
example of the intersection of queerness, Palestine and occupation, but in Israel, the West Bank 
and Gaza, occupation takes on a more immediate and perhaps less apparently resistant meaning, 
implying the negative “structural position of queerness” marked by Lee Edelman, one clearly 
less desirable for resistant occupation. Given the spatial logic of Israeli occupation, more careful 
use of the term occupation needed, perhaps especially in relation to queerness, which is now 
used to code certain places uncivilized, anti-democratic and unmodern for their supposed 
inhabitability by queers.  It was Lucas who prompted the LGBT Center in New York City to 
close its doors to Palestine solidarity activism, queer or otherwise, and so the call to “occupy” the 
center takes on a disturbingly ironic aspect.  The next chapter will more closely take up the 
question of occupation through literal and figurative housings of resistance, belonging, and 
alliance in cinema and queer Palestinian film and activism to allow for a more complex look at 
what it means to inhabit Palestine, as place and idea, today.
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5.0  CHAPTER FOUR: PALESTINIAN CINEMA AND QUEER 
PALESTINIAN ALLIANCE 
5.1 HOUSING IMAGES 
Characterizing a Palestinian literary and artistic theme “of the formerly proud family house 
(village, city, camp) now wrecked, left behind, or owned by someone else,” Edward Said 
determines that “each Palestinian structure presents itself as a potential ruin.”1 In addition to the 
large body of Palestinian literature, poetry and art on the topic, the real or “potential” ruin of 
Palestinian structures has also for some years also been a common theme in North American 
Palestine solidarity and anti-occupation documentary film and video work of the kind that, as 
Terri Ginsberg explains, “tend to utilize the camera as a relatively transparent index of external 
reality: an empirical device of raw ‘witnessing,’ a progressive populist instrument of social 
intervention and mobilization.”2 In light of Ginsberg’s analysis, these documentaries can also be 
understood in terms of how they participate in what Thomas Keenan has analyzed through 
reference to a dominant human rights discourse of “mobilizing shame”—the “watchword of the 
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international human rights movement.”3 Keenan explains, “the concept gathers together a set of 
powerful metaphors—the eyes of the world, the light of public scrutiny, the exposure of 
hypocrisy—as vehicles for the dream of action, power, and enforcement.”4  However, the 
concept has met a crisis—which Keenan analyzes in relation to widely televised and mediatized 
conflicts and so-called “humanitarian interventions” such as the 1999 NATO air campaign over 
Kosovo—due to “the effective erasure of a fundamental axiom of the human rights movement in 
an age of publicity: that the exposure of violence is feared by its perpetrators, and hence that the 
act of witness is not simply an ethical gesture but an active intervention.”5 Keenan posits that 
while exposure still carries a sense of action—that if only the world could see what is happening 
atrocity could be prevented—it does not actually happen this way, primarily since “images never 
speak for themselves, never make anything in particular happen, even if they seem often to make 
something happen and are now indispensible in war.”6 Keenan does not mean to suggest that 
ethical action is impossible in a human rights field and broader public sphere saturated by image-
production, rather “if we continue to think that images by virtue of their cognitive contents or 
their proximity to reality have the power to compel action, we miss just the opening of new fields 
of action they allow.”7 For Keenan, interpretation of and a critical relation to images is key. 
House demolitions and the wreckage left from Israeli military assaults, common 
occurrences of the occupation and a frequent image in solidarity and documentary films on 
Palestine are indeed visually striking examples of the violence of occupation and ethnic 
cleansing, and can serve as concrete evidence to document and seek justice in response to Israeli 
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war crimes. Yet, while images of violence, including against architecture (“Palestinian 
structure[s]”), became increasingly popular in international courts after human rights 
organizations began to use the same remote sensing technologies as the state, the production of 
these images seem to follow the logic of exposure and mobilizing shame critiqued by Keenan. 
Indeed, despite a wealth of evidentiary material documenting Israeli military crimes such as the 
destruction of Gaza during “Operation Cast Lead,” little legal or punitive action has been taken. 
In fact, the controversy surrounding the Goldstein Report, Judge Richard Goldstone’s UN Report 
on the 2009 Israeli assault on Gaza that alleged intentional Israeli war crimes perpetrated against 
Palestinian civilians, underscores the limited field of action for conducting field research into 
Israeli military assaults.8 Furthermore, Andrew Herscher argues that visualizations produced by 
remote sensing technologies, including satellite and aerial photographs, de-legitimize victims 
insofar as they replace the need for the witness on the ground, whose testimony becomes 
secondary corroboration of satellite images and Google maps: “remote sensing does not only 
substantiate human witnesses to human rights violations, but also supplants those witnesses as 
authoritative sources.”9 
Well-known Israeli human rights non-governmental organization (NGO) B’Tselem 
(whose name, somewhat ironically, means “in the image of”), seemingly aware of the potential 
de-legitimation of the victims they purport to work in the name of, has initiated more than one 
camera-distribution project encouraging more Palestinians to document Israeli military and 
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settler violence. 10 Given their mission to “document and educate the Israeli public and 
policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon 
of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel,” it 
would seem that B’Tselem uses such camera-distribution initiatives to mobilize shame in Israeli 
society.11  They further explain their mission through logics of exposure and shame: 
The focus on documentation reflects B’Tselem's objective of providing as much 
information as possible to the Israeli public, since information is indispensable to taking 
action and making choices. Readers of B’Tselem publications may decide to do nothing, 
but they cannot say, “We didn’t know.”12 
 
The videos are also used in legal proceedings to provide “vital evidence” and they reference a 
“few cases” where “broadcast of the footage has contributed to genuine policy changes.”13  Yet, 
given that the Palestinian-run human rights organization Al Haq, a frequent partner of B’Tselem 
that also documents Israeli and Palestinian violence (and its elder by a decade), tends to receive 
less positive international attention, it may still be easier for Israeli organization to effectively 
document and expose the world to examples of Israeli violence.14  
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Ginsberg similarly argues, regarding “contemporary North American Palestine solidarity 
films made in the documentary tradition” that they “echo preponderantly what Palestinian 
filmmaker Omar al-Qattan refers to as the ‘commando’ reportage of international corporate news 
agencies…in its subordination of oppressed voices and perspective to Western politics 
priorities.”15 She describes two rather distinct types of Palestine solidarity documentary film 
work according to how much the films invest in logics of exposure and the cinematic image’s 
availability and recognizability as proof. Ginsberg characterizes the tendency of the majority of 
North American Palestine solidarity documentaries to 
offer little more than generic compilations of albeit damning footage juxtaposed with 
albeit revolutionary testimonials, which, for reasons no longer subject to serious debate in 
film circles, supply, in their relative aesthetic alienation from larger explanatory contexts, 
limited and sometimes ironically self-contradictory counterproof.16 
 
Thus, as cinematic documentary conventions like those critiqued by Ginsberg collude with the 
same techniques of mediation that limit discourse on Palestine, and as the dominant evidentiary 
modes of visualization favored by human rights NGOs further de-authorize the victims on the 
ground, the logic of exposure, that seeing is believing (and eventually action), is undermined at 
the same time it is invested in. Herscher concludes that: 
the predominant use of satellite imagery suggests that it is only remote seeing that offers 
fully believable representation and that sight on the ground is subject to distortions, 
biases and obstacles that render it inherently unreliable. When remote seeing is believing, 
seeing up close and personal becomes an undependable and only preliminary form of 
vision.17 
 
In light of this, images of the Palestinian house, primarily in its form as a ruined structure—
resulting, for example, from recent military incursions, common in the West Bank or Gaza, or 
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from earlier destruction and dispossession, as can be found in remains of former Palestinian 
villages throughout contemporary Israel—can have the arguably unintended effect of serving a 
discursive context in which Palestinians are seen as illegitimate sources, unable to lay claim to 
mediating their own experiences.  
This is yet another way that the Palestinian house is ruined, then, and indeed the broader 
meanings that houses take on in Historic and Occupied Palestine, as well as in Israel and in the 
contemporary Jewish settlements, suggest that they are highly charged images in relation to 
ethno-national intelligibility.  In Chapters 2 and 3, I explored a different aspect of the 
landscape’s formation as part of a network of visuality and spatiality that continually reinvests 
Jewish national belonging with a sense of inevitability and self-evidence. Underscoring the 
continued relevance of the power of the Wall and Tower figuration in the contemporary 
perceptual field in the region, the final shots of the 2008 Israeli film The Lemon Tree point to the 
irony of the visual and spatial logic of the hilltop settlement home when it meets that of the 
Separation Barrier. The character of the Defense Minister, whose own absurd commitment to so-
called security measures have caused his wife to leave him, appears alone in his home, sitting in 
the dark, only the back of his head is visible as he sits in a chair facing one of the still closed 
windows. He f activates automated metal blinds, which slowly open to reveal his bittersweet 
victory: the Minister’s “picture window” now affords a view of the Separation Barrier in its most 
concrete and imposing form. A medium shot from behind the Minister reveals him centered of 
the frame, a dark silhouette against the bright view outside of the concrete barrier, which nearly 
reaches the top of the frame, leaving only a sliver of sky visible. The frame is further bisected by 
the window frames as well as by two columns supporting the back porch. This is a view 
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obstructed, but at the same time it underscores the blind spots, fragmentation, and not-seeing that 
constitute the dominant logic of Israeli national intelligibility discussed in Chapter 3. 
 Yet, it is important that the structure in this image is a house, particularly given how 
affectively and politically charged houses are in a context of home demolitions, evictions, 
expanding settlements, and also given the association with the home as both a private space and 
a site where national belonging is reiterated. Architecture scholar Beatriz Colomina emphasizes 
the important connection between architecture and subjectivity: “architecture is not simply a 
platform that accommodates the viewing subject… it is a viewing mechanism that produces the 
subject. It precedes and frames its occupant,” insinuating in this context the contradictory logic 
that informs Israeli national belonging.18 To belong in such a home like the settlement home, 
with its military functions of surveillance and control, does not simply connote a kind of familial, 
safe, and private comfort, but is fully enmeshed with a militant ethno-nationalism, or, as 
Colomina puts it “the view enters the house.”19 The continued militarization of Jewish-Israeli 
belonging in Israel is exemplified by recent “loyalty laws” that compel adherence to the idea of 
Israel a “Jewish democratic state,” by the Nakba Law that bans commemoration of the nakba, or 
“catastrophe,” which describes the near destruction of Palestinian society that occurred when the 
state of Israel was founded, the many laws that distinguish between Jews and non-Jews and 
discriminate against the Arab minority of Israel, and the inequality within the Jewish-Israeli 
population between European and Arab Jews in Israeli society.  While exclusion or un-belonging 
are often more readily associated with violence, in Israel belonging is compulsory, even if 
illusory for all but a small minority. What kinds of belonging, national or otherwise, can 
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Palestinians construct in this context, particularly given the potential or actual ruin of the 
Palestinian structure and the denial of Palestinian belonging in Israeli and other contexts? 
Suggesting that architecture is a form of mass media, Colomina likens it to cinema, 
whereby “the house is a device to see the world, a mechanism of viewing. Shelter, separation 
from the outside, is provided by the window’s ability to turn the threatening world outside the 
house into a reassuring picture.”20 In this way, the view from inside the house can be as charged 
with meaning as the image of the house from the satellite, suggesting the house’s ability to 
produce ways of seeing in multiple ways.  Colomina describes the picture window, like the one 
in Lemon Tree, in particular for its dual functions and for how it complicates the notion that the 
house provides clear private/public or interior/exterior boundaries. The picture window  
turns the outside world into an image to be consumed by those inside the house, but it 
also displays the image of the interior to that outside world. This shouldn’t be confused 
with exposing one’s privacy.21 
 
The Lemon Tree emphasizes the irony of security and surveillance logics, particularly in a shot 
from behind the Minister’s back as he looks out his picture window at the blank Separation 
Barrier, which fills “the view.” The movie camera, the subject, the house with its picture 
window, and the Separation Barrier are aligned in this scene in such a way that suggests their 
formation of network of techniques of viewing that posit contradictory and yet complimentary 
modes of micro-power, state power, and subjectivation in the inhabitance of such a house.  
Colomina interprets Le Corbusier in terms of positing modern architecture’s definition of 
inhabitation in terms of inhabiting the picture produced by the house, whereby “to inhabit means 
to see.” Even the window of modern architecture is never simply suggestive of the logics of 
exposure compelled by Enlightenment thinking, since the window is like a screen that 
                                                
20 Colomina, Privacy and Publicity, 7.  
21 Colomina, Privacy and Publicity, 8. 
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“undermines the wall.” Not “a physical undermining, an occupation of the wall, but a 
dematerialization following from the emerging media,” by which Colomina means radio, 
television, cinema and photography.22 Thus, for Le Corbusier, “the interior no longer needs to be 
defined as a system of defense from the exterior,” perhaps explaining the importance of metal 
blinds and a view of a concrete wall, defined in dominant Israeli discourse as purely defensive, 
which seems to attempt to re-instate physical boundaries of interior and exterior while at the 
same time undermining claims of inhabitance seemingly threatened by an apparent obstruction to 
seeing “the view.”23 
As one of the primary ways Zionist Jewish Agencies articulated, in a widely distributed 
form, their claim on the land of Palestine, I have argued that cinema serves as a site of the 
continued reiteration of the terms through which some modes of belonging and forms of national 
homemaking in Historic and Occupied Palestine are and have been legitimated and others are 
and have been denied. While the Sabra figure permeated Jewish Agency propaganda films, the 
complex notion that Jewish “pioneers” were both creating and returning to their rightful 
homeland similarly functioned to establish a particular and stable notion of home and nation 
through which normative Jewish nationalism was sustained. And although it makes sense to 
interpret Palestinian cultural productions and Palestinian histories as a response to the repeated 
claims of Palestinian nonexistence, inconsequence, and illegitimacy, Palestinian cinema does not 
simply respond and/or recuperate. Rather, in many ways Palestinian filmmakers decline to 
respond in the same terms used by those who seek to de-legitimize them, and thus attempt to 
avoid representational traps like the logic of exposure. The stakes of such a strategy is explained 
by Said, since a Palestinian critique of those who deny Palestinian rights lies in the very terms of 
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the denial itself: “every assertion of our nonexistence, every attempt to spirit us away, every new 
effort to prove that we were never really there, simply raises the question of why so much denial 
of, and such energy expended on, what was not there?”24  
Using the house as a frame to hone in on how Palestinian filmmakers and activists posit 
and inhabit forms of belonging that fall to the side of the conventional modes of belonging 
compelled and regulated by the Israeli state, I explore what it means to inhabit Palestinian 
sociality and collectivity in a context of dispossession, dispersion, and seeming unlivability. 
Queer diasporic, queer of color, and women of color feminist critiques of home, resistance, and 
solidarity are turned to a different moments of this accounting of Palestinian belonging and 
unbelonging, compelled by the many crossings over between queer, feminist, and Palestinian 
interpretations of these concepts, and following the many examples of queer Palestinian activism 
and creative work prominent in the broader Palestinian social justice struggle in recent years. 
The concept of the house as a viewing mechanism, and the exchanges between the house, 
camera, subject, and other techniques and technologies of visuality and power further organizes 
the concerns of this chapter. First, though, I’ll provide some context for thinking through the 
material and conceptual terms of “Palestinian unbelonging,” in order to explain what it means to 
say that certain modes of belonging are maintained over others in the context of occupation. 
5.2 PALESTINIAN UNBELONGING 
According to a widely familiar narrative, Israel provided Jewry a place to settle both physically 
and ontologically, but the state’s founding was also an opportunity to re-configure the image of 
                                                
24 Edward Said, After the Last Sky, 42. 
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Jews and the meaning of Jewish belonging, which took on a national imperative at the beginning 
of the twentieth-century. Distancing their vision of the new nation from the rather literally 
unsettled figures of the wandering Jew, the shtetl and the ghetto, Zionist leaders sought to 
establish Palestine as a place where Jews would make a home that conformed to the same 
contemporary European norms that deemed Jewish communities unfit or undesirable. In his 
diaries, Herzl described his dream for Jewish national homemaking in terms of the components 
of an ideal city: we shall build houses, palaces, workers’ dwellings, schools, theatres, museums, 
government houses, hospitals, lunatic asylums—in brief, cities.” (11) While these places suggest 
a particular kind of social stratification associated with a diverse secular and modern society, 
Herzl recognized that a Jewish state should also establish some unique attributes: 
We shall not only copy Paris, Florence, etc., but look for a Jewish style also, expressing 
relief and freedom. Open cheerful hallways, borne on columns. Make air zones between 
cities. Every city like a large house situated in a garden. (13) 
 
The “relief and freedom” of the architecture Herzl imagined would emphasize a clear distinction 
between the style of living made possible by a Jewish state, a kind of unconstrained expressive 
Jewish homemaking, and the mode of living associated with survival under conditions of 
increasing repression in Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The “open” hallways and 
“airzones” oppose the stereotype of the cramped and overcrowded urban Jewish ghetto or the 
isolated shtetl.  Writing in a mode of creative invention, Herzl imagined Palestine and the figure 
of the new Jewish pioneer as blank slates onto which certain “homing desires” could be 
projected on and enacted through.25 Avtar Brah’s notion of diasporic “homing desires” construes 
diaspora as a productive kind of orientation, which creates certain notions of home and is not 
simply or necessarily a condition of displacement from a clearly defined and original home.   
                                                
25 See Avtar Brah, Cartographies of Desire: Contesting Identities (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
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In a book on queer migrant narratives, A.M. Fortier suggests the notion of “home” is 
usefully complicated by narratives of home that don’t presume it as a secure, heteronormative, 
homophobic or un-queer space. In other words, Fortier suggests that ‘home’ needs to be 
conceptualized differently, and not as always already stable, hetero-normative, and original, nor 
as the “quasi-mythical” and de-contextualized queer home often invoked in mainstream 
discourse on “coming out.”  Fortier suggests that home is often conceived of as a space from the 
past: 
the childhood home is more effectively rethought not by refusing ‘home’ and leaving it 
behind—which merely reinstates the authority of the heteronormative model of ‘home’—
but, rather, by conceiving it as a contingent product of historical circumstances and 
discursive formations—of class, religion, ethnicity, nation—that individuals negotiate in 
the process of creating home. In this sense, home is never fully achieved, never fully 
arrived-at, even when we are in it.26  
 
The imagined future queer home, in other words, is posited as the ideal space that the childhood 
home never provided. Through this model, “‘home’ remains widely sentimentalized as a space of 
comfort and seamless belonging, indeed fetishized through the movement away from the familial 
home toward an imagined other space to be called ‘home.’”27 If we understand home as already 
constituted through certain kinds of un-belonging, and not just through similarity, security and 
community, then the possibilities for understanding belonging and its relation to home and 
identity expand, and queer can no longer serve as a too easy metaphor for “not-home,” nor in the 
service of an idealized future “queer” home, one again posited only in terms of security and 
                                                
26 Anne-Marie Fortier, “Making Home: Queer Migrations and Motions of Attachment,” in 
Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration, eds. Sara Ahmed, Claudia 
Castaneda, Anne-Marie Fortier, and Mimi Sheller (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 131. 
27 Anne-Marie Fortier, “Making Home,” 119. 
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sameness.28 Fortier explains how the notion of the diasporic home can accommodate a 
multiplicity of spaces of belonging and unbelonging and “encounters with estrangement and 
familiarity”29: 
the diasporic home is already queer because it is always somehow located in a space of 
betweenness: that it is a site of struggle with multiple injunctions of being and ‘fitting in’ 
that come from ‘here’ and ‘there.’ In this respect, ‘home’ is intensely queer, and queer, 
utterly familiar.30 
 
With this emphasis on the proximity between queerness and familiarity, as well as Fortier’s 
reference to home as a “contingent product of historical circumstances and discursive 
formations” formed through a process of negotiation, that, like Stein’s notion of national 
intelligibility, emphasizes process, contingency and unstable notions of belonging.  Considered 
together, these models suggest ways to think about both queer and home in unsettled terms. 
The sense that the diasporic home is “never fully achieved, never fully arrived-at” is a 
driving concern of Ghada Terawi’s short film The Last Station (2007), from Shashat's 3rd 
Women’s Film Festival on the theme Palestinian Portraits. Terawi narrates, through first-person 
inter-titles, the story of her parents; driven out of Palestine and forced to live in diaspora where 
no place (Beirut, Tunisia) could be home for long. Terawi only first sees Palestine herself in 
1995—she describes checkpoints, the Separation Barrier, soldiers, tanks—a homeland under 
siege. At the end of the film the narrator explains that “the road back home was more beautiful 
than home itself. But this was not the end of my journey.”  In The Last Station, home is unstable, 
particularly when the ideal home Terawi imagined does not match the reality of the homeland 
under siege. This diasporic experience of home is similar to how David Eng describes Asian 
                                                
28 On the violence involved in claims to belonging in racialized queer Israeli contexts, see Adi 
Kuntsman, Figurations of Violence and Belonging: Queerness, Migranthood and Nationalism in 
Cyberspace and Beyond (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2009). 
29 Anne-Marie Fortier, “Making Home,”121. 
30 Anne-Marie Fortier, “Making Home,”125. 
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American experience as “suspended between departure and arrival…permanently 
disenfranchised from home, relegated to a nostalgic sense of loss or to an optative sense of its 
unattainability.”31 The Last Station emphasizes a sense of suspension between departure and 
arrival, and between the home of her parent’s memory and the home she encountered in 1995, 
through the use of both still photographs and video. The still photographs emphasize the kind of 
stasis the idealized notions of Palestine took on in her parent’s stories, while archival footage of 
Palestinians forced to leave their homes, combined with Terawi’s footage of contemporary 
military occupation, underscore the ongoing processes of the unmaking of the Palestinian 
homeland. Terawi’s film simultaneously contends with and maintains the sense of unattainability 
that a Palestinian homeland has for many Palestinians, without attempting to solve or settle the 
desire to finally arrive at home, presumably the home waiting at “the last station.”  
For David Eng, “queer diasporas” is “not only an object of knowledge” but “also a 
critical methodology,” one that explore movements and migrations “through the lens of 
queerness, affiliation, and social contingency” and the “declines the normative impulse to 
recuperate lost origins, to recapture the mother or motherland, and to valorize dominant notions 
of social belonging and racial exclusion that the nation-state would seek to naturalize and 
legitimate.”32  Furthermore, Eng’s methodology of queer diasporas “denaturalizes race precisely 
by contesting and rethinking the pervading rhetoric that ‘situates the terms ‘queer’ and ‘diaspora’ 
as dependent on the originality of ‘heterosexuality’ and ‘nation.’”33 In Terawi’s film, a similar 
“decline” to recover the lost origin of the idealized Palestinian homeland allows for a less linear 
and more open-ended exploration of Palestinian dispossession. A sense of unbelonging, in other 
                                                
31 David Eng, The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010): 110. 
32 Eng, The Feeling of Kinship, 13-14. 
33 Eng, The Feeling of Kinship, 14. 
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words, is not countered with uncomplicated claims of belonging, and home as a concept is 
unsettled, mirroring the sense that Palestinians and the Palestinian Question are unsettled. If 
normatively ideal Jewish Israeli identity defines a settled people (or, more romantically, the 
settling of a unsettled people), Palestinians are both unsettled by and unsettling to Zionism. 
Refusing to concede their right to the land of their ancestors, Palestinians have had to construct 
ever-new ways to articulate their attachment to Palestine as home and their understanding of 
what it means to belong to such a home. 
This is not to say that certain notions of home are not regulatory and idealized, 
compelling certain routes toward home over others and restricting, in some very concrete and 
violent ways in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, access to detours toward any recognizable 
version of home. If home is frequently an ideal concept, then it makes sense to analyze how it 
functions as a regulatory norm. Judith Butler describes regulatory norms in terms of binary 
gender and compulsive heterosexuality:  
When the disorganization and disaggregation of the field of bodies disrupt the regulatory 
fiction  of heterosexual coherence, it seems that the expressive model loses its descriptive 
force.  That regulatory ideal is then exposed as a norm and a fiction that disguises itself as 
a developmental law regulating the sexual field that it purports to describe.34 
 
In other words, idealized notions of home (and national home), act, like gender, to regulate lived 
experience, while at the same time appearing to merely describe it. It is also in this way and for 
this reason that Butler describes gender as “a project with cultural survival as its end,” whereby 
“the term strategy better suggests the situation of duress under which gender performance always 
and variously occurs.”35 In Israel, duress and regulation take on a specifically legal aspect 
through the enactment of a loyalty oath bill, which first applied to non-Jews and was extended to 
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include Jewish immigrants, that compels patriotic commitment to the concept of Israel as a 
“Jewish democracy,” even, or especially, for those who are excluded by those terms.36 In other 
words, the master narrative of an idealized national home, a safe haven for all Jews (and, in 
Brand Israel pinkwashing discourse, all queers), is quite literally a compulsory narrative. The 
criminalization of the Nakba through 2011 bill that “calls on the government to deny funding to 
any organization, institution or municipality that commemorates the founding of the Israeli state 
as a day of mourning,” seems in this context aimed at willfully ignoring the ruins and remains 
(many visible on the Israeli landscape) of other instantiations of the landscape as “home.”37  
National identity and subjectivity, as it becomes bound to particular idealized notions of home 
for Jewish-Israeli society, requires repetition that, like gender, “is at once a reenactment and re-
experiencing of a set of meanings already socially established; and it is the mundane and 
ritualized form of their legitimation.”38 The idealization of home in this context confirms the 
extent to which Zionism involves rigid protection of certain ethnic and conceptual borders of 
belonging.   
For example, Jewish homemaking in Palestine was by no means universally applied to all 
Jewish immigrants.39 For this reason, in describing a Zionist formation of particular notions of 
Jewish home and belonging, it must be acknowledged as a primarily Ashkenazi, or Jewish-
                                                
36 See Chaim Levinson and Jonathan Lis, “Netanyahu wants loyalty oath bill to include Jews as 
well” Ha’aretz October 18, 2010, accessed December 2, 2012, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/netanyahu-wants-loyalty-oath-bill-to-include-jews-as-
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37 Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, “Israel criminalizes commemoration of the Nakba,” Electronic 
Intifada, March 29, 2011, accessed December 2, 2012, http://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-
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38 Butler, Gender Trouble, 191. 
39 In a recent example, Israel halted Ethiopian Jewish immigration between 2008 and 2010. See 
Jessica Elgot, “Israel reopens Ethiopian Immigration,” The Jewish Chronicle Online, January 19, 
2010, accessed December 2, 2012, http://www.thejc.com/news/israel-news/26183/israel-reopens-
ethiopian-immigration. 
   206 
European, phenomenon constituted against, and imposed onto, internal and external others. In 
other words, bound to an overly stable and settled notion of home, according to a particular 
version of the “homing desires” fulfilled through the Israeli state, Israeli national intelligibility is 
maintained as exceptional and exclusive, affording an absolute right to belong for some, and 
denying it in any real sense to others. Ashkenazi Jews are posited as the ideal citizen of a 
democratic Jewish State. Ella Shohat underscores how this framework limits analysis of Arab 
Jews within Israeli society and in relation to Palestinians:  
Arab Jews presented some challenges for Zionist scholarship, precisely because their 
presence “messed up” its Enlightenment paradigm that had already figured the modern 
Jew as cleansed from its shtetl past. In Palestine, freed of its progenitor the Ostjuden, the 
New Jew could paradoxically live in the “East” without being of it.40 
 
Even the Jewish Right of Return brings with it certain compelling duties and obligations that 
during different periods of immigration and transformations in citizenship and population, were 
not optional; including the impossibility of returning to former homes in Europe, North Africa, 
and the former Soviet Union.41 As the description for Rachel Leah Jones’ documentary Ashkenaz 
(2007) succinctly articulates it, Ashkenazi Jewish identity transformed “from the other of Europe 
to the Europe of the others.”42 In contradictory fashion, though, the idea that Ashkenazim are 
Europeans amongst the Near Eastern “other” also refigures a kind of unbelonging in the very 
attempt to construct notions of ideal Jewish citizenship in Israel.  Acknowledging that Palestine 
is an “other” place, and that Ashkenazim represent “Europe,” reiterates displacement.  
Furthermore, echoing Herzl’s wish to “not only copy” European cities, Ashkenazi Europeanness, 
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if it only appears as such outside of Europe in the Middle East, may indeed appear to be “only 
copy.”  
The actual social inequalities in Israeli society, which aren’t always reducible to a model 
of inclusion/exclusion or center/margin, emphasize the extent to which national belonging in 
Israel enacts a certain kind of violence typically associated only with exclusion. In other words, 
even those who come closest to the state’s idealized notion of national citizen subject are subject 
to a contingent regulatory and obligatory process (including compulsory military service), not to 
mention the many forms of racism and sexism that underlay access to privilege in Israeli society. 
As perhaps one might expect of any concept of nationhood and belonging, especially one 
founded on a particular ethno-religious identity, the national homeland is predominantly 
conceived of in its negative relation to Others, and necessarily exclusive or repressive of Others. 
For example, the Sabra, conceived of as a native identity, was a deliberate and new construction 
through which Jewish masculinity was intended to be reclaimed and idealized. Diasporic Jews 
were increasingly encouraged to take up the Sabra identity (through various institutionalized and 
cultural coercions including the compulsory learning of Hebrew) in part as way to mark their re-
settlement in Palestine, in other words to shed what were seen as undesirable diasporic qualities. 
The Sabra was also modeled, in contradictory fashion, after behaviors and practices associated 
with the Arab population of Palestine, those who Zionism would deny as having any legitimate 
claim to the landscape. 43  In other words, the Palestinian Arab and Bedouin population was 
neither unknown nor entirely excluded by the dominant Zionist narratives of Jewish national 
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homemaking in Palestine, though the Sabra concept would at the same time seem to compel rigid 
exclusion and exceptionalism.  
At the same time, this kind of willed unknowingness regarding these restrictive 
separations and markers of difference produce what Yael Berda has described as a kind of erotic 
fascination or “the erotics of the occupation.”  Berda shows how Arab culture is certainly not 
unknown to Jewish-Israelis, indeed a kind of erotic exchange takes place through an incredible 
proximity to and adoption of certain Arabic foods, cultural interests, words, and so on: “Israelis 
have to know, to touch and to smell everything that the other has—the land, the coffee, the 
music—but without knowing the other.”44  Erotics in this way are about orientations and 
desires—through this play of proximity and distance—which is not reducible to a notion of 
repression since, again, Palestinians and Palestinianness are neither unknown nor entirely 
excluded in this paradigm, but for Berda is also intimately tied to incredible degrees of violence. 
For Berda, this erotics subtends Israeli national security discourse and the intimate knowledge 
pursued constantly at airports, checkpoints, nightclubs, military routines, and so on.  Berda 
describes the kind of willed ignorance of Israelis to know and possess Arabic language, cuisine, 
music, and land.  For Berda this is a kind of attraction/ revulsion that in some ways implies an 
attraction toward one’s own incoherence and destruction, while at the same time compelling a 
strict identification as “not other.” Presuming that erotic relationships necessitate an aspect of 
mystery, Berda shows how these secrets and distances are produced by the contradictory 
inconsistencies and over-administration that is part and parcel of the occupation.  With this kind 
of constantly withheld and yet carefully cultivated desire described by Berda, we might wonder 
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whether the occasional spectacular violence of the martyr operation, or deadly IDF incursion into 
Gaza, can be interpreted as a kind of erotic release—for Israelis, at least, since the erotic desire 
of Palestinians doesn’t really enter Berda’s analysis.   
Berda’s description of the erotics of the occupation serves as a reminder to be skeptical of 
discourses of exclusion and inclusion. As Michel Foucault describes, the “repressive hypothesis” 
did not fully explain the “machinery of power” of the new science of sexology around the turn of 
the century that 
did not aim to suppress [sexual perversion], but rather to give it an analytical, visible, and 
permanent reality: it was implanted in bodies, slipped in beneath modes of conduct, made 
into a principle of classification and intelligibility, established as a raison d’etre and a 
natural order of disorder.45 
 
In other words, this generation of sex as discourse produced it not as a site of liberation from 
censorship, repression, or power in a broad sense, but “in the very space and as the means of its 
exercise.”46  In a similar way, Jewish national homemaking produces Palestinians as a ghostly 
presence (or “absent-presentee,” terminology the state uses to describe some Palestinians who 
refused to leave their villages).  This proliferation of Palestinianness occurs in part through the 
discourse of exclusion that borders on extinction through the often repeated notion that 
Palestinians have never existed, no longer exist, are not who they say they are (i.e. they are 
Arabs with no special relation to the land of Palestine), and/or are an ancient uncivilized people 
of the past (Bedouins, who need to assimilate and join modern society). In other words, even in 
the discourse of exclusion and absence, Palestinian intelligibility, recognizability and visibility 
proliferates. Like Native Americans in Renee L. Bergland’s study of a particularly North 
American national uncanny, Palestinian and Bedouin populations represent the uncanny for 
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Zionist Jewish nationalism through their mere presence as indigenous people still inhabiting the 
landscape of Israel and Palestine. This presence implies their historic and continued claim to 
Palestine as a homeland (even as the most concrete claims, bolstered by proofs of former or 
present ownership, are frequently ignored and denied by the state).  In this light, given that 
Zionism was and continues to be a program of Jewish settlement in Palestine, a definite colonial 
sense of this uncanniness emerges, as explained by Bergland: 
The sense of unsettledness in the word unheimlich is important, because it evokes the 
colonialist paradigm that opposes civilization to the dark and mysterious world of the 
irrational and savage. Quite literally, the uncanny is the unsettled, the not-yet-colonized, 
the unsuccessfully colonized, or the decolonized.47 
 
In the case of Palestine and Israel, the indigenous populations are unsettling from the perspective 
of Jewish nationalism in part because of their seemingly unstable relationships to a particular and 
idealized concept of national home; Bedouins, for example, continue to present a threat as a 
people somewhat defined by their flexible and borderless sense of home. The Israeli Foreign 
Ministry website, for example, characterizes the Bedouin population as an Israeli “minority 
community”: “formerly nomadic shepherds, the Bedouin are currently in transition from a tribal 
social framework to a permanently settled society and are gradually entering Israel's labor force.” 
This description conceals the ongoing destruction of Bedouin encampments and demolitions of 
homes, especially in the Negev where Bedouin communities continue to be forcibly “relocated” 
since they live near the largest Israeli settlement Maale Adumim48.  A longer article from 1999, 
which still appears on the Israeli Foreign Ministry website, explains that “the Bedouin to some 
extent fail to distinguish between objective difficulties and those connected with their changing 
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sub-culture and thus feel an exaggerated sense of deprivation.”  The state's self-serving 
description of Bedouin as irrational and “formerly nomadic” emphasizes the state's discourse of 
modernity and democracy for all while blaming the Bedouin for their own “sense of 
deprivation.” At the same time, these descriptions suggest the state is threatened by the existence 
of a community that refuses to adhere to state-sanctioned forms of settlement and national life; 
the article goes on to describe Bedouin “land offenses,” including “illegal building,” and 
“grazing in protected areas.”49 
The ever-increasing Arab minority in Israel also serves to continually complicate and 
challenge the state’s concept of itself and what a Jewish democracy entails, and this of course is 
what is meant by Israeli discourse of an Arab “demographic threat.” These fantasies cast 
Palestinians and the visible evidence of present and past Palestinian livelihood in the ruins of 
demolished villages in national parks, for example,50 as ghostly and impossible absent-presences 
co-habitating in a relatively small geographical region. In this way, the notion of the strictly 
Jewish-Israeli homeland, although it repeatedly posits itself in exaggerated security terms, 
produces a continually disavowed figure of insecurity its core, haunting every new proclamation 
of belonging with figures of unbelonging. Even the potential of a competing non-Jewish 
indigenous national attachment to the land poses a structuring contradiction of the Zionist claim 
to a Jewish natural and holy right to Palestine while at the same time imposing and articulating 
the ‘holy’ and the ‘natural’ through the relatively recent European Enlightenment concept of the 
nation and through British colonial rule. Given that Israel was meant to settle and provide safety 
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for Holocaust survivors and for at-risk Jewish populations everywhere, and before that to provide 
a Jewish homeland to liberate Jewish communities from repression in Europe and elsewhere, it is 
perhaps no surprise that the national concept of homeland would appear as idealized and strict as 
it does in dominant Israeli national discourse.   
While every new Jewish settlement demands Israeli recognition as a part of the ever-
expanding Jewish national home, the continued destruction of Palestinian homes shows 
something of the endurance of Palestinian nationalism beyond such settled or idealized concepts 
of ‘home.’ 51 This is not to say that Palestinian nationalism refrains from an idealization of 
Palestine as national homeland, indeed there are many examples where it does. The concept of 
Palestine as homeland is a central and driving concern of Palestinian cultural production and 
resistance. Furthermore, the centrality of the right of return for Palestinian refugees in the 
Palestinian national struggle, particularly in widely popular Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
movement,52 underscores the importance of Palestine/Israel as home and as a national home for 
Palestinians. Still, Palestinian society is largely dispersed, dispossessed, besieged, and possesses 
little to no recognized and/or respected sovereign land rights. In this context, where does 
Palestinian resistance reside, how can resistance be inhabited, and, following a question from 
Palestinian films, what can cinema do? 
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5.3 INHABITING RESISTANCE: WHAT CAN CINEMA DO? 
 
Joseph Massad, discussing the importance of “cultural resistance,” argues, “Palestinian cinema, 
along with other Palestinian cultural expressions more generally, has been integral to Palestinian 
resistance.”53  Yet many Palestinian films suggest there is no simple relation between cinema and 
political resistance. As explained in Chapter 1, the question “why the cinema?” appears both 
explicitly and implicitly throughout a constellation of Palestinian cinema and visual media that 
refer to the material and medium specific conditions of their production. An initial way to 
understand why the question ‘why the cinema?' is so prevalent seems related to the early 
adoption of cinema as a propaganda tool by Zionists to establish the legitimacy of Jewish 
nationalism in Palestine. But Palestinian cinema cannot be simply seen in terms of a response to 
Zionist and Israeli cinema, and indeed it has its own unique history in relation to Palestinian 
political struggles against Israeli military and cultural forces. I will explore this question through 
Palestinian films that take up questions of inhabitance, ruined houses, and resistance.  
In the opening scene of The Shooter (2007), by Ihab Jadallah, a film that implicitly takes 
up the question of the relation between militancy and cinematic practice, a protagonist speaks 
directly to the camera about the hypocrisy of the American Western film hero John Wayne who 
was a hero “even when he was a bad guy.” “I was never a hero,” the Palestinian John Wayne 
tells us as he takes out his own gun from his holster and looks at it.  “Plastic!” he yells, referring 
to the gun, “Fuck this production! Fuck all the films in this country!” A Palestinian film that 
begins by saying “fuck this film” is indicative of a sentiment that connects much of Palestinian 
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cinema and perhaps derives from the earlier notions of revolutionary cinema, which was made in 
a context not only of a lost war (of 1967) but which also resulted in a notoriously lost film 
archive.  Much of the remainder of The Shooter takes place in a nearly destroyed warehouse or 
home structure, the walls crumbling from explosions and gunshot.  The protagonist seems caught 
in the crossfires of an unknown conflict, while a journalist attempts to provide live reports of the 
action unfolding, offering a variety of approaches to the task.  A description for The Shooter for 
the 2009 Chicago Palestine Film Festival reads:  
Detached from many of the daily horrors of the occupation, Ramallah filmmaker Ihab 
Jadallah finds himself compelled—by producers, collaborating artists and viewers—to 
present himself and his work in accordance with a “meta-script” that features violence, 
with good-guy and bad-guy narratives. This film is at once a parody of and a rejection of 
these constraints. 
 
In fact, The Shooter takes this theme of narrative constraint as its primary theme, suggesting how 
Palestinians are caught up in certain scripts of violence and caricature, and that since these 
scripts are perpetuated through news media and cinema, a film such as The Shooter has no 
simple option for response or resistance.  The Shooter suggests in this way that cinema takes 
your guns away (or only gives you plastic ones), and yet the film itself posits cinema as a form of 
critique that can self-reflexively disrupt “shooting.” 
One might expect more explicitly militaristic references to shooting in an early 
Palestinian Liberation Organization film, particularly one that features and celebrates guerilla 
fighters, yet even in Palestinian filmmaker Mustafa Abu Ali’s 1969 film They Do Not Exist, the 
film emphasizes the conditions of its political possibility. As the title underscores, self-
reflexively, the film is not just an ironic response that speaks the opposite (“they do exist”), 
rather, it is a repetition that emphasizes citationality. The film does not make the mistake, 
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according to Foucault, that the discourse that would insist, “they do exist” is excluded; rather it 
acknowledges the “tactical polyvalence of discourse.”54 Foucault writes   
we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and 
excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a 
multiplicity of discursive elements that come into play in various strategies.55  
 
Repeating the Zionist discourse of “they do not exist” calls attention to a strategy of a nationalist 
discourse by calling its bluff—how can the nonexistent speak in the same terms as the dominant 
discourse that would supposedly exclude them?  Citation, in other words, highlights what 
Foucault calls “the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument 
and an effect of power, but also a hindrance.”56 Massad describes the Palestinian militant cinema 
of the 1970s, of which Abu Ali was a major player, as “characterized by their purpose of inciting 
politics and critiquing it simultaneously.”57  
Most scholars of Palestinian cinema argue that these early films fit into a rubric of a 
Third Worldist revolutionary film aesthetic, sharing much of its rhetoric and even some of its 
major artists who worked alongside the Palestinian filmmakers. But even Abu Ali’s film is 
ultimately more interested in a broad critique of colonialist violence and ethnic cleansing than a 
clear articulation of Palestinian existence and a specific Palestinian nationalist politics (in 
revolutionary film style the film uses bold text to link Native American, Jewish and Vietnamese 
genocides to the Palestinian catastrophe). The close-up of the fida’e with his head lowered in the 
end of the film (the last few minutes are marked as missing), is intercut with a battle scene and 
fighters illuminated only by gunshots, and suggests the threat of a Palestinian resistance caught 
                                                
54 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100. 
55 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100. 
56 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 101. 
57 Massad, “The Weapon of Culture,” 35. 
   216 
between visibility and invisibility that is perhaps more threatening for its refusal to participate in 
dominant modes of representation.   
Hamid Dabashi suggests that in general Palestinian cinema is in some ways necessarily a 
militant cinema, a cinema with guns, insofar as its “defining moment” is the Nakba, whereby 
“what ultimately defines what we may call a Palestinian cinema is the mutation of that repressed 
anger into an aestheticized violence—the aesthetic presence of a political absence.”58 For 
Dabashi, aestheticized violence marks the “mimetic crisis” and paradox of Palestinian cinema 
and it’s “traumatic realism.”59 Dabashi relates the militant to the filmmaker literally when 
discussing Suleiman:  
a manner of storytelling when all else has failed. Elia Suleiman does with his camera 
what the Palestinian fighters do with their mutilated bodies. They both find ways of 
telling their stories—one with exploded bodies, the other with disjointed staccatos of 
narrative stutters that magically mutate into coherent statements, with pitiless precision. 
As suicidal violence means denying the colonial state the very last (bodily) site of 
violence by a violence that out-explodes the institutionalized violence of the state, as 
Weber theorized it, disjointed narrative amounts to the discursive dismantling of that 
state, and of the violence that brought about and sustains it.60 
 
Guy Hennebelle, a somewhat forgotten (or, rather, rarely cited at length) scholar of Arab 
and Palestinian cinema was onto a similar approach to thinking Palestinian cinema in relation to 
the militant cinema of the late 1960s and 1970s, but with more of the sense that it was unclear 
what effect cinema would and could have in the Palestinian context. In the late 70s, Hennebelle 
and Janine Euvrard edited a special issue of CinemAction on the question “Israel-Palestine: What 
Can Cinema Do?” Omar al-Qattan has also questioned the role of cinema in struggle:  
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One of the things that I have learnt over the last fourteen years making films as a 
Palestinian is how organically linked are the subjective and the objective, metaphor and 
militancy, the aesthetic and the political indeed the struggle for Palestine and the 
strategies deployed for making films on and in it.61 
 
Abu Ali’s film, like a whole body of Palestinian cinema, highlights the many obstacles to 
producing meaning, specifically those obstacles particular to a Palestinian history of 
dispossession, and locates resistance in the terms of the obstacle. Said describes this mode of 
meaning making when he writes that Palestinian creativity “expresses itself in crossings-over, in 
clearing hurdles, activities that do not lessen the alienation, discontinuity, and dispossession, but 
that dramatize and clarify them instead.”62  
By relating the self-conscious critique that reference citation and constraining contexts 
for “shooting” to Butler and Foucault’s conceptual frames for understand power, subjectivity and 
recognition, I am suggesting that Palestinian political filmmaking have always maintained an 
aspect of a kind of political stance that Mona Lloyd describes regarding the possibility of a 
resistant politics in Butler’s work: 
Subversion must be a political project of erosion, one that works on norms from the 
inside, breaking them down not through external challenge but through an internal 
repetition that weakens them.  A subversive politics thus becomes a subtle politics, one 
that requires patient, repeated, local action…. The politics of subversion remains a 
politics of the incalculable, a non-programmatic and ungrounded politics of possibility, 
but the incalculable should not be conflated with the indescribable or the unthinkable.63  
 
The references to “erosion” and an “ungrounded politics” suggest the correlation to Palestinian 
modes of belonging that proceed without a secure foundation, proper objects, or recognizable 
claims to the ground on which, or to which, they might speak. While “unrecognizable” within 
dominant frames of understanding national belonging, particularly those instituted by the Israeli 
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state and implied through neo-liberal capitalism, Palestinian modes of belonging still maintain an 
aspect of possibility, even if only through their persistence. Films preoccupied with the theme of 
partial and damaged homes and house-like structures suggest how different modes of belonging 
are established through different moments of Palestinian history, from various and intersecting 
Palestinian subject positions (older and younger men and women, diasporic second generation, 
etc.), and through seemingly unlivable and uninhabitable positions. 
In Alia Arasoughly’s 2006 short Clothesline, for example, a woman is concealed in her 
home under curfew as Israeli tanks invade the streets of Ramallah.  Incorporating documentary 
footage of the siege of Ramallah during the Second Intifada, the film constructs the sense of a 
sharp distinction between the exterior military zone outside, represented through documentary 
footage of tanks and the sound of their fire, and artificially lit interiors of the woman’s home, the 
primary location of the film’s personal drama.  The clothesline separates the two realities, 
providing a domestic screen through which the woman seems to view the smoke and destruction 
outside. The interior shots unfold a quiet anxiety as the woman boils water, gathers her purse and 
papers, and resorts to sleeping on the floor. The everyday banality of boiling water and moving 
about the house turns eerie and claustrophobic as the woman camps out, like a squatter, in what 
seems to be her own home. A voice-over suggests a more intimate conflict, as if she speaks to a 
lover—“why did you make me wait?”  This seemingly personal narrative dissolves into one 
more obviously related to the siege; indicating that house searches have begun, she asks, “when 
will they get to mine? What will they find?”  The sound track serves as a bridge between the 
interior and exterior image tracks, making the violence implied by the psychological siege and 
confinement to the home more legible. The personal space is rendered even more unhomely 
through reference to the potential and immanent intrusion of soldiers in the woman’s house. 
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Indeed the anxiety, boredom and fear of military-imposed curfew has already altered the way she 
lives in her home—close shots emphasize the constraint of her predicament. Yet, although the 
woman’s home seems claustrophobic, uncomfortable, and likely not to provide safety or refuge, 
the woman’s determination to remain there, regardless, seems ultimately the point of the film.  
The theme of uninhabitability in Clothesline, and the sense of resilience in the face of 
siege and immobility that it implies, is echoed in the film’s mode of production and distribution, 
which imply how cinema can foster alternative forms of belonging.  Arasoughly is the director of 
the NGO Shashat, a women's filmmaking organization based in the West Bank, which funds and 
supports Palestinian women's filmmaking and programs an annual festival.  The 2011 Shashat 
film festival, which had 85 screenings in the West Bank and Gaza, many adapted to the 
particular location (universities, etc.) and to the fragmentation of Palestinian society under 
occupation, contested the popular notion that there is no Palestinian audience for Palestinian 
cinema.  Shashat films also, according to the organization's mission, represent a challenge to 
patriarchal Palestinian society from within. In other words, Shashat films both make space for an 
audience that is not supposed to exist, but at the same time challenges the parameters of what 
kind of society can be fostered and envisioned through that spectatorial space. Shashat films 
challenge masculinist assumptions about what a national cinema might address, and at the same 
time they lay claim to particularly Palestinian stories and cinematic practices.   
Clothesline, furthermore, suggests the need for alternative cinematic and visual strategies 
that avoid the pitfalls of reproducing the conditions of illegitimacy that conventional modes of 
expository documentary and the logic of exposure offer Palestinians. Relating the house to a 
camera producing views and classifying landscapes, Colomina explains that, especially with 
series of windows, “the house is no more than a series of views choreographed by the visitor, the 
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way a filmmaker effects the montage of a film.”64 In Clothesline the viewer is aware that the 
“choreographed” views are the documentary footage while the frame narrative is likely re-
created, furthering a sense that the filmmaker is acknowledging the claustrophobic impatience 
ushered in by a context where it is not enough to document the atrocity.  The perspective from 
inside the house is framed precisely as an internal, subjective, and psychically violated one, 
rather than an objective and contextualized documentary. The line between the subjective inside 
and the objective outside are blurred through this visual framing, as well as through a narrative 
that emphasizes the projection of the siege into the internal space of the home and the woman’s 
psyche.  That the footage of the tanks in the streets of Ramallah has a different visual quality 
than the interior house scenes emphasizes, though, that this blurring is taking place, that it is both 
a strategy of the filmmaker as well as a technique of the Israeli occupation, which uses the logic 
of objectivity and documentary evidence toward its own ends. 
Saverio Costanzo’s 2004 Italian-produced feature Private similarly focuses on the theme 
of a Palestinian home under siege, and with its European co-production and Italian-Palestinian 
director, it faced controversy over its status as a Palestinian film.65 In Private, a Palestinian 
family endures an Israeli military occupation of their two-story home.  Since they refuse to leave 
their home, the soldiers force the family of five to sleep in the living room, where they have to 
retire after curfew hour and are not allowed to leave until morning.  As many have remarked, the 
house becomes a metaphor for the larger occupation, its closed zones and daily humiliations.  
The family's father insists they remain in their home from the beginning of the domestic siege, 
even while he encounters resistance from his family, particularly his oldest daughter who would 
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prefer to fight back or simply leave.  After more than one incredibly tense scene where the 
daughter spies on the soldiers from inside a cabinet, she comes to understand and adopt her 
father's approach to resistance and resilience.  In the end of the film a new shift of soldiers comes 
to the house to complete the same supposed security measures and monitoring of the previous 
shift, but the family remains.  Although the family home has been transformed into the military 
fort, the father emphasizes above all that they refuse to leave, regardless of how un-homelike 
their house has become. 
Much of the Palestinian landscape in Palestinian art is depicted as shrinking, undergoing 
transformations beyond recognition, and for many a Palestinian homeland is a dream or fantasy 
limited to memory, to poetry, art, oral narration, and embodiment.66 While no subject position is 
ever stable, the remarkable contingency of contemporary Palestinian identity is perhaps 
particularly unique in the way that it becomes recognized primarily through suspect and/or 
partial conditions—i.e., from the stereotypical perspective Palestinians are primarily terrorists or 
stateless refugees—rather than through the appearance of coherence and essence. Even the most 
well known Palestinian public figures, such as the late Edward Said, are accused of not “really” 
being Palestinian—a charge too easy to elaborate on. Palestinian national subject status is more 
often denied than granted to individuals through various kinds of ID absences: permits, passports 
and other documents and rights that would seem to prove official national embodiment.   
Alternative visions of home in Palestinian cultural production, marked by modes of 
persistence that occur under damaged conditions and without fixed meaning, can serve as a 
model, then, for precarious orientations to the notion of national home. Further, these alternative 
modes of aligning with ‘home’ suggest possibility of forming alliances and building coalitions 
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on terms other than according to strict notions of home, belonging, and identity. In other words, 
adopting what I would characterize as a survival strategy, Palestinian society has had to adapt to 
ever decreasingly idealized or normative concepts of home in order to maintain a persistent 
critique of the destruction of their society and their unwillingness to give up their native historic 
homeland and/or their attachment to “Palestine,” whatever “Palestine” might indicate to diverse 
and dispersed Palestinians. The structuring paradox of Palestinian cinema as a national cinema 
without a nation, further emphasizes that Palestinian expressions are always produced through 
compromised, partial or damaged conditions. Palestinian cinema, like other Palestinian 
photography and moving imagery, tends to posits versions of Palestinian nationalism that are 
constituted through an unstable and ungraspable home, embracing a defiant nationalism that 
persists with or without any claim on normative national structure, without a definite place, 
without distinct Palestinian citizenship, and without an acknowledged history. I want to suggest, 
though, that this persistence of Palestinian modes of sociality posited even through conditions of 
un-belonging represent more than a resilient expression of nationalism against all odds, or 
complement to, a revolutionary struggle, or even simply an artistic instantiation of resistance. 
Following a sentiment described by Said, I see this approach in Palestinian cinema as a kind of 
persistence of living through supposedly unlivable conditions, “in any case, we keep going.”67 
This approach exposes the Palestinian position in the world, rather than denying it, which works 
to turn that position into a question, to explore the nuances of it, and to use it against those who 
presume it as a space of non-existence, defeat, or victimhood.    
NGO and European-funded films like Private and Clothesline might be presumed to 
some extent cater to neo-liberal aims of normalization, rights and recognition, and excluding 
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other forms of resistance in cinema. Such recognized funders do provide a certain sense of 
legitimation to Palestinian films, even though such films are still often subject to controversy if 
they are seen as criticizing Israeli policies, military occupation, and society, so it is worth 
comparing such films to a Palestinian cinema posited in primarily British and North American 
media in terms of resistance. In 2009, the news broke that Hamas had written and produced a 
film, Imad Aqel, which was shot in a set built on the site of the former Jewish settlement Ganei 
Tal in the Gaza Strip. Various news sites picked up the story, either to sensationalize on the idea 
of the “terrorist” Hamas producing a feature film, or to suggest that Hamas’ was expanding 
resistance to include cultural resistance marked by the increasing use of mass media (including a 
satellite TV channel, a radio station, and newspapers) and the arts. According to the various 
reports, the film focuses on Hamas’ founding in the 1980s, while the title refers to a Palestinian 
killed by Israeli soldiers for allegedly killing thirteen soldiers and settlers.68 Hamas’ “Cinema of 
Resistance” suggests that the older model of PLO guerilla film units has not been completely 
surpassed by transnational funding models and increased NGO-ization of Palestinian cultural 
production and strategies toward improving the human rights and social justice situation for 
Palestinian society.  The Cinema of Resistance suggests a more militant housing of resistance 
and cinema, particularly since Imad Aqel was shot inside a former Jewish settlement. 
Additionally, a Cinema of Resistance would presumably have very different mode of address 
than a U.S., European, Arab state, and independent co-funded Palestinian cinema—Imad Aqel 
does not currently have a wide internet or regional distribution, and my discussion of it here is 
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based on (primarily sensationalist) secondary news reports.  And yet, although the co-funded 
Palestinian cinema may primarily rely on significantly less militant institutional housings for its 
existence, such films still tend to offer critiques of home, belonging, and resistance that imply a 
political mode of cinematic practice. 
In Annemarie Jacir’s 2008 feature Salt of This Sea, themes of mobility and belonging are 
immediately associated with the bodily invasion of Soraya (Suheir Hammad), the Palestinian-
American protagonist, as she makes her way through Ben Gurion Airport security and the extra 
scrutiny focused on travelers with Palestinian heritage.  Soraya is visiting Palestine for the first 
time, but after she is unable to retrieve her grandfather’s money from the bank where it was held 
prior to 1948, she begins an adventure, joined by two West Bank men who have been refused 
visas to study abroad, in hopes of remaining in the country indefinitely.  Soraya’s desire to settle 
in Palestine is thwarted at every turn by the Israeli military occupation, by the historical legacy 
of 1948, and by her own resistance to traveling within Israeli imposed restrictions.  In Jaffa, the 
group finds the former home of her grandfather, where a young leftist Israeli woman now lives.  
The woman, who uses anti-occupation mugs for her coffee, welcomes them inside, but Soraya 
insists they drop the polite behavior, demanding that the girl acknowledge that the house belongs 
to Soraya—“recognize it!” she yells after smashing a vase.  Soraya and Emad, leaving behind 
Marwan with the Jewish-Israeli girl, move from their short stay at her family’s historic and now 
disposed home in Jaffa to a crumbling structure in the destroyed village Dawayima where 
Emad’s family lived prior to 1948. Disguising themselves as Israeli settlers, the couple purchases 
a few home furnishings, including a “home sweet home” sign written in English, to make the 
space more livable, acting as if they will stay there indefinitely. Soraya wakes up and pretends 
they are Jewish campers when a history teacher (played ironically by the late Juliano Mer 
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Khamis) happens upon them while leading his students on a tour of the land, ignoring the 
Palestinian Arab history of the place and discussing only its Jewish and Biblical history.  They 
leave Dawayima and are eventually stopped by police.  Soraya is deported and Emad’s future is 
unclear, but he would likely be jailed for traveling in Israel without a permit or citizenship.  The 
film emphasizes the deep connection to settling and making a home in Palestine, even in homes 
that are occupied and ruined.   
Salt of This Sea suggests the necessity of constrained alliances amongst Palestinians, 
whether living and desiring to live in Occupied Palestine or abroad, and implies a subtle critique 
of the place of cinema in such precarious solidarities. Marwan, a filmmaker, remains in Jaffa in 
Soraya’s family’s home, seemingly having hit it off with the Jewish Israeli girl living there.  His 
breaking off from the group is not so much characterized as a betrayal as much as it suggests that 
there is no single position for Palestinians living under occupation. Though Emad criticizes 
Soraya for her seeming naiveté and idealism as an urban Palestinian-American hoping to connect 
with the Palestinian countryside, he stays with her as they move from the occupied house in Jaffa 
to his family’s destroyed former village. Their journey models a kind of alliance between 
diasporic and non-diasporic Palestinians, suggesting how their solidarity need not arise from a 
settled position or place.  They find “home sweet home” in a ruined house, imagining a future 
family in a de-populated village on what has been appropriated as Israeli state park lands.   
5.4 QUEER PALESTINIAN ALLIANCE 
The seeming impossibility of firmly aligning oneself with Palestine for identificatory purposes, 
because of its continued political denial, makes it a kind of explicitly damaged orientation.  In 
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other words, Palestinianness, or an orientation ‘for’ (i.e. being “pro-Palestinian) or ‘toward’ (i.e. 
a “homing desire” fixed on Palestine) Palestine, describes a kind of alignment that cannot seem 
to ever really stick as much as more recognized identity categories (whether national, ethnic, 
religious, etc.), even if those are as equally contingent, intersectional, and performative—that is, 
they only appear coherent, stable, and prolonged because they are repeated and citational. This 
in part explains why Judith Butler emphasizes the compulsory and regulatory aspects of the 
performativity of gender, rather than something like the sense of free choice suggested by the 
notion of performance. National intelligibility, in what I have described as its processural and 
performative aspect, serves as a reminder of which meanings of queer constitute a more critical 
and intersectional analysis that can account for contradiction. The more recent turn in queer and 
trans studies toward migrant studies, surveillance, racialization, critiques of neo-liberalism, queer 
liberalism, homonationalism, and so on, underscores that the queer critique need not only point 
to possible horizons or potentials, since the production of new possibilities seems to always also 
produce new forms of abjection, impossibility, inadmissibility, unexpressability, and 
unintelligibility in their wake. My emphasis on processes of national intelligibility in part 
emphasizes, then, what’s queer about the queer critique of this project, but also how supposedly 
unlivable or non-normative positions have some purchase on the livable and the normative, and 
given the on-going processes of performativity, undergo constant renegotiation. 
The notion of unrecognizability also bears on the questions of resistance and agency, and 
alliance and solidarity by extension. While Hegel posited that it is only through experience of 
recognition that we become constituted as socially viable, Butler argues that this doesn’t account 
for how “the terms by which we are recognized as human are socially articulated and 
changeable. And sometimes the very terms that confer ‘humanness’ on some individuals are 
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those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility of achieving that status, producing a 
differential between the human and the less-than-human.”69  Thomas Keenan, in addition to 
Butler, has taken up this question in relation contemporary human rights discourse, particularly 
in the context of the War on Terror, in which certain “terrorist” figures, in seemingly 
contradictory fashion, employ the same discourses of human rights.  He reads a 2005 
communiqué from the military wing of Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah in Iraq, a Sunni jihadist group 
fighting against coalition forces and their Iraqi allies, which asks, in an address to the US and 
coalition forces, “where are human rights?” in response to the detention and killing of Muslims.  
For Keenan, a broader field of perception, regulated in part by dominant understandings of the 
human and human rights, marks some kinds of communication and speakers unrecognizable or 
illegible victims, meaning that 
the burden on those who would be heard is not simply to speak, communicate, and 
exchange but, first of all, to be understood as speaking.  The event marks an entrance into 
a political space, which by definition excludes them.  Moaning, lowing, crying—
expressing one’s private suffering—makes no claims on others, remains outside 
discourse, the political sphere, humanity.  For something to become a matter of justice, of 
politics, of sharing and division, one must transform the boundaries and definition of the 
political or public space, change the definition of who speaks and what counts as 
speaking within it.70  
 
Butler further explains this constrained and precarious sense of political possibility, here through 
reference to Fanon’s taking up of similar concerns: If Fanon writes that ‘a black is not a man,’ 
who writes when Fanon writes? That we can ask the ‘who’ means that the human has exceeded 
its categorical definition, and that he is in and through the utterance opening up the category to a 
different future.”71 More to the point, Butler states, “those deemed illegible, unrecognizable, or 
                                                
69 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 2. 
70 Thomas Keenan, “‘Where are Human Rights…?’: Reading a Communiqué from Iraq,” PMLA 
121.5 (2006): 1603. Emphasis added. 
71 Butler, Undoing Gender, 13. 
   228 
impossible nevertheless speak in the terms of the ‘human,’ opening the term to a history not fully 
constrained by the existing differentials of power.”72 For both Butler and Keenan, the broader 
epistemological configuration that determines who and what counts as human is not undermined 
through the utterances of the supposedly unspeakable, and yet the constant renegotiation of terms 
such as “the human” means that transformation is possible. 
Yet, in accounting for sites, subject and acts that might count as resistant, certain 
normative values can get re-iterated through supposedly progressive politics. For example, Sara 
Ahmed succinctly describes the terms through which freedom is frequently construed, whereby  
the positing of an ideal of being free from scripts that define what counts as a legitimate 
life seems to presume a negative model of freedom; defined here as freedom from norms. 
Such a negative model of freedom idealises movement and detachment, constructing a 
mobile form of subjectivity that could escape from the norms that constrain what it is that 
bodies can do.73  
 
Ahmed expands on this sense of freedom as one that privileges movement and mobility. 
This critique of the terms of freedom and resistance is similar to Saba Mahmood’s question 
regarding whether “the category of resistance imposes a teleology of progressive politics on the 
analytics of power—a teleology that makes it hard for us to see and understand forms of being 
and action that are not necessarily encapsulated by the narrative of subversion and re-inscription 
of norms.”74  Lisa Marie Cacho, in her essay on mourning her brother, looks to Cathy Cohen and 
Robin D.G. Kelley to suggest a different model, a “politics of deviance” through which “we 
would read nonnormative activities and attitudes as forms of ‘definitional power’ that have the 
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potential to help us rethink how value is defined, parceled out, and withheld.”75 For Cacho, “the 
act of ascribing legible, intelligible and normative value is inherently violent and relationally 
devaluing,” and so we ought to be cautious that politics of possibility are careful not to re-
inscribe the same terms of value often implied by resistance and freedom, particularly in context 
increasingly influenced by neo-liberalism.76 As the editors of Strange Affinities: The Gender and 
Sexual Politics of Comparative Racialization Grace Kyungwon Hong and Roderick A. Ferguson 
argue, it is in women of color feminism and queer of critique such as this that “we find an 
analytic for understanding how the creation of categories of value and valuelessness underpins 
contemporary racialized necropolitical regulation.”77 
In light of these insights into notions of resistance, freedom, political possibility and 
value, I argue that an attention to constrained modes of Palestinian sociality cannot simply be 
explained as subversive. Said explains a Palestinian mode of living as a sense of partiality, where 
meanings attach to events and objects in seemingly accidentally ways, which perhaps better 
explains the relation between the politics of possibility: 
For where no straight line leads from home to birthplace to school to maturity, all events 
are accidents, all progress is a digression, all residence is exile. We linger in nondescript 
places, neither here nor there; we peer through windows without glass, ride conveyances 
without movement or power.78 
 
Said’s point is as much about spatiality as it is about temporality, since he speaks both of 
“nondescript places, neither here nor there” as well as of a kind of suspended time; “digression,” 
                                                
75 Lisa Marie Cacho, “Racialized Hauntings of the Devalued Dead,” in Strange Affinities: The 
Gender and Sexual Politics of Comparative Racialization, eds. Grace Kyungwon Hong and 
Roderick A. Ferguson, eds. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 48. 
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“we linger,” and the image of a conveyance without power.  Here Said describes a mode of being 
in the world that marks exilic or diasporic experience, but which also shares a kind of damaged 
(insofar as it fails in normative terms) life itinerary with notions of queer temporality. As 
Jack/Judith Halberstam points out: 
all kinds of people, especially in postmodernity, will and do opt to live outside of 
reproductive and familiar time as well as on the edges of logics of labor and 
production...here we could consider ravers, club kids, HIV-positive barebackers, rent 
boys, sex workers, homeless people, drug dealers, and the unemployed.79 
 
Palestinian existence, in its general contours as mapped by Said, similarly cannot follow 
normative, and by extension hetero-normative time; a linear and progressive narrative that marks 
a “normal” life as following a “straight line...from home to birthplace to school to maturity” and 
which marks those who fail as immature, backward, and inconsequential. For Said, Palestinian 
communal identity is similarly already fostered through unstable routes that indicate the 
insurmountable instability of Palestinian identity: 
How rich our mutability, how easily we change (and are changed) from one thing to 
another, how unstable our place—and all because of the missing foundation of our 
existence, the lost ground of our origin, the broken link with our land and our past. There 
are no Palestinians. Who are the Palestinians? 'The inhabitants of Judea and Samaria.' 
Non-Jews. Terrorists.  Troublemakers. DPs. el pueblo palestino, il popolo palsetino, le 
peuple palestinien—but treated as interruptions, intermittent presences.80 
 
With the sense that queer diasporic temporalities and spatialities are non-aligned, damaged, and 
follow non-normative itineraries toward unhome-like ends, a more processural and contingent 
notion of alliance emerges, including a sense that alliance is a particular kind of orientation 
associated with some “homing desires” that posit desire as a direction rather than a fixed identity, 
which, again, seems unattainable for Palestinians.  Since queer and diasporic positions generate 
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their own kinds of sociality and possibility, this suggests they persist regardless of unstable 
foundations and unfixed meaning.   
This in turn suggests a compelling model for solidarity, similar to Ahmed’s definition of 
solidarity: 
Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same struggles, or that our pain is 
the same pain, or that our hope is for the same future. Solidarity involves commitment, 
and work, as well as the recognition that even if we do not have the same feelings, or the 
same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on common ground.189 
 
For Ahmed, the “ground” of solidarity is not identity, but the physical grounding of bodies on the 
grounds of the planet. If all coalitions are in some sense temporary and contingent, and only gain 
a sense of stability through repetition, it seems possible that some coalitions can form without 
requiring the kind of identification and mutual benefit that seems to define the notion. In light of 
this, queer alliance suggests a kind of alliance that, through sustained critique of identity, need 
not be mutually beneficial, and may be at times about risking the self for the other. A queer 
alliance does not compel proper positioning or straight lines, but attention to constant change, to 
the re-ordering of priorities and positions (perhaps what Ahmed means by commitment and 
work), to letting what one is aligned with change and remain somewhat uncontrollable, unfixed, 
and unknowable; in a word, different. For Judith Butler, Palestine is today a kind of queer 
question, which she links to a discussion of solidarity and coalitional politics: “I think that queer 
people should have solidarity with those populations whose lives are not considered livable. 
That’s a kind of alliance that I would understand as a queer alliance. So that explains why I 
would – as someone who elaborated a queer theory – be very concerned with the situation in 
Palestine where violence is waged against Palestinians, and where the loss of those lives is not 
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regarded as equally valuable, as equally lost.”81  Haneen Maikey, Director of alQaws for Gender 
and Sexual Diversity in Palestinian Society, and Lynn Darwich similarly suggest that queerness 
can be a framework for broad social justice in their discussion of queer Arab activism, arguing 
that “one of the powerful characteristics of PQBDS [Palestinian Queers for Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions] is in its ability to link the struggle for sexual and gender diversity with the 
Palestinian struggle for freedom and justice.” For Maikey and Darwich, queer Palestinian 
activism prioritizes issues and concerns that not only affect a self-identified LGBTQI community 
and that cannot wait until after the hopeful end of occupation. In this way, queer Palestinian 
activism seeks to transform the terms of Palestinian struggles for ending occupation and 
injustice.  
The terms and form of Palestinian resistance are necessarily quite different than the terms 
of Jewish-Israeli national belonging. Jewish homemaking in Israel compels a process of 
orientation toward certain strict and stable notions of what kind of home constitutes national 
belonging, where the ideal is a regulatory norm carrying the threat of deportation, loss of 
citizenship, loss of national identity, and worse.  Jewish-Israeli identity itself mandates certain 
strict alignments, and makes others seem unthinkable or undesirable. “To align” suggests placing 
things in proper positions and straight lines, while “alliance” typically invokes the ideal of 
mutual benefit and a certain affinity of interests between parties.  In the US, a discourse of “we 
are all Israelis now” became especially prominent after 9/11, emphasizing identification with 
Israel that has been the norm in the US—in mainstream media and in foreign policy—since the 
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late 1920s. The notion that there is mutual benefit for a US-Israeli affinity is widely accepted.  In 
this context, what kinds of coalitions can one form with or for Palestine?   
I have characterized the Palestinian cinematic theme of resiliently taking up residence in 
seemingly unlivable spaces as a kind of anti-foundational persistence, which, like queer 
strategies of identity critique, marks a Palestinian cinematic strategy. I have explored this 
through the rather literal example of anti-foundational forms of belonging and community forged 
in spite of, or rather through, houses in various conditions of destruction, occupation, and 
apparent unlivability. Creative reconfigurations of home and belonging are, I argue, ways that 
Palestinian society has been able to persist in a struggle for recognition and rights from positions 
that are seemingly impossible, unlivable, or inexpressible. These reconstitutions of home 
“dramatize and clarify” the modes of violence that positions of national intelligibility always 
pass through, rather than conceal them through reference to seemingly positive terms like 
inclusion and tolerance. In their resistance, refusal and/or failure to adhere to dominant schemas 
of national representation and recognition with normative national homemaking scripts, much of 
Palestinian cinema poses Palestine as a kind of queer question. Furthermore, queer critique offers 
a way to think differently about the various strategies within Palestinian cinema that reject 
conventions of representation and assumptions about visibility, appearance and recognition. The 
inability to easily claim space, metaphorically and literally, as Palestinian has allowed for more 
transformative critical politics to emerge at increasingly mainstream levels, as evidenced by the 
Boycott National Committee’s non-attachment to a particular state solution or political party and 
it’s popularity within Palestinian society as the most important strategy to end the occupation, 
stop discrimination within Israeli society, and allow for a more just Right of Return that would 
apply to Palestinians and not just Jews. Adaptive and critical modes of Palestinian belonging 
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found in Palestinian media, art, and activism are challenging the continued Israeli destruction of 
Palestinian homes and the possibility for livable lives, combatting Israeli pinkwashing and its 
positing of Palestine as uninhabitable for queerness, but also putting increasing pressure on 
Palestinian society to produce a more just collective possibility for transformation. Palestinian 
queer activism in particular suggests the potential to resituate queerness in relation to the spatial 
logics of occupation, to complicate ideas about queer versus un-queer spaces and what kinds of 
mobility or immobility queerness compels. New queer cinema and media projects are also taking 
on the topic of sexual and gender diversity in Palestinian society, using strategies that attempt to 
circumvent commonplace discourses around visibility, coming out, and public/private divides, 
implying new routes for belonging, sociality, and the continued inhabitance of Palestine.
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
 
The visual and discursive terrain that constituted “Palestine” at the turn of the century largely 
positioned it as a site primed for “immense transformations.” Literary, popular, and medico-
scientific discourses helped create the conditions for Zionism to posit itself as a Western and 
civilizing project on par with, and at times in cooperation with, the British Mandate 
administration, and with the discourse of an exceptional historical and religious claim to the land. 
The static image of Palestine in travel literature, illustrations, and maps, which constructed 
Palestine as a place out of sync with civilization—a desolate, desert non-place—seemed set in 
motion through the will of Zionism and with the help of new cinematic technologies, as 
suggested by Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman:  
The State of Israel initiated immense transformations in the geography of the country: 
seas were dried up, roads were laid, a network of infrastructure was spread out, ports 
were excavated, forests were planted, deserts were made to bloom, towns and cities were 
founded.  In Israel every view of the landscape is merely a single frame taken from one 
continuous documentary film.  Every photograph is only a coincidental image in an 
endless saga.  In the same way, every built object is perceived according to its 
circumstances; always as a single co-ordinate on the long path of construction or ruin.1 
 
While the metaphor invoked by Segal and Weizman of a shift from photography to the moving 
image is useful for explaining Zionism’s transformation of Palestine, as a metaphor cinema’s 
role is somewhat under-emphasized.  This dissertation has argued for a better understanding of 
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the various ways cinematic technology has been enlisted in shaping the terms of belonging in 
Historic and Occupied Palestine, and how cinema itself has been a “co-ordinate on the long path 
of construction or ruin.” 
Given the common sense and contradictory tendency to think about images as both 
universal and indecipherable (since non-textual), it is worth emphasizing that images, including 
photographs and films, cannot speak for themselves outside of the historical contexts that not 
only shape the means and intentions of their production, but that continue to shape and reshape 
how they are seen and understood.  In On Photography, Susan Sontag offers an explanation for 
such critical historical occasions when photographic evidence of an important, and often tragic, 
event was not absent, but where “there was, ideologically, no space” for it to be seen: 
Though an event has come to mean, precisely, something worth photographing, it is still 
ideology (in the broadest sense) that determines what constitutes an event.  There can be 
no evidence, photographic or otherwise, of an event until the event itself has been named 
and characterized.  And it is never photographic evidence which can construct—more 
properly, identify—events; the contribution of photography always follows the naming of 
the event. What determines the possibility of being morally affected by photographs is the 
existence of a relevant political consciousness.  Without a politics, photographs of the 
slaughter-bench of history will most likely be experienced as, simply, unreal or as a 
demoralizing emotional blow.2 
 
I have argued that Palestinian dispossession and claims to national belonging were rendered 
unrecognizable sometime before the presentation of what would otherwise be damning proof of a 
former vibrant place for Arab Palestinian life in Historic Palestine, which was largely destroyed 
after the creation of the state of Israel. Consequently, even those seemingly irrefutable 
photographic and filmic images only primarily reiterate a still lingering and reiterated illegibility. 
In part, then, this research was driven by a desire to understand how rigorous archival work like 
that of Palestinians historians and scholars Walid Khalidi (author of All That Remains: The 
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Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, and Before Their Diaspora: A 
Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948), Rashid Khalidi (author of Palestinian 
Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness), and Edward Said, the oral 
history and extensive documentation of destroyed Palestinian towns on 
Palestineremembered.com (a project inspired in part by Walid Khalidi’s All That Remains), and 
many more, seem to have little effect on the recurring question—where is the visual proof of that 
place, of those people, which you claim exist? Rather than attempt to recover further visual 
proofs or unmask false images, I have aimed, with a particular focus on the role of cinema as and 
intersectional discourses of race, gender, sexuality and belonging (national and otherwise), to 
historicize and analyze particular processes that have worked to maintain an epistemological 
configuration marked by Palestinian unrecognizability.  
At the same time, I do not mean to ignore the possibilities of cinema and cinematic 
practice in promoting and inciting transformation. As Thomas Keenan argues, given the 
“interplay of preservation and destruction” involved with imaging, particularly in reference to 
conflict or human rights abuses, there is “no destruction without images, yes, but also no 
response to the destruction, no critique and no intervention.”3 While Chapter 4 largely critiqued 
the use of visual technologies to document human rights abuses, the logic of arming victims of 
occupation, siege, and other types of oppression with cameras to document abuse and “become 
the media” recording their history is not necessarily flawed. Julia Bacha, director of the 2009 
Israeli/Palestinian/American produced documentary Budrus (on civilian protests against the 
building of the Israeli Separation Barrier inside the West Bank village Budrus) argued in a “Ted” 
talk that cinema has the potential to create cognitive dissonance for broad audiences not used to 
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thinking of Palestinians outside a frame of misunderstanding, due largely to a widespread lack of 
attention to what she refers to as a Palestinian “peaceful resistance movement.”4  
The types of documentation Bacha describes can be powerful, and documentary video 
activism, including solidarity video work, has in some cases succeeded to bring wider attention 
to the harsh realities of Israeli occupation and its broad system of Apartheid-style segregation, 
ethnic cleansing, and injustice. Yet, in this dissertation I have wanted to make room to consider 
where a more skeptical tradition in Palestinian cinematic practice fits. In Chapter 1, I refer to this 
tradition in terms of the repetition of the question “why the cinema?” across Palestinian 
cinematic practice, which I took as a prompt to question my own methodological approach 
within transnational film studies. This tradition in Palestinian cinema of a more questioning 
approach is expanded on in Chapter 4’s discussion of Palestinian belonging through the figure of 
the house, and in relation to contemporary modes of queer and trans critical thought. Palestinian 
cinema and queer critique were brought together in this project to complicate 
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visibility/invisibility dichotomies, particularly as they get mapped onto conceptualizations of 
power, identity, and resistance.  
Without the “relevant political consciousness” of which Sontag speaks, it makes little 
sense to respond to false images with accurate images, since there is a larger epistemological 
framework at work that to some extent pre-figures how they will be recognized, valued, and 
understood. I have attempted to chart some of the usual routes of such a framework in its 
development and reiteration in relation to Historic and Occupied Palestine, and through a 
particular focus on cinema. Revealing the extra-Zionist routes of early Jewish Agency “Palestine 
films,” for example, Chapter 2 aimed to detach them from reigning progress narratives in Israeli 
transnational film studies, instead exploring their implication in a broader visual culture that 
promoted exclusive Jewish national belonging in Historic Palestine. I explored how the Sabra 
figure, the visual representation of the New Muscle Jew in Palestine, re-oriented racial, sexual 
and gender tropes associated with Jewry as part of the Zionist claim to belonging in Historic 
Palestine. At the same time, exploring examples from the early Zionist reinvention of Jewish 
masculinity in Chapter 2 to contemporary debates around Brand Israel’s use of gay rights in 
Chapters 3 and 4, I also engage race and sexuality as dimensions of Zionist, Israeli and 
Palestinian visual culture in ways that counter Israeli state discourses of Jewish national progress 
and Palestinian intolerance. Given this dissertation’s concerns for how certain modes of 
belonging in Palestine become recognizable and legitimate while others are continually marked 
as illegitimate or unthinkable, it was important to emphasize how Jewish national belonging was 
constituted through new ideas about sexuality as an identity type in legal-administrative, medico-
scientific, and cultural discourses. Cinema and sexual identity, in other words, were explored in 
this project as techniques of a wider epistemological configuration developed and developing at 
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the same time as the transformation of Palestine and the creation of Jewish belonging through 
Zionism. Chapter 1 also described my approach to queer theory in the dissertation, drawing from 
recent work in queer migrant studies, trans studies, and queer of color critique. I further 
complicated Israeli cinema’s supposed progress from a propagandistic past to a multicultural 
democratic present by tracing the last decade of Israeli state investment in nationalist gay Israeli 
cinema in Chapter 3, and by analyzing alternative modes of belonging and queerness in 
Palestinian cinema in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 3 focused on cinema’s enlistment in somewhat more concrete sites where cinema 
was enlisted toward settlement and occupation through the aerial mapping and re-imagination of 
the Palestinian landscape for settlement planning, in the fortification of those settlements, and in 
the visuality of the Separation Barrier. I hoped to show how the Zionist transformation of the 
Palestinian landscape was assisted by cinematic technologies, by regimes of visuality drawn 
from the landscape tradition, and by militaristic and architectonic purposes and investments for 
cinema such as the use of proto-cinematic technologies in the construction of settlements and 
settlement networks.  I explored these concrete transformations in close relation to how norms of 
belonging were shaped through these reconfigurations of visuality and recognition. Furthermore, 
I argued that contemporary debates around Brand Israel pinkwashing, homonationalism and 
queer Palestinian activism suggest alternative ways to think about social transformation through 
diverse approach to visuality and recognition, to thinking about the relationship between images 
and power, and to modes sociality and belonging to the side of nationalism. 
The wider epistemological framework through which I argue cinema and sexuality ought 
to be understood emphasizes the kind of contradiction I think is inherent at the horizons of 
thought, where much queer and critical theory sets its sights. On the horizon in the landscape 
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view, Tom Gunning writes, “instead of the point where things vanish, the far distance becomes 
the point of entrance into visibility.”5 According to Sara Ahmed, the farness of The Orient for 
The Occident “takes the direction of wish,” whereby the Occident’s orientation toward this other 
marks a “desire to possess, and to occupy, [which] constitutes others not only as objects of 
desire, but also as resources for world making.”6 Ahmed writes that such an orientation toward 
the other marks the other as “available to us within our field of vision.”7 However, Ahmed 
suggests that it is not vision alone that confirms the availability of the other on the horizon as a 
site of occupation and world making, since “what is reachable is determined precisely by 
orientations that have already been taken and that have been repeated over time.”8  And, as a 
counterpoint to the sense of positive futurity that the horizon might imply, Ahmed reminds us 
that the wish involved in the Occident’s desire for the Orient “points to the future, or even to a 
future occupation,” suggesting that the entrance into visibility that Gunning discusses must be 
understood with the context of ongoing colonial and neo-colonial occupations.9 Following 
Ahmed, I want to suggest that we might not want to look to the horizon to find resources for 
transformative thought and action, but rather to better understand the contours of who and what 
are coming into view, or becoming recognizable and available, and under what terms.  
In conclusion, by mapping new contexts for understanding the role of cinema in shaping 
the idea and place of Palestine, I aimed to better prepare myself to witness new Palestinian 
cinematic practices, modes of belonging, and visualizing discourses that intervene in the broad 
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context of the unrecognizability of Palestinian dispossession, especially from a dominant North 
American perspective. I also hoped to be attendant to the ways in which cinema continues to be 
enlisted in state and military power, as well as in more everyday forms of micro-power that 
continue to unsettle the grounds for action and thought.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 “Barren Wilderness,” Built in Day (1938), produced by the Keren Hayesod (United Israel 
Appeal). Screenshot taken by the author from the online holding in the virtual catalogue of the Steven 
Spielberg Jewish Film Archive. 
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Figure 2 Network of settlements map, from Built in a Day (1938), produced by the Keren Hayesod 
(United Israel Appeal). Screenshot taken by the author from the online holding in the virtual catalogue of the 
Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive. 
 
 
Figure 3 Surveillance images (binoculars, watchtower), from Behind the Blockade (1947), produced 
by the Jewish National Fund. Screenshot taken by the author from the online holding in the virtual catalogue 
of the Steven Spielberg Jewish Film Archive. 
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